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FOREWORD
This book summarizes the proceedings of a January 1980
workshop on "Procedural and Organizational Measures for Accident
Management: Nuclear Reactors," sponsored by and convened at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria. This workshop was part of an ongoing research program
on risk management within IIASA's Management and Technology Area.
While the work addresses general problems in risk management, it
is our firm belief that the results are more apt to be useful if
they are developed in the context of concrete, real-world case
studies.
Consequently, our work began with a study of the management
of technological disasters that focused on the responses to two
blowouts on oil platforms in the North Sea (see David W. Fischer,
editor, Two Blowouts in the North Sea: Managing Technological
Disaster, Pergamon Press, 1981--another volume in this IIASA
Proceedings Series). After examining problems in preparedness
for and management of nuclear reactor accidents--the topic of
this book--the program is now moving on to study the use of risk
assessments in siting liquefied energy gas facilities.
As the title of the workshop indicates, the emphasis in this
volume is on procedural and organizational issues in accident man-
agement. This focus was chosen because previous work on the North
Sea oil blowouts and analyses of the accident at Three Mile Island
indicated that, while the technical aspects of accident preven-
tion had received much attention, nontechnical organizational
aspects of the accident-response systems can be equally important.
Yet these latter aspects have been the topic of much less study.
It is our hope that this volume will take a modest step toward
correcting this situation.
Alec Lee
Chairman
Management and Technology Area
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I. INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
John W. Lathrop
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis*
BACKGROUND
The deployment of large-scale hazardous facilities, such
as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas terminals, generates
serious problems for emergency planning and preparedness. Fore-
most is the need to plan and prepare for accidents of high con-
sequence but low probability. Because of the outstanding safety
record of commercial nuclear power, nuclear accident management
experience has been assembled slowly. Accident management plan-
ners must rely instead on drills and procedures that lack authen-
tic testing. The difficulty is compounded by the inability to
anticipate all the ways a complex system can founder and by the
development of obstructive " mindsets" that are not validated by
actual accident experience (see The President's Commission 1979).
The Reactor Safety Study (USNRC 1975) broke new ground in
assessing the technical aspects of nuclear safety. with its
various critiques (e.g., Kamins 1975, Lewis et al. 1978) the
Reactor Safety Study represents the core literature in the field.
But although these documents identify human error as an important
component of overall risk, the organizational and procedural as-
pects of accident preparedness and management have not been given
full attention. To redress this gap in nuclear risk research,
the Management and Technology Area of the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) convened a workshop in January
1980 to focus specifically on organizational and procedural as-
pects of nuclear reactor safety.
After the workshop had been scheduled, its aims were indi-
rectly endorsed by the two major commission reports on the acci-
dent at Three Mile Island in the USA. The President's Commission
on the Accident at Three Mile Island (1979) concluded that
*As of October 1981, Senior Scientist, Woodward-Clyde Consultants,
San Francisco, California, USA.
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4To prevent nuclear accidents as serious as Three Mile
Island, fundamental changes will be necessary in the
organizations, procedures, and practices--and above
all--in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and, to the extent that the institutions we
investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group (1980)
put similar emphasis on organizational problems:
The one theme that runs through the conclusions we
have reached is that the principal deficiencies in
commercial reactor safety today are not hardware
problems, they are management problems.
Participants from 17 countries attended the IIASA workshop,
representing operators, regulators, emergency management agencies,
and local, regional, and national governments. While it would
have been natural for the workshop to center its attention on
TMI, this tendency was resisted by the organizers, for this would
have involved the classic dangers of "planning for the last war."
Instead, the workshop organizers encouraged the presentation and
comparison of each country's current accident management plans
and procedures.
No discussion of nuclear accident management plans should
proceed very far without an acknowledgment of existing research
on the topic. One of the best examples of such work is a docu-
ment issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency, "Planning
for Off-Site Response to Radiation Accidents in Nuclear Facili-
ties" (1979). In fact, four participants at the IIASA workshop
were involved in the writing of that document. The IIASA work-
shop was not intended to supercede this work, but rather to
supplement it with international experiences in the field. The
papers delivered at the workshop and the accompanying discussions
covered an extremely broad range of topics, going far beyond the
various details of each country's plans. The topics included
problems of maintaining preparedness for rare events, learning
from past accidents, the role of the public in accident manage-
ment, considerations of public attitudes, the desirability of
candor in the planning process, and problems of liability.
Overriding the national differences in emergency plans was
the fact that the USA had had a recent accident, while the other
countries were fortunate enough to have only plans and exercises
to talk about. While the representatives from the US were frank
about their emergency plans--where they functioned and where
they failed--the representatives from other countries could only
discuss theoretically how their plans would work. It was diffi-
cult, then, to compare the US plans with the others. The US
plans could be viewed with the benefit of post-accident hindsight,
while the performance of other countries' plans could only be
estimated. This difficulty highlights one of the central prob-
lems of planning for rare events: plans and preparedness must
be maintained without authentic testing.
5The Problem of Uncertainty
A comparison of the descriptions of the TMI accident with
the descriptions of accident management plans contained in this
volume illustrates the most general problem of planning for rare
events. One discovers that not only were the technical aspects
of the TMI accident unforeseen, but the very character of the
accident was unanticipated by the accident management plans.
The accident developed very slowly and was poorly understood--at
any given moment in the first three days there was a great deal
of uncertainty or misunderstanding as to the current and future
status of the plant.
While it is dangerous to react too specifically to TMI (since
the next accident will surely differ), the fact remains that a
slow, confusing accident could recur and should be accounted for
in accident management plans. Yet a review of the accident man-
agement plans shows that in many cases an implicit assumption is
made that an accident will be marked by a well-understood initi-
ating event, and that the potential dose to members of the public,
or a relatively low bound on that dose over the next few hours,
will be known. Several plans described in this volume discuss
the appropriate ranges of dose within which particular popula-
tion protection countermeasures should be taken. Yet how would
such a dose range assist a decision maker faced with a hydrogen
bubble that mayor may not explode, as happened at TMI? Of
course, later calculations showed that the bubble could not have
exploded, but that is not relevant here. What matters is that
during the accident a decision maker at TMI only knew that the
bubble might explode and might lead to a release. Given that
uncertainty he was not aided in his accident management decisions
by a countermeasure guideline based on a dose range.
The narrow conclusion to be drawn from this example is that
accident management plans should be designed to assist the people
who must cope with a very uncertain plant status. But the exam-
ple also has a much broader message: planning for rare events
can be seriously hampered by basing plans on past events or hypo-
thetical events, which in retrospect tend to be well understood.
An accident situation may in fact be very poorly understood by
the participants as it unfolds. That was certainly the case at
TMI.
DEFINITIONS
The remainder of this introduction summarizes the elements
and problems of nuclear accident preparedness and management,
and then briefly describes the contents of the book. Naturally
and appropriately, those aspects of the problems of accident
management that fit into the focus of the workshop will be
emphasized here, i.e., procedural and organizational measures.
PRE: 14 _ B
6Definition of a Nuclear Accident
A nuclear accident is defined in this volume as an occur-
rence at a nuclear reactor associated for some period of time
with a significant probability of an immediate or future release
of nuclear material. 'Significant probability' here means a
probability high enough to require consideration of off-site
countermeasures. The most important feature of accidents as
they are defined here is that they are extremely rare. Most of
the time design features and operator vigilance combine to pre-
vent off-normal events from evolving into an accident. It is
crucial to make a distinction between prevention and management
here, for the workshop did not address preventive measures or
instrumentation and operator procedures designed to deal with
an off-normal event before it becomes an accident. Rather, this
volume concentrates on how to proceed when accident prevention
mechanisms fail.
The Elements of Nuclear Accident Management
While the basic elements of nuclear accident management are
quite straightforward, they can generate difficult decision-
making tasks. A central decision in nuclear accident management
as discussed here concerns which population protection counter-
measures to execute, if any. Three types of countermeasures are
of interest:
shelter (i.e., advising the population to stay indoors);
prophylactic medicine (administering potassium iodide or other
medicines designed to prevent radioiodine take-up by the thy-
roid);
evacuation (advising the population to leave the area) .
Each of these countermeasures can specify a target population
(for instance pregnant women) and the area of application (sec-
tor, radius). On a longer time scale other countermeasures may
be taken, such as control of possibly contaminated food products,
but these steps typically do not involve decision making under
time pressure and uncertainty--the main focus of this volume.
The basic elements of nuclear accident management may be
briefly listed as follows:
(1) Identification of accident and initiation of technical
contpol measupes. A nuclear accident does not always start in
a clearly recognizable way. The realization that an accident
is taking place may involve detection of a set of plant parameter
values that must be subtly discerned within the noise of normal
or off-normal but non-accident fluctuations. A more extensive
discussion of this phenomenon is given in a study by Bull et al.
(1980) of nuclear accident management.
(2) Assessment of accident sevepity. It may be difficult
to assess accident severity when a reactor is behaving in an
unanticipated way. It involves determining what is happening
7and is going to happen in terms of radioactive releases to the
atmosphere. When a full understanding of the system cannot be
attained, the likelihood of a release or of various magnitudes
of releases must be roughly estimated.
(3) Communication to government authorities. The assess-
ment of accident severity must be communicated to authorities
clearly enough to permit sound accident management decision
making. This step transfers the focus of accident management
from on-site to off-site actors, and adds the element of politi-
cal choice to the previously technical decision making process.
(4) Deciding which countermeasures to execute and where.
This step calls for weighing the costs and risks of various
countermeasures (including taking no countermeasures) .
(5) Execution of countermeasures. While this step may seem
central to accident management, it is not highly problematic
from a decision-making point of view, and so receives little
attention in this volume.
After control of an impaired reactor is fUlly regained, three
more accident management steps should be taken. They belong to
the gray area between accident management and preparedness for
the next accident.
(6) Resumption of normalcy. This step includes reversing
evacuations, settling liability claims, and long-term cleanup.
(7) Analysis of the accident for lessons to be learned.
In the case of TMI, extensive post-accident analysis has been
carried out. In fact, the IIASA workshop reported on in these
Proceedings may be considered part of that process.
(8) Incorporating lessons learned into accident management
plans. This feedback process does involve some hazards. For
instance, accident management plans may be altered too specif-
ically in response to the detailed characteristics of a past
accident, so that overall preparedness for the range of possible
future accidents is impaired. As well, a past accident may in
hindsight be analyzed only as a well-understood event; thus plans
may not be modified to deal with a future accident, which in fact
could be poorly understood by participants as it progresses.
Central Problems of Nuclear Accident Management
Although any accident situation presents a possibility of
radiation exposure to the population, uncertain plant status,
meteorological conditions, and other factors typically make it
impossible for anyone in the midst of an accident to know or
predict with any certainty the size of the population dose.
The decision to take countermeasures is further complicated by
the risks associated with them. These can include loss of life
in the case of an evacuation, and rare negative side effects in
the case of administration of potassium iodide. There are also
8political and financial costs associated with executing counter-
measures. Even the dissemination of information concerning an
accident and the consideration of countermeasures c~n have nega-
tive effects on the population. The Kemeny Commission concluded
that mental distress was the most serious health effect of TMI
(The President's Commission 1979). Thus accident management
decision makers must balance the risks of uncertain radiation
exposure in the absence of countermeasures with the uncertain
costs and risks of implementing countermeasures that will reduce,
but not eliminate the risk of exposure. The Kemeny Commission
suggests that accident managers should consider, in addition,
the effects of indecision on the public.
The balancing of costs and risks between implementing and
not implementing a countermeasure is complicated by the inability
of a single person to have a full appreciation of all the costs
and risks. People with technical backgrounds and familiarity
with the impaired reactor are needed to assess plant status and
estimate the likelihood of a radiological release. People with
legitimate governmental authority are needed to make the diffi-
cult trade-offs between the costs and benefits of various coun-
termeasures, to order their execution, and accept responsibility
for the consequences. Yet technical personnel typically do not
have legal authority, and government officials cannot be expected
to possess technical expertise and familiarity with the plant.
In short, the competence necessary to make responsible accident
management decisions rests with two groups of people.
Clearly, good communications between these two groups is
essential. Even when an accident is well understood such com-
munication is difficult between groups of people with different
perspectives. When an accident is poorly understood, as was the
case during the first days at TMI, it becomes even more challeng-
ing to convey the state of knowledge about the situation to gov-
ernment authorities in such a way as to permit sound accident
management decisions. An accident management system must be
designed to aid these communications and decision-making tasks
as much as possible.
Preparedness
In this context the concept of nuclear accident preparedness
has three main elements:
development and maintenance of accident management plans,
including emergency procedures and the organizational frame-
work within which the plan is to be executed;
maintenance of staff and equipment in place; and
maintenance of the readiness of that staff and equipment.
At first glance, maintaining preparedness seems more straight-
forward than accident management. However, two basic charac-
teristics of nuclear accidents make preparedness just as challeng-
ing as accident management: they are very rare and they are
potentially extremely costly in terms of lives and property.
9These properties lead to four central problems in maintaining
preparedness:
(1) Most preparedness and management activities concentrate
on preparedness. The rarity of nuclear accidents means that the
people and organizations involved in accident management spend
year after year maintaining preparedness, never experiencing an
accident. This contrasts with the activities of general emer-
gency management agencies, which may deal with several flood
and transport accident evacuations each year. Of course, such
general emergency agencies may be part of the nuclear accident
management system, but only part. In most respects this system
is not authentically exercised. As Oran Henderson (Director of
the general emergency management agency that was involved in
the TMI accident) points out in Chapter 5, there are important
differences between normal evacuations and evacuations associated
with nuclear accidents.
(2) The difficulty of nuclear accident management decisions
suggest that they should be pre-analyzed as much as possible in
the planning process. Since accident management involves deci-
sion making under extreme uncertainty, with knowledge and author-
ity divided between technicians and government officials, each
key person involved in an accident may be burdened with an ex-
tremely difficult information-processing and/or decision-making
load. Considering the large costs associated with inappropriate
decisions, it is worthwhile to invest heavily in plans that an-
ticipate and resolve as many communications and decision prob-
lems as possible, and thus decrease the burden of decision making
in the midst of a stressful accident.
(3) The extreme rarity of nuclear accidents means that any
single action that consumes resources to increase preparedness
is almost certain to fail to reap direct benefits. This may
have a negative effect on the motivation of people involved in
nuclear accident preparedness and may be expressed in behavior
ranging from organizations' budgetary decisions to individuals'
job planning decisions. Thus any effort to maintain prepared-
ness must involve special rewards and incentives to ensure that
individual decisions are made in the best interests of society.
(4) It is difficult to effectively test a nuclear accident
management system. Given the lack of actual accident experience,
drills and exercises must be used to assess preparedness. Of
course, during a real accident the possibility of catastrophic
consequences puts very high stress on decision makers--stress
that may greatly affect individual performance. It is extremely
difficult to generate such stress in a drill or exercise. It
is also difficult for an exercise to simulate the degree of un-
certainty and confusion that may accompany a real nuclear acci-
dent.
OUTLINE OF CONTENTS
The second chapter in this Proceedings, "An Open Discussion
of Problems in Accident Preparedness and Management," presents
10
the main points raised in the discussion sessions of the work-
shop. In the spontaneity of the discussions, workshop partici-
pants openly addressed the unresolved problems of accident
management. The remainder of the volume is devoted to the
participants' formal presentations. These have been grouped
into four sections.
The Accident at Three Mile Island: Three Perspectives.
In Section II three key people who had been involved in TMI de-
scribe the accident from their own viewpoints: Herman Dieckamp,
President of General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU) (the
parent company of the utility that operates TMI); Robert Vollmer,
Director of the Three Mile Island Support Staff at the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC); and Gran Henderson, then Director
of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). Each
describes the organizational framework within which his agency
operated, and identifies needs, problems, and lessons learned
from the TMI experience.
Emergency Planning and Preparedness: International Perspec-
tives. In Section III representatives from six countries describe
the nuclear accident management organizations in their horne coun-
tries. The two US contributors both represent the NRC: Martin
describes the interface between accident prevention and manage-
ment, the division of responsibility between the operator and
regulator, and lessons learned at TMI regarding organizational
response; Collins explains accident assessment systems and com-
pares bases for emergency planning (for instance, various zone
concepts) .
Matthews and Pepper of the Central Electricity Generating
Board in the UK present a comprehensive description of UK emer-
gency plans, organization, zones, and exercises. Clarke and
Webb of the National Radiological Protection Board in the UK
present the principles of UK dose criteria for countermeasures
and the criteria themselves. Representing the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG), Bernhardt (Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Neckar
GmbH) describes the on-site organization necessary to interface
with off-site agencies, and principles of organization and au-
thority. Von Gadow (FRG Ministry of the Interior) explains the
division of responsibility among accident management agencies,
dose criteria for countermeasures, and lessons learned in the
FRG from TMI and domestic exercises. Kaspar (Ministry of Labor,
Health, and Social Welfare) concentrates on an elaborate emer-
gency management exercise performed in the FRG.
The paper by Baas and Bosnjakovic (Netherlands Ministry of
Health and Environmental Protection) presents the Dutch off-site
accident management organization, the accident classifications
and dose reference levels used in his country, as well as the
Dutch review of the TMI accident. The paper by Beskrestnov and
Kozlov of the USSR Ministry of Energy covers information manage-
ment, accident classifications, and dose criteria for counter-
measures. Finally, the paper by Teste du Bailler, of Electricite
de France, briefly presents the French philosophy of nuclear acci-
dent management.
1 1
Broader Issues. Section IV addresses broader historical,
legal, and behavioral aspects of nuclear power. Here Harold
Green (George Washington University National Law Center) briefly
reviews the history of the nuclear industry and public attitudes
in the US, discusses the effects of TMI on the credibility of
the US nuclear industry, and closes with a discussion of the
importance of candor and its role in accident preparedness and
public acceptance of nuclear power. The paper by Harry otway and
Rolf Misenta (Joint Research Center, Ispra) discusses the job
demands of a nuclear reactor operator, the underlying variables
that determine his performance, solutions to the problem of main-
taining operator vigilance, and possible future roles of the
operator. Gary Hamilton (Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public
Affairs) then describes the liability, compensation, and cost as-
pects of nuclear accident management in the USA.
Technical Considerations. In the final section of the book,
representatives of five countries discuss technical aspects of
nuclear accident management. The paper by Ibragimov (USSR Ministry
of Energy) presents three different taxonomies of nuclear power
plant equipment and operations, then considers various bases for
safety and reliability requirements. Kumamoto et al. (Kyoto Univer-
sity) describe a data storage and retrieval system designed to help
operators, emergency planners, risk assessors, and plant designers
to learn from previous accidents. Deme et al. (Hungarian Central
Research Institute) describe an off-site quick dosimetry system
and its possible use in decision making about countermeasures.
Danzmann (Gesellschaft fUr Reaktorsicherheit, K81n) describes
a risk assessment of reactor accidents, taking accident manage-
ment countermeasures into account in the calculations of doses
received. Finally, Brinckmann (Central Institute for Nuclear
Research, German Democratic Republic) discusses the possibilities
of using noise analysis for early accident management.
CONCLUSION
This overview has introduced the central concepts, defini-
tions, and problems of nuclear accident preparedness and manage-
ment, as well as a brief preview of the papers. It is intended
to orient the reader to the scope of the workshop upon which
this volume is based. The following chapter contains a synthesis
of the themes that arose in the workshop discussions. The re-
mainder of the book is devoted to the papers presented by the
workshop participants.
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2AN OPEN DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS IN NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT PREPAREDNESS
John W. Lathrop
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis*
This chapter is structured around major themes that emerged
from workshop discussions. It is in no way meant to replace or
summarize the 21 papers presented in the following chapters of
this volume; in fact, none of the themes presented here is fUlly
addressed in anyone paper. Rather, this chapter puts the main
points of the discussions and findings derived from the discus-
sions into readable'form and, hopefully, will entice the reader
to look further into the volume for more detailed treatments of
nuclear accident preparedness and management issues.
As may be expected, discussions at the workshop, often in-
volving issues as broad as the acceptability of nuclear power,
gave rise to markedly different points of view. As a result,
it is extremely difficult to appear to be "fair" in representing
the workshop discussions. The participants represented such
diverse points of view that some of them will take exception to
any point presented here. Many participants were part of the
nuclear industry, emergency management agencies, or regulatory
bodies, and so quite naturally felt that nuclear accident pre-
paredness and management is currently being effectively performed.
In contrast, this chapter emphasizes problems of nuclear accident
preparedness and management. This should not imply that the
problems are dominant or unsolvable. The problem orientation
adopted here is simply meant to reflect the tone of the discus-
sions and to serve as a constructive contrast to the often pos-
itive tone of the papers.
In the course of the discussions, given topics were often
addressed several times. Thus, my task as editor was to organize
comments on discussion topics (where appropriate, quotes or para-
phrases) into a cohesive sequence. Although I tried to remain
as neutral as possible, I could not make the synthesis without
some interpretation. For this reason, it must be stressed that
the points presented here are my responsibility rather than that
of the workshop participants.
*As of October 1981, Senior Scientist, Woodward-Clyde Consultants,
San Francisco, California, USA.
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Theme 1: There is no room for complacency in nuclear accident
preparedness and management.
On the last day of the workshop, John Horan of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reminded the participants
that they were not addressing an academic, hypothetical problem:
I would like to spend a minute or two on the topic of
complacency. A number of times during the workshop,
comments have been qualified by the phrase, "if there
is another nuclear accident." I feel that our approach
has to be to use the phrase "when the next accident
occurs." I have identified six major accidents in the
past 27 years of our industry. Only two involved com-
mercial nuclear power plants: Browns Ferry and, of
course, Three Mile Island. One can detect something
of a periodicity in the occurrence of accidents--about
one every five years. But I don't think that our past
history is that much of a light to guide us; today we
have many more power plants coming on stream and much
higher power levels. In addition, many of our plants
are now aging. As Mr. Pepper noted, the employees
operating the plants are also aging. For these rea-
sons there is no room for complacency.
Perhaps those least apt to be complacent are the political
authorities who may be forced to make difficult nuclear acci-
dent management decisions. As discussed in the introductory
chapter, a basic problem in accident management is the frequent
need for authorities to make decisions on population protection
countermeasures on the basis of incomplete technical accident
assessments. This decision problem can be partially characterized
in analytic terms, but the human dimension must not be under-
estimated. The question of decision making under uncertainty
came alive in comments made by workshop participants who knew
they could find themselves in this situation at some time in the
future. One participant commented that he could not imagine
making such decisions--it seemed to him like a situation out of
Alduous Huxley's Brave New World. In this context Godfried van
den Heuvel, Mayor of Borsele, Netherlands (a town situated near
the country's largest nuclear plant) spelled out what it might
be like for him if there were an accident in the nearby nuclear
plant:
When something happens in the plant in Borsele, we
have an excellent emergency plan to alarm and to help
the people living in the surrounding area. In the
event of an accident the operator informs his director
and then the director warns me; he explains--as far as
he knows--what happened in the plant and describes for
me the size of the accident. If the accident is large
an emergency committee will be called together, consist-
ing of local authorities, technical experts, and offi-
cials from the national government, with the provincial
governor as chairman. But in the period of time between
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the first message from the director of the nuclear power
plant and the convening of the committee--two or three
hours--I am responsible for managing the off-site re-
sponse to the accident.
The chance that immediate action would be necessary
during that period seems very small. But if action
has to be taken, then it would be very difficult for
me to decide what to do at such a moment. I under-
stand that evacuation involves a lot of risks for
people, especially when it covers a large area. But
as the figures discussed yesterday showed, failure to
evacuate also involves a big risk. My problem is that
I would have to look at different plans and alterna-
tives, and then make a decision without sufficient
guidance from specialists. My decision whether or not
to order an immediate evacuation would be based only
on a very small amount of information from the direc-
tor of the plant. That is a great responsibility.
You can only know after the event if your decision was
correct or not.
Theme 2:
2a:
Nuclear accident preparedness and management must ac-
count for the extreme uncertainty that may be encoun-
tered in the course of an accident.
Three Mile Island exposed a basically unanticipated
type of accident, one that developed slowly and in a
confusing manner.
As Herman Dieckamp (General Public utilities, Inc.) points
out in his paper, one of the most significant aspects of the
accident at TMI was the very slowly evolving stock of information
regarding the actual state of the plant. This led to long periods
of time when decision makers did not know whether radioactive
substances were about to be released and instead had only an un-
expressed probability distribution over possible events. This
kind of accident was not adequately anticipated by existing spe-
cific countermeasure guidelines. This finding is troublesome for
two reasons. First, nuclear accident management plans must be
revised to handle such cases more adequately, but it is not clear
how the revision should be implemented, or how its success can
be evaluated. Second, the TMI experience suggests that sometimes
the only way to expose a weakness in a safety system is to have
an acciden~. If it took TMI to uncover one dramatic, unantici-
pated accident, how many other such accidents are possible in
this technology, and are there ways to prepare for them? As
Dieckamp commented during a discussion:
In my mind the real reason that Three Mile Island
occurred was not so much tied to deficiencies in pro-
cedures, training, or instruments, but rather to the
fact that the system behaved in a way that was not
generally anticipated. The operators had certain pre-
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conceived opinions about system behavior during a loss-
of-coolant accident and about the kinds of diagnostic
signals such an accident would trigger. The system did
not behave as expected because of the peculiar position
of the loss-of-coolant point. As a result the opera-
tors failed to diagnose the condition and reacted inap-
propriately. In fact their training and procedures
probably inhibited them from doing the right thing.
This realization leads to several questions. First, is
our elaboration of system behavior complete enough to
be used as the foundation for procedures and training?
Second, since it may be unreasonable to expect that we
can fully define systems in advance, does it not follow
that we need operators with more than just procedural
training on site at all times--operators with the fun-
damental knowledge and insight to diagnose unantici-
pated conditions and to take the right action?
The accident spurred much discussion about the
importance of simulators and simulator training. Many
people think of simulators as control room mock-ups
or replicas with all the instruments and switches in
the right place. In my own mind the problem is not
so much one of hand-eye coordination--knowing what
switch to hit at which moment. Rather, the critical
factor is the operator's insight into system response:
as things begin to change, he should be able to im-
mediately deduce what is happening. What are required
are system simulations that can take into account most
of the possible combinations and permutations of events;
in effect the operators should be able to play with the
simulations over a period of time to develop an inherent
feel, an inherent understanding of system behavior.
In this context Robert Martin explained the unanticipated
nature of the TMI accident from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) perspective:
Until TMI we had presumed that existing design work
had given us a fairly good handle on the set of major
accidents that could occur at a plant. Our presump-
tion was that accidents progress rapidly, not over a
protracted period of time, and soon bring the plant to
some stable (albeit not favorable) state. Therefore
our accident response was geared much more toward deter-
mining the magnitude of the radiological problem, the
stable point the plant had reached, rather than dealing
on a real-time, hour-by-hour basis with an evolving
accident scenario. I don't think anybody's emergency
planning has really been based on the evolution of an
accident. Even within the utilities, corporate engi-
neering structures were not tied in to provide engi-
neering evaluation on a real-time basis. The existing
plans called for emergency staff, trained to rapidly
respond to a set of preplanned or anticipated condi-
tions, to establish a stable state in the reactor and
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then to evaluate the radiological consequences of the
accident. In my view, everything at TMI was geared
towards that kind of a response. There was no heavy
engineering involvement in the first several hours of
the accident, with the General Public Utilities cor-
porate engineering headquarters, with the licensee,
with Babcock & Wilcox, or with anyone else. Rather,
the small, on-site emergency team functioned as it was
designed to function, that is, it dealt with the acci-
dent as best it could with available resources. No-
body anticipated that there would be a protracted
period before any semblence of stability was estab-
lished.
2b: In a poopZy undppstood accident, such as the one at
TMI, the unanticipated natupe of the accident and the
unceptainty pepvading the fipst houps ape cPiticaZ
factops.
As Dieckamp noted, the unanticipated nature of the TMI acci-
dent had a pronounced effect on the attitudes of accident manage-
ment decision makers:
One of the things that certainly strikes me is that
this accident involved a sequence of events and net
impacts on the plant that none of us had ever consid-
ered credible or possible. When that happens, one's
degree of confidence and willingness to render a tough
judgment about what is or is not credible is suddenly
significantly changed. And one also becomes extremely
aware of the remaining uncertainties and contingencies
that may need to be dealt with. From my own point of
view, I felt very strongly that we should throw every
possible thought and every possible solution or anti-
cipation into the pot for consideration.
Dieckamp explained that the uncertainty pervading the TMI
accident situation did more than just compound the difficulty
of regaining control of the reactor and of determining appropriate
countermeasures:
The question of determining the severity of the acci-
dent was indeed difficult. I think it contributed to
the lack of understanding and the anxiety among the
general public. God forbid that such an accident
happen again, but if it should, I'd like to be able
to be better informed about what is going on and for
what reasons, so we can better communicate the situa-
tion to the public.
Perhaps the most important effect of the uncertainty was confusion
and continually changing information about plant status. This
situation led to several conflicting reports to the local govern-
ment and media. The conflicts in these reports contributed to a
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loss of the credibility of the utility, which in turn caused the
NRC to play a very different and much larger role than had ever
been anticipated. Thus the uncertainty led to a rearrangement
of the roles of the various agencies that was not part of acci-
dent management plans. Many people and agencies found themselves
in roles that they were not prepared to play.
2c: In particular, the uncertainty and unanticipated char-
acter of a poorly understood accident may markedly
increasp the importance and difficulty of communications.
In a poorly understood accident situation, summary descrip-
tors of the accident or plant status are not available. This
can lead to severe difficulties in communication, as several
reports on Three Mile Island attest. For example, the Rogovin
Report (1980) stated,
... [T]he inability of the utility's management to com-
prehend the severity of the accident and communicate
it to the NRC and the public was a serious failure of
the company's management .... Moreover, NRC and B&W
[Babcock & Wilcox] employees in the control room also
did not recognize or communicate critical information.
And their offsite organizations did no better, and
perhaps worse, than the utility's offsite engineers
at GPU in New Jersey in demanding reporting of impor-
tant information and in recognizing the significance
of the information that they did receive. The ... NRC
and B&W did no better than [Metropolitan Edison/General
Public utilities] in reporting critical information up
the management chain and acting upon it ....
During the workshop Herman Dieckamp addressed the same problem
in a more operational way; he described good communications as
a basic requirement for making the best use of available per-
sonnel:
The problem is to make the most effective use of one's
technical resources. This requires that one plan
ahead of time how to communicate the critical para-
meters and information in a preplanned and logical way
to people off-site. One must aim to quickly give
those people the best possible understanding of what
is happening, so that they can begin to go to work in
an effective, productive way.
During the early days of the accident, the effective-
ness of advisory and support people off-site was limit-
ed by the degree to which in-plant operations were
efficiently communicated to them. This hindered their
ability to determine the right questions and answers
to worry about.
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Later in the discussion, Dieckamp pointed out that due to
the unanticipated nature of the accident, failures in communica-
tion occurred even when adequate levels of information were
available.
We did not think ahead of time in terms of establish-
ing a correlation between plant operations and associ-
ated radiological releases. We were not able to give
the authorities advanced warning as effectively as we
should have, based upon known plant operations. We
should have been able to say, "We are about to open
this valve, we are about to make this gas transfer,
this liquid transfer, ... , we should expect a radiation
release for 30 minutes, but only a limited amount be-
cause the tank involved has finite quantity, etc."
2d: There is a need for emergency plans designed to handle
a slowly developing, confusing accident.
As discussed above, the lack of summary descriptors of plant
status in a poorly understood accident situation can lead to com-
munications problems. More generally, the lack of summary de-
scriptors can put a much higher information-processing load on
those involved in such an event than in the case of a well-
understood accident. It follows that emergency management plans
should be designed to help participants cope with and communicate
about very uncertain situations. Each person involved in acci-
dent management must have a clearly defined role within a well-
understood information-processing structure. To the degree
possible, difficult but anticipatable decisions should be pre-
decided in the planning phase. Dieckamp responded with the
following statement when asked about the confusion that surround-
ed TMI:
You are right when you say "confusion." There was a
lot of confusion. That experience suggests that one
should plan an organizational structure responsive to
the need for expertise and specialization. A method
is required for coordinating people with different
specialties, people who should be assigned ahead of
time. If such an organization is put into place early,
on the first or second day of the accident, instead of
on day four, five, or six, it can greatly alleviate the
problem of confusion.
At another point in the discussion, Robert Martin explained
the role plans should fill in managing the uncertainty of a nu-
clear accident. In his view, plans enable large numbers of
experts to predecide critical decisions for the small number
of people who must make those decisions in the stress of an
accident.
At some point during an emergency some information or
a given circumstance will require that I make a deci-
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sion. As an operations-oriented individual, an emer-
gency plan is to me a guide for making decisions. In
general for organizations involved in implementing
emergency plans, the plan is a vehicle for making deci-
sions. But the decisions are not the same thing as
the plans. A very small number of people make the
decisions. A large number of people contribute to
plans.
Drawing on his experience at TMI, Dieckamp identified a
particular central role for emergency plans in nuclear accident
management:
It would have been nice if we had been smart enough
at the time of the accident--or if we were smart
enough now--to know how to immediately meld the owner/
operator group and the NRC into one working team. A
faster coalescence of both the operator and the regu-
lator is needed to bring to bear the experience of both
groups and to generate one list of questions and a com-
mon set of priorities.
2e: In particular, emergency plans must be designed to aid
accident managers in making decisions on the basis of
the information that is actually apt to be available
in the course of an accident, i.e., very incomplete
information.
It is one task to develop an accident management plan that
calls for decisions to be made on the basis of all information
that should, ideally, be available. It is quite another task
to develop a plan that is resilient to confusion, that takes into
account the likelihood that any accident will be accompanied by
a certain amount of chaos and unplanned gaps in information.
There can be a large difference between the information available
in the midst of an accident and the actual state of affairs.
Robert Martin made this clear in his description of the TMI case:
We at the NRC have concluded that if we had had some
other data, we might have been able to make better
decisions at TMI. On the basis of the guidelines that
Mr. Clarke presented in his paper, TMI was a non-event.
But it was certainly not a non-event when decisions
had to be reached in the course of the accident. At
that time it was very much an event and an emergency.
Analyses conducted after the accident showed radiation
exposure to any individual was only 1% of the level
below which no measures need be taken, according to
the guidelines cited by Mr. Clarke. Those guidelines
suggest that you would not even have to tell anybody
about the accident--if you had known that that was
going to be the outcome. But you did not know.
TMI is not the only example of a nuclear accident situation char-
acterized by a lack of complete information on which to base
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decisions. John Horan described the period following the
Stationary Low Power Plant 1 (SL-1) nuclear accident of 1961
in the following terms:
... during this time the major questions centered
around the condition of the plant. Is it still criti-
cal? Is the coolant bubbling away? Are there poten-
tials for components to readjust themselves, for
another criticality to occur ... ?
In Horan's opinion all accidents are characterized by some degree
of chaos:
Much attention has been given to the chaotic condition
that existed at Three Mile Island. But I don't really
think this is unique. Even an automobile accident gen-
erates confusion. The larger the scope of an emergency,
the higher is the likelihood of a chaotic situation.
I think this is an inherent part of serious accidents
in general.
But even when an accident situation is not chaotic, decisions
may still have to be made on the basis of indirect and incomplete
information. In the drill described by Dieter Kaspar (see Chapter
12), a recommendation for evacuation was made on the basis of the
reported deteriorating state of the reactor (increasing tempera-
ture and pressure), rather than on information directly related
to the release of radioactivity. This is an excellent example
of accident management based on anticipations of future events--
events that may be uncertain even given extensive information on
the current state of the reactor.
One solution to the problem of insufficient information may
be to limit the decision-making tasks of anyone individual to
those for which he is apt to have adequate and timely data, with
a clear fall-back response proposed for the case when adequate
data is not available. Harold Collins (NRC) gave one example
of such a solution when he pointed out that accident management
plans should include the use of plant instrumentation to recom-
mend initial protective measures off-site, with a specific mech-
anism to handle situations in which the operator is confused.
This idea is contained in the NRC's Criteria for Preparation and
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Prepared-
ness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (USNRC 1980). In Collins'
words,
The intent of the NRC document is to require that the
nuclear facility operator make judgments in his con-
trol room about accident projection off-site. In other
words, the operator should rely on his plant instrumen-
tation to initially recommend protective measures off-
site, rather than send people out into the field to make
radiological assessments, a time-consuming activity.
His decision to call off-site authorities and to recom-
mend protective measures should be based initially on
what he is seeing in the plant. If the operator cannot
PRE14-C
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determine what is happening in the plant within about
fifteen minutes, then he must notify the off-site emer-
gency management authorities, according to the NRC doc-
ument. He has to say, "I have the following problem of
such-and-such proportions," or, "I have a problem, but
I don't know how serious it is. You had better put
your emergency organizations on an alert status."
The lack of complete information on which to base decisions
may also be due to factors other than a poorly understood acci-
dent situation. For example, accident management may call for
the implementation of technical procedures that have never been
tried before. When asked for an example of such a procedure,
Robert Martin discussed the hydrogen bubble at TMI:
Consider the procedure by which the hydrogen bubble was
removed from the primary coolant system. That was an
evolution that was never predicated anywhere in the
plant design or plant evaluations. The manner in which
the hydrogen gas was dissolved and moved to a different
part of the reactor coolant system for venting required
increasing and decreasing the pressure and temperature
in an involved process. There was no standard operat-
ing procedure for that evolution.
The problem of decision making on the basis of incomplete
information may be compounded by other pressures. Gran Henderson
(Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) brought up the ques-
tion of political considerations:
I think that the information that our Governor had at
that particular time probably did not warrant either an
in-place shelter or an evacuation of pregnant women
and preschool-aged children. However, with the great
number of outside pronouncements being made, the Gov-
ernor was subjected to some political pressures. In
addition, he couldn't get answers to all of his ques-
tions. In Washington there was debate among the mem-
bers of the NRC as to what action should be taken. I
think that the Governor was justified in what he did,
but he could have made either decision [to order or
not to order a limited evacuation] with the informa-
tion that was available.
Theme 3: Some aspects of accident management plans presented at
the workshop were not oriented toward handling the
extreme uncertainty that may be associated with a nu-
clear accident.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, one typical frame-
work adopted for accident management plans involves setting bounds
on measured, anticipated, or projected individual radiation doses
that could be caused by an accident. These bounds are to be used
as at least partial guidance for recommending countermeasures.
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A review of the Clarke, von Gadow, and Beskrestnov papers in
this volume reveals three examples of such dose-based counter-
measure guidelines. A fourth set of guidelines can be found in
the US Environmental Protection Agency's Protective Action Guides
(1975), which, for example, call for mandatory evacuation if the
whole body dose exceeds 5 rem (anticipated maximum individual
dose). Five of the six countries whose accident management plans
were discussed at the workshop (FRG, Netherlands, UK, USA, USSR)
had one form or another of dose-based countermeasure guidelines.
As Clarke points out in his paper, each guideline represents a
balancing of radiation risks versus the risks of the counter-
measures.
But it is not clear how such guidelines would help in an
accident involving a great deal of uncertainty about the status
of the reactor. For example, how would such a guideline apply
when the decision maker only knows that there is a 10% chance
that the guideline will be exceeded in the near future? More
concretely, we could ask, How would such a guideline have helped
a decision maker at TMI late on March 30, 1979? He knew only
that there was a hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel, that its
flammability was still being calculated/argued, that it could
have exploded, and that this could have led in turn to major
releases of radiation. Does the anticipated maximum individual
dose apply to this uncertain situation? Not explicitly, though
some probability distribution over such a dose is implied. At
a later time it became clear that the hydrogen bubble could not
have exploded, but the decision maker could not have known that
on March 30th. How was he supposed to use the 5 rem guideline
when faced with such uncertainty? Clearly, accident management
guidelines should be linked more directly to information that
the decision maker is actually apt to have available at the
time the decision must be made.
This point was clearly made by Ernst Hampe (Commission of
the European Communities), in response to a paper that presented
dose-based countermeasure guidelines:
Risk categories I, II, and III, representing dose
ranges of 5 to 15 rads, etc. have been described here.
What importance should we attach to these categories?
I must frankly say that I am tempted to smile when
such guidelines are presented, and I try to relate them
to incidents or accidents that have occurred in various
parts of the world. During the first two days of such
events one doesn't have a clear picture of real con-
sequences or how the situation may evolve. A nuclear
accident differs from a railroad accident, a case in
which one can immediately see what has happened or
what can still happen. Moreover it is not unknown
for effluent monitors to fail soon after the onset of
a nuclear accident. In this light, does it make any
sense to create such guidelines? Or would it be better
to avoid such fine distinctions and simply issue warn-
ings sufficiently in advance, say at the first sign of
trouble or ot least when a situation arises that is
not fully understood?
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Later in the workshop Herman Dieckamp presented a similar
argument:
I must say that the various definitions of categories
of 5 rems, 10 rems, or 15 rems are very narrowly de-
fined in relation to the levels of uncertainty that one
may expect. The uncertainty in predicting the m3gni-
tude of a release is large, compared to the narrow dif-
ferentiations of categories of accidents or incidents.
My impression is that in an accident entailing radio-
logical releases there is confusion and uncertainty;
nicely drawn diagrams of communications channels be-
come confused and short-circuited, and all of a sudden
one loses the ability for rational decision making.
We should not think in terms of neat little relation-
ships in which we plot a parameter and when it reaches
a certain trigger level "we do something." Rather,
there will probably be emotionalism and uncertainty;
anxiety will take control, rather than careful tech-
nical assessments.
Dieckamp also pointed out a related problem associated with
countermeasure guidelines based on off-site doses. Such guide-
lines tie decision guidance to meteorological conditions, and
this may add a great deal of uncertainty to the overall situation.
As Dieckamp said,
During the TMI accident the question of off-site im-
pacts became a very difficult and uncertain issue.
It is not so cut-and-dried for radiological teams to
go out with instruments and measure here and there.
The accident at Three Mile Island occurred in a time
period of three or four days with the worst possible
meteorological conditions that one can imagine--
absolutely dead, still air. A puff of radiation me-
andered about in these conditions. This contributed
to the confusion about the relationship of radiation
releases to the plant and the accident. It didn't
seem to make sense.
John Horan related meteorological conditions to the broader
problem of misinformation.
Mention has already been made about the problem of
misinformation and the lack of data needed to inform
local authorities. During one event in which I was
involved a number of years ago, I was given a wind
direction that was off by 90°. And this information
came from one of the best meteorological research
organizations available in the United States. Under
the stress of the emergency, this misinformation was
delivered and we operated under it for six hours.
This was a mistake on our part as well, because we
should have verified the wind direction ourselves.
I feel the potential for operating under misinforma-
tion will always exist.
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In addition to the problems associated with the use of off-site
doses as a guideline for countermeasure decisions, there are
other aspects of accident management plans that do not address
the extreme general uncertainty that may be associated with a
nuclear accident. Consider, for example, the criteria for
simply recognizing that an accident is taking place. As Herman
Dieckamp said,
How does one know when to sound the alert? In the case
of TMI, most of the alert criteria were based upon the
so-called design basis accident--a major LOCA [loss of
coolant accident]. We had a list of about eight para-
meters, all of which related to the characteristics of
a LOCA. For instance, one such parameter was high con-
tainment building pressure. We never did have high
containment building pressure during the TMI accident.
Containment was to be isolated at four pounds per square
inch [overpressure], again based ~pon a major LOCA. It
took about four hours before the building pressure ever
went high enough to initiate that isolation; in fact
even then the isolation system initiated somewhat early,
while the pressure was still well below four pounds.
The first declaration of emergency that called for off-
site notifications--what we call a site emergency--was
based on high radiation levels in several areas of the
plant. The site emergency was not announced until
about 6:50 or 7:00 a.m. The declaration of general
emergency--a more serious alert also involving off-
site notifications--came at about 7:20 a.m. Yet the
incident had actually started at 4:00 a.m., and the un-
covering of the core and severe core damage occurred
from 100 to 140 minutes later. Thus the off-site noti-
fications did not corne until hours after the start of
the accident and more than an hour after the first
serious damage to the core.
This suggests that we should think very hard about
how to decide when an incident or an accident, what-
ever you want to call it, is occurring. How can we
be sure that our bases for making that decision are not
too narrowly constrained by preconceived notions of
what the accident is going to look like? One critical
feature of the TMI accident was that it did not look
anything like the design basis accident.
After the fact people can say, "Well, the operator
should have recognized this or the operator should
have recognized that." I don't know-who you have in
your power plants, but we don't happen to have Ph.D.s
in ours. Our staff members do what they are trained
to do. They go by the book--by the lists that are
given to them. And I think many difficulties would
be associated with the suggestion that they should
not go by the book.
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Dieckamp also pointed out a related problem concerning the train-
ing of operators and writing of procedures:
If we would stop at the point of identifying what the
operators could have done and failed to do to prevent
the accident, we would conclude that the operators
were stupid. However, if we ask ourselves, "Why didn't
they do those things?" we find that their training and
their procedures specifically inhibited them from per-
forming certain actions. And why was that the case?
The plant had encountered conditions that had not been
anticipated in any of the analyses, and, therefore,
exhibited behavior that had not been considered in the
generation of procedures and training. As a result,
the operators behaved according to their training and
not according to science. Had they behaved optimally
or correctly, they would have been better scientists
than the several hundred or thousand or tens of thou-
sands of scientists who had not anticipated this acci-
dent before March 28, 1979. I think we ought to think
very deeply about this, because what it says to me is
that our ability to train the operators and write good
procedures is limited by our ability to know ahead of
time all the combinations and permutations of failure
and system response that they could ever encounter.
Theme 4: There is a need for research on the decision-making
tasks that are apt to arise in accident management.
Robert Martin articulated this theme clearly:
If I were to look at an area that I think deserves
research in the area of emergency planning, I would
focus on the art, the skill, the science, and the
prayerful aspects of decision making. What components
does a plan need to help an individual make a decision
that best serves public health and safety? Do I have
to take into consideration the number of people that
could be killed during an evacuation? How much infor-
mation do I need to legitimately justify a decision,
in a case in which both the decision and the failure
to make the decision might jeopardize life and prop-
erty?
Decision making in the case of a nuclear accident
differs from military planning and business planning.
In a nuclear emergency I have to deal with an evolv-
ing accident that threatens human safety. I have to
make a combined technical, political, and health deci-
sion to risk the life of people by taking some sort of
corrective or protective action that may in fact jeop-
ardize them more than the thing I am trying to save
them from. I would strongly urge that IIASA apply a
systems analysis approach to such decision-making
27
problems. The results of such research might allow us
to test our individual plans and ask, "Do the plans
give us sufficient decision-making capability?" If
they don't, then we can change the plans, and take such
measures as requesting more data and more telemetry.
But right now we don't have a clear understanding of
the information we need to make better decisions, ex-
cept on an event-by-event after-the-fact basis.
Theme 5: Accident management plans should be resilient to con-
fusion.
One of the key lessons of TMI was that a nuclear accident
may generate great confusion. Yet there is little evidence that
any country has altered its plans since that accident in such a
way as to increase resilience to confusion. John Lathrop (IIASA)
put the following questions before the workshop participants:
The impression I get from the morning's talks is that
emergency plans work. I have the uncomfortable feeling
that if this workshop had been held a year and a half
ago, before TMI, the representative from the united
States would have given a presentation not greatly dif-
ferent from the British presentation and the audience
would probably have thought that the US plans would
work. Yet at TMI the US plans did not work. Confusion
in the first days led to a loss of the utility's cred-
ibility which in turn influenced the NRC's position
throughout the accident. How are other nations' plans
resilient to confusion, resilient to equipment failures,
resilient to loss of credibility? Which fall-back plans
are available? Which agencies could be called in when
confusion causes a real problem with the perception of
the accident?
Richard Pepper from the Central Electricity Generating Board in
the UK responded in the following manner:
I don't think it is possible to forecast resilience
against confusion. But that is the very reason for
having a plan initially. Mr. Oieckamp questioned
whether a given plan can really help in an emergency
situation. He and others have asked, "How realistic
are these numbers? Should one wait until one has 14.5
rem in the thyroid before taking a tablet and running?"
I think such questions go beyond the real purpose of
an emergency plan. It is necessary to set up a system
and to train people to know what to do in principle.
In the chaos of the first few hours of an emergency
many people are in need of support. The comfort of
knowing that 30 rem to a thyroid is reasonably accept-
able is something that a controller can hang on to.
If he had not been given that number, he would have
to turn to somebody to get it. Such figures provide
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him with guidelines on which to base his actions. I
am quite sure that what will happen will be different
from what the controller anticipates. Nevertheless,
the guidelines give him a basis for coping.
In Harold Collins' view we should not expect to see plans change
in response to TMI, because the plans are not the problem:
John Lathrop has suggested that those of us who have
spoken today probably would have given much the same
presentation a year and a half ago, before TMI. He
is quite right. That is because several of us, re-
presenting twenty countries, think that we have identi-
fied quite well what ought to go into emergency plans
after more than four years of work on the question.
This work was organized by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Several documents have been published
as part of this effort [see IAEA TECDOC-225, 1979].
Because of the Three Mile Island accident, people
think we should now go back and reinvent the wheel.
That is not necessary. The problem in the US--and I
dare say in other countries--has been getting people
to follow the existing guidance. They just won't do
it. I don't know what it would take to get people
to put in place features of plans that we have already
told people to adopt. There seems to be a great re-
luctance in this area.
One participant maintained that it is not possible to develop a
resilient plan, that success in recovery from a rare event is
determined by the human resources that can be marshalled. While
his point is different than Collins', there is in fact some com-
mon ground in their two responses: the problem is not one of
adjusting technical aspects of the plans, rather it is one of
adjusting the plans where they interact with people--those who
must accept the plans and implement them.
Theme 6: Safety cannot be maintained through plans and regula-
tions alone. There is a limit to the size and role
of emergency plans.
During the workshop it was natural to dwell on the plans and
regulations involved in nuclear accident preparedness and manage-
ment. But participants often made the point that such plans and
regulations are not sufficient. Robert Martin stressed in his
paper that a technical adequacy review will not be effective if its
purpose is only to satisfy regulatory requirements: its mission
must be safety. Similarly, Ernst Hampe noted, "Twenty vears of
experience in this field have shown me that safety cannot be
assured by administration." As well, there is a limit to how
large a role plans should play, how elaborate and imposing plans
should be. As Godfried van den Heuvel stated,
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When I listen to all of your plans and make my notes,
I think, "Well, maybe we can use a little bit of this
here and a little bit of that there for our own plan;
we can try to constantly improve the plan." But then
I ask myself, "Must I make such a plan for the people
who live near a nuclear power plant?" Of course we
should discuss the make-up of a good, workable plan,
but we must ask ourselves how far we can go in mani-
pulating the people with our plans. How far can an
authority go?
This point was reinforced by Harry Otway (CEC Joint Research
Center, Ispra):
My experience in planning for this sort of accident
is that the more specific the plan, the more likely
it is to be wrong. We seem to be tacitly assuming
that emergency planning is a good thing that one can't
get too much of. Is it possible to discuss the optimum
amount of planning? How much is enough? At what point
are we involving too much effort, perhaps even distract-
ing ourselves from the more important issue of prevent-
ing accidents? How much planning do we really need?--
maybe even none. At one extreme perhaps all we need is
a mobile team of experts in crisis management, who can
be sent to every crisis. If the team has directed
evacuations from several types of incidents, it will
know how people respond to evacuation. The team could
provide advice to local officials and the staff of a
particular technical facility.
While Otway stressed the need for experts in general crisis
management as entire or partial substitutes for plans, Herman
Dieckamp saw a need for people with technical backgrounds in the
nuclear field to be rapidly available to assist in regaining
control of a reactor:
I conclude that more technically trained people are
needed in the plant on a 24-hour-a-day basis. We
found in the case of the TMI accident that those
people corning to the site who had worked in a plant
designed by Babcock & Wilcox were much more effective
than those who had not, because they carne on-site with
a greater degree of prior knowledge. This knowledge
gave them the ability to move right in and become
effective very quickly. One problem that we should
discuss is how to make these additional human resources
effective at the earliest possible time. I think more
of these resources should be on-site at time zero.
In contrast, Robert Martin warned against relying on technical
experts too much:
I think it is important to recognize the weaknesses
of thinking, "If I have a super-technical person who
arrives on site in his flowing white robes, he will
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be able to make all necessary determinations." This
will not necessarily occur, perhaps because of the
mind set of the expert or his 'best learned response'.
The duty officer at TMI on the night of the accident
was the plant's technical superintendent. He was
qualified on Unit I and was licensed. He was in charge
of all technical reviews for Unit I; in fact, he was
the chairman and the leading technical expert on the
plant's safety review committee. He arrived at TMI
within an hour of the start of the accident, yet he
didn't understand what was happening, either. I think
it's a mistake to rely too much on that technical per-
son who is going to solve all your problems for you.
Theme,?: Nucleap accident ppepapedness and management should be
a dynamic ppocess of social leapning.
?a: In a nappow sense. detailed leapning fPom past acci-
dents pequipes delibepate institutional mechanisms.
While such leapning notably failed befope TMI. such
mechanisms ape now in place to pemedy this failupe.
In one of the first comments made at the workshop, Herman
Dieckamp listed some causes of the TMI accident, as they had been
identified by the Rogovin and Kemeny Commissions (e.g., deficien-
cies in training, procedures, instrumentation). He emphasized
as most important the finding that "the accident occurred because
of a failure to learn the lessons of others." The Rogovin Report
(1980) cites previous incidents similar to the initial stages of
the TMI accident. One event in particular, which had occurred
at the Davis--Besse Plant in Ohio, had been intensively studied
by the utility, the reactor manufacturer (Babcock & Wilcox), and
the NRC. Yet the institutional framework for passing on lessons
learned was not effective, and the results of those studies did
not find their way to the staff of the TMI plant before the acci-
dent. Several efforts have been initiated in the US since TMI
to assure that lessons learned are passed on to operating plants.
The point remains, however, that adequate, timely learning mech-
anisms require deliberate institutional effort. Apparently it
required an accident like TMI to uncover the inadequacy of the
learning mechanisms of the US nuclear power system.
Assuming that the necessary institutional mechanisms are
effective, the learning process for design-error-related accidents
can be modeled as a statistical process. Karl Ott (Working
Group for Applied Systems Analysis, K81n, FRG) presented a paper
at the workshop (Ott and Marchaterre 1981) that described a model
of this learning process. Ott's model views particular accidents
as opportunities to deplete a population of yet unknown types
of accidents "lurking" within a technological system. Ott fit
his model to five past nuclear accidents that had led to a broad
learning experience influencing power reactor development. These
accidents included TMI and the Browns Ferry fire. According to
Ott's model, a TMI-type accident was Rlurking" in present reactors
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with a frequency of one per 220 years. Learning from TMI should
substantially reduce the residual design-error accident frequency,
but only in conjunction with an adequate institutional learning
process.
7b: In a broader s~nse, it is not clear how well accident-
management institutions learn from past accirients, i.e.,
effectively change th~mselves to better deal with future
accidents.
Roger Clarke (National Radiological Protection Board, UK)
began his presentation as follows:
I am reading here from a report: "The accident oc-
curred during a routine maintenance operation. In the
report which the Committee of Inquiry submitted regard-
ing the accident, it was stated that the accident was
partly due to inadequacies of the instrumentation pro-
vided for the maintenance operation that was being per-
formed at the time of the accident, and partly to
faults of judgment by the operating staff, these faults
of judgment being themselves attributable to weaknesses
of organization." [Report to Parliament on the Acci-
dent at Windscale, 1957]. So in some ways this situa-
tion was not dissimilar to TMI. Among the problems
identified at Windscale were that the physicist in
charge had no operating manual with sections dealing
with the type of incident at hand. He had no instruc-
tions to help him, nor had he the benefit of sufficient
training.
While there may not have been an opportunity to learn anything
from Windscale at a detailed level that could have helped prevent
TMI, Clarke's example shows that the two accidents shared some
general features. It may be too much to expect that general
lessons learned (e.g., "training is important") are learned so
well that no future accident could be attributed to poor training.
At the same time, the recognition that there are similarities
between accidents does raise the question of how well accident
management institutions learn general lessons from past accidents.
The workshop participants reached no consensus opinion on this
issue. Comments ranged from "no, they don't learn" to "yes,
they do" to "they react, but not necessarily in the right direc-
tion." As a "no, they don't" example Harold Collins made the
following comment:
Within a four-year period in the United States, we had
two serious nuclear power plant accidents. The first
occurred at Browns Ferry; it was started by a workman
testing for air leaks with a candle. He ignited in-
strumentation and control system wiring insulation
and nearly caused a very serious accident. Dr. Stephen
Hanauer, chairman of the NRC investigation group, re-
marked at one point during the investigation, "It was
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like a mild heart attack, maybe it woke us up." Well
I submit to you that we never were woken up by Browns
Ferry. Nobody woke us up around the world, and no-
body woke us up in the United States. All kinds of
investigative reports were put together, a few things
happened within the NRC (a brand new agency at that
time), and a few things happened in the nuclear utili-
ties. But there really wasn't much of a change in the
way people did business in the plants. The Browns
Ferry accident was a serious event, and we should have
learned much more from it. It could have resulted in
radiological releases to the environs from two units.
We were very fortunate that this did not occur. Then,
of course, four years later, almost to the day, the
Three Mile Island accident took place. Two days ear-
lier I had received a letter from a county official,
which commented on one of our guidance publications.
The official took great issue with the notion of
emergency planning zones. He asked, "What do we need
all this for? Nothing is ever going to happen."
Yet the same workshop participant stressed that TMI, unlike
Browns Ferry, had really made a difference:
Those of us who have been in the business always be-
lieved that putting emergency plans in place was the
proper thing to do. But it was difficult for us to
convince many state legislatures, governors, and so
on that a nuclear power plant accident really could
occur and that they needed proper emergency plans and
resources to respond in the event of an emergency.
Since Three Mile Island, of course, the whole picture
has changed. States that had been dragging their feet
on the emergency planning activity are now all jumping
on the bandwagon.
Ten years ago, when I first became involved in this
field, about three people in the whole Atomic Energy
Commission were working in the emergency planning
and preparedness area. At that time, when we presented
accident scenarios and a lot of "what if" events,
people smiled and essentially told us, "it's very
nice that you fellows are doing all of this, but why
don't you go back and do a little more work, and corne
see us in about five years?" This type of attitude
pervaded the entire emergency planning and prepared-
ness activity in the United States. Since the acci-
dent in Pennsylvania, I can assure you that the entire
picture has changed drastically.
In his paper, Robert Martin provides evidence that since
TMI the NRC has SUbstantially increased its efforts to identify,
evaluate, and resolve deficiencies at nuclear plants. In Martin's
words, this increased activity represents nthe agency's recog-
nition that the TMI accident, as it evolved, may well have been
prevented, if such measures had been pursued more aggressively
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earlier." Yet, during the discussion sessions, Martin pointed
out that not all the changes implemented in response to TMI may
result in actual improvements in nuclear safety:
An agency under attack may make a number of changes
because it feels pressure to institute change. These
changes require critical review by both the industry
and the agency. Consider the decision to place resi-
dent inspectors at every operating facility in the
united States. A large number of attributes of the
resident inspector program have not yet been identi-
fied. For example, what role would such inspectors
fill in an emergency? The agency maintains that they
would continue to serve their normal role, i.e., to
assure that the licensee is carrying out its function.
However, in the first key minutes or hours of an acci-
dent, the very presence of the inspector presents a
host of new problems. For instance, if an operator
goes to perform a manipulation, he might look at the
inspector; if the inspector does not react, is it
unfair for the operator to assume that he has the
tacit approval of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to carry out that manipulation? Perhaps the inspector
simply did not understand what the operator was doing.
In the process of evolving emergency planning mea-
sures, one has to test every suggested change to see
if it contributes constructively to overall emergency
planning. Making a lot of changes could be like put-
ting band-aids on a cancer. It may not be the proper
treatment for the disease.
7c: The rarity of nucZear accidents hinders accident man-
agement Zearning.
As discussed below, the events at Three Mile Island exposed
a basically unanticipated type of accident, one that developed
slowly and in a confusing manner. It was unanticipated because
the accident management plans that were then in effect were de-
signed to manage a select set of accidents: hypothetical acci-
dents and the very few accidents that actually had occurred.
Of course, both hypothetical and historical accidents were well
understood: the former because they were generated from the
minds of analysts, the latter because they had been thoroughly
studied. Because of the rarity of nuclear accidents, accident
management plans were geared to well-understood accidents. It
is not surprising that such plans proved inadequate when applied
to an on-going accident that was poorly understood by the par-
ticipants, i.e., Three Mile Island.
The rarity of nuclear accidents heightens the importance
of international exchanges of experiences. In order to make the
most effective use of the small amount of existing nuclear acci-
dent experience, emergency planners should be prepared to apply
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lessons learned from an accident in another country to their own
country's accident management system. Yet institutional differ-
ences can hinder this transfer, as was illustrated in one of the
workshop discussions. After hearing a description of the role
of the US federal government in the TMI accident, a participa~t
remarked from the floor that such a federal role would be con-
sidered undesirable in his country, and was therefore not fore-
seen in its accident management plans. However, this participant
overlooked the fact that the role of the federal government during
the TMI accident had not been foreseen in the US plans, either.
The confusion and uncertainty that marked the first days of the
TMI accident led to differing and continually changing reports
about plant status. The conflicting reports lessened the credi-
bility of the utility, which in turn caused the federal govern-
ment to playa much larger role than had been planned. A very
important lesson to be learned from the TMI experience is that
confusion and uncertainty can lead to a fundamental rearrangement
of agency roles. Yet it is very difficult to apply that lesson
to another country's accident management system.
A third difficulty caused by the rarity of nuclear acci-
dents relates to the often long time lapses between accidents;
this has a negative effect on motivation to maintain prepared-
ness. This difficulty was illustrated by Harold Collins (see
Theme 7b above) when he mentioned that four years after Browns
Ferry (and a few days before TMI) , an emergency planning official
maintained that nothing was ever going to happen. An emergency
management agency official who attended the workshop stated
that he had to seek budget increases within three to six months
following a disaster; after that time interest would wane. TMI has
caused a marked increase in government agencies' enthusiasm for
emergency preparedness, but it remains to be seen whether that
interest will continue at an adequate level over the (possibly)
several years until another nuclear accident occurs.
Theme 8: Discussion of nuclear accident management may involve
the broad issue of the acceptability of nuclear power.
Discussions concerning the effectiveness of nuclear accident
management plans may be affected by the participants' biases in
favor of or against nuclear power. These biases may make it
difficult to analyze the effectiveness of nuclear accident man-
agement systems in a way that may be generally considered objec-
tive. Persons opposed to nuclear power may be markedly critical,
either out of genuine concern or to strengthen their stance as
advocates of alternative energy strategies. Similarly, putting
emphasis on nuclear accident preparedness can be construed as
promoting nuclear power. As Joanne Linnerooth (IIASA) suggested,
the very activity of emergency planning may be viewed as a strat-
egy to win public confidence:
What are we trying to get across to the public with the
concept of emergency planning? A few points made this
morning may throw light on this question. First, the
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accident management plans that we have been talking
about this week probably won't work. The human fac-
tor, the confusion, and many other factors have not
been taken into account in the simulation models or
the various plans we have been discussing. Second,
even if accident management plans do work, they prob-
ably won't help too much. We have to ask ourselves
what other reasons there may be for making elaborate
emergency plans. One answer is suggested by the
history of nuclear power. In the beginning the strat-
egy of those promoting nuclear power seemed to be to
tell people that there are no risks, that the proba-
bility of an accident is very low. But now that we
have had TMI, the credibility of that line of thought
has diminished. It is difficult now to tell people
that there is no chance of an accident, because they
have already seen two very significant ones in the
last few years. Perhaps promoters of nuclear power
are now concentrating on emergency planning because
they recognize that the public is concerned with the
consequences of accidents and is not satisfied by
assurances that accidents rarely occur. Perhaps
those promoters are saying "Let's now focus on the
consequences and let's convince the public that the
consequences of accidents will be taken care of be-
cause we have emergency plans."
Theme 9: Because nuclear accident management is embedded in a
political context, the process of ensuring preparedness
is important.
Theme 8 touched on the link between the acceptability of a
nuclear accident management system and the acceptability of nu-
clear power. This link has an important implication: the ac-
ceptability of nuclear power as an energy source may be related
to the perceived legitimacy of the process that establishes and
maintains the accident preparedness and management mechanisms.
As David Fischer (Institute of Industrial Economics, Norway)
stated,
The question of the visibility of the planning process
is important. I would argue that if the public is
going to accept emergency plans, it must be able to
accept the planning process used to generate the plans.
Therefore, this process needs to be well publicized
and visible. Improved visibility with heightened pub-
lic confidence in the planning process would counteract
the tendency of the media to attempt to show as scan-
dals the conflicts in perceptions and decision making
regarding nuclear accident management.
Harold Green discussed the relationship between the history
of the political process affecting nuclear power in the US and
the current critical reactions to TMI:
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One of the Kemeny Commission's conclusions was that
the NRC appeared to be more concerned with the wel-
fare of the nuclear power industry than it was with
regulation. I have, from time to time, used the
analogy of the "overprotected child" in this context.
Such a child is so protected by loving parents from
all conceivable risks during his early years that he
is not able to "make it" in the ordinary world of
risk when he reaches adolescence. Nuclear power has
had such a set of "loving parents", namely the Atomic
Energy Commission, then ERDA [Energy Research and
Development Agency), DOE [Department of Energy), NRC,
and, perhaps the most loving of all during the years,
the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.
These agencies really sought to protect their tender
infant from the buffeting of the normal political
processes operating in the United States.
Atomic energy has thus had a very peculiar political
history in that country. There has never been an
exhaustive debate or discussion within Congress about
the risks and benefits of nuclear power. And yet, a
national commitment to nuclear power was made some-
where along the line. In my opinion, this fact under-
lies the intense political controversy about nuclear
power in the United States. What we are now experi-
encing is the debate that was lacking earlier--the
kind of debate that I think is inevitable in the
American political system. Such a debate is bound
to come sooner or later, and in the case of nuclear
power we are having it "later," at a time when the
industry is least able to afford it.
We must also realize that most people who have been
involved in the atomic energy scene in the United
States over the years have been "insiders", i.e.,
experts in one sense or another. It has become in-
creasingly clear that when people who are not "in-
siders" become involved in questions about nuclear
power they tend to become antagonized and object to
what they see as the way the system operates. I do
not think we should pay too much attention to the
criticisms that these people level. The serious
problem is that the system is constructed so as to
almost inevitably produce negative perceptions among
"outsiders." I do not know of any "outsider" who
has reacted with kind words when exposed to the
technology and regulatory structure of the nuclear
industry. From the outset it seemed inevitable to
me that the Kemeny Commission--which consisted almost
entirely of people who knew nothing about the nuclear
industry--would emerge with basically hostile, skep-
tical, and indeed, in some respects, inaccurate per-
ceptions.
But I think we ought to recognize that this is nat-
ural. I hope that those concerned about the future
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of nuclear power in the US will give serious thought
to the type of reforms required for normalizing the
political processes and developing the nuclear indus-
tryon a solid basis, to overcome the overprotective
childhood that the industry experienced. To use a
medical analogy, I think we need to lay nuclear power
down on a couch and perform a psychoanalysis.
Theme 10: Nuclear accident preparedness and management cannot
reduce the risk of nuclear accidents to zero.
This statement may seem obvious. Yet most of the workshop
papers and discussions tended to dwell on accidents for which
accident management measures would be straightforward and effec-
tive, i.e., reasonably well-understood accident situations with
adequate warning to carry out countermeasures. However, it is
not hard to imagine accidents where there would be no adequate
warning. In addition to the typical example of a rapid core
melt, consider a slow, TMI-like accident, where the operator
remains too confused to sound a definite alert until shortly
before a major release.
Danzmann presented the only paper at the workshop that
assessed the health effects to the population that could occur
during a nuclear accident in spite of countermeasures. As his
paper, which reported on the main results of the German nuclear
power plant risk study, makes clear, significant nuclear acci-
dent risks remain even after accident management countermeasures.
Thus, in the interest of candor (see Chapter 16), nuclear acci-
dent management plans should clearly address possible limitations
to their effectiveness as well as their obvious benefits.
In the midst of all the discussions of elnergency plans at
the workshop, it was easy to lose sight of the fact that one day
someone in the room could find himself in an accident situation
in which all the carefully planned emergency measures in the
world would not keep lives from being lost. As Godfried van den
Heuvel reminded the participants,
It is fairly easy to make an emergency plan, but no one
talks about the problems that arise for a government
authority when a meltdown really does occur. I think
the most severe accident is possible. Terrorists could
do something unexpected to a power plant, creating a
situation that no one can forecast.
Theme 11: The human element in nuclear accident management de-
serves more attention in emergency plans.
Problems of human error, operator stress, and operator
training were frequently discussed during the workshop. But per-
haps more attention should have been devoted to broader problems
PRE' '4 - 0
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of human behavior. Take, for example, the problem of operator
incentives. A plan cited by Harold Collins requires operators
who have become confused about the status of their plant to
notify authorities within 15 minutes (see Theme 2e). Is it real-
istic to expect compliance with such a requirement, given the
probabilities of an accident and the actual incentives facing
an operator? An operator who may face career penalties if he
sounds a false alarm may be very reluctant to notify authorities
on the basis of ambiguous information. This reluctance may
cause him to act against the best interests of public safety.
Clearly the incentives of an operator facing such decisions
should be examined and perhaps adjusted to ensure that appropri-
ate decisions are made.
A more problematic point concerns risks faced by the opera-
tors. Early in the workshop a question about TMI addressed to
Herman Dieckamp spurred a discussion on this topic:
GYLDEN: What was the most pessimistic contingency
that you ever considered during the accident?
DIECKAMP: I think we worried most about the possible
need to evacuate the site.
GYLDEN: What would have been the criterion for such
an evacuation?
DIECKAMP: I think you can imagine the kinds of con-
ditions that could raise that possibility. The cri-
terion would simply be unacceptable risk. This becomes
a very difficult question.
While Dieckamp referred to a deliberate evacuation of the site,
ordered by accident managers, this interchange raised the pos-
sibility that the operators might decide to leave on their own
initiative. Joanne Linnerooth brought up this issue following
Dieter Kaspar's presentation:
The stress situation during an accident is very high.
I have noticed that most emergency planning relies
heavily on plant staff to perform many duties. I
wonder if Dieter Kaspar's simulation model has con-
sidered the chances that a great number of these people
might panic and simply run? There would be a high in-
centive to get out of the area.
Dieter Kaspar (Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Welfare,
Baden-Wuerttemberg, FRG) responded, "Yes, certainly there will
be very much stress. I don't think one can do much to avoid it.
Perhaps training would help." In this context Robert Martin
presented an additional reason why the operators might leave:
When we did the investigation on TMI, the operators
initially said that they had no concerns about remain-
ing in the control room themselves. But during the
interviews it became clear that if their families were
forced to evacuate, they would not stay behind and let
their families leave the area without them. When one
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evacuates an area, one may very well be evacuating the
wife and children of the people who are in the control
room. This introduces a different level of stress and
a different set of circumstances; they may not be wil-
ling to "go down with the ship"-they may not stay.
This possibility is a feature that has not been includ-
ed in the discussion of emergency plans.
Later in the workshop Siegfried Bernhardt (Gemeinschaftskernkraft-
werk Neckar GmbH) made a related point about the unanticipated
consequences of evacuations.
Although we have to be prepared for an evacuation, I
do not believe that it is a very good measure. For
example, the river flood control operators working
for our water authorities have said, "We would not
stay here during a nuclear accident-related evacua-
tion." Who will then regulate the water level in the
river? Dams could break and cities could be flooded.
Who knows what other secondary failures will occur as
a result of those evacuations? There are many more
problems to be expected than simply handling the traf-
fic and finding houses for the evacuees.
Yet another aspect of the human element was brought up by
Godfried van den Heuvel in a discussion of some technical proba-
bilities of serious nuclear accidents.
The danger of terrorist action is a compelling reason
for us to make emergency plans. I don't know if your
forecasting of risks includes capture by a very small
group. You can make calculations about technical
risks, but the human factor, as has been mentioned,
can do strange things that are difficult to forecast.
You have to take account of this human factor in your
emergency plans.
Clearly, accident management plans should be prepa~ed to
handle these aspects of human behavior. The unanticipated de-
parture of key staff or terrorist attack are not readily amenable
to prediction or analysis, but these problems could so drastic-
allv affect the effectiveness of an accident management system
that they must be considered in any responsible planning process.
Theme 12: Although exercises are important, it is difficult to
carry them out effectively.
Baas and Bosnjakovic point out in Chapter 13 that the rarity
of nuclear accidents increases the importance of exercises in
testing and maintaining nuclear accident preparedness. If an
exercise is to be effective, it should include the aspects of an
actual accident that affect human behavior most significantly.
One such aspect is stress. Otway and Misenta emphasize in
Chapter 17 the impact of stress on operator performance: the
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absence of stress in normal operation lowers operator alertness,
while heightened stress in an accident impedes performance. They
suggest in their paper that frequent surprise exercises would
be a good way to increase operator alertness and, if they are
realistic exercises, to allow the operators to improve their
tolerance for stress. Yet it is not easy to design exercises
that are authentically stressful. Another important aspect of
accidents that affects human behavior is confusion, as TMI
showed. Yet again it is very hard to generate authentic con-
fusion in an exercise, even if only a limited number of partici-
pants know about the exercise in advance.
The difficulty of running an effective exercise was often
raised at the workshop. In his presentation Dieter Kaspar de-
scribed an elaborate and thorough exercise carried out in the
FRG (see Chapter 12). The exercise was carefully designed, cap-
turing many features cf a real accident. For example, emergency
planners did not have a script, but received instead a series
of messages from the reactor crew, just as in an actual accident.
At one point a recommendation to evacuate was made on the basis
of incomplete information, a situation that would also be apt
to happen in a poorly understood accident. Yet Robert Martin
took issue with the authenticity of the FRG exercise, contrast-
ing some aspects of the exercise with the events at TMI:
We should look very closely at staff behavior in the
stress situation of an accident. Consider the timing
in the German exercise. I have the distinct feeling
that in the exercise the authorities were notified
through normal channels and that the time that elapsed
between the notification and the response to the noti-
fication was very short. [Editor's note: In fact the
delay was only two minutes.] I don't think that is
realistic. Our investigation at TMI showed that once
the accident was recognized it took five staff members
to make the phone calls, tying up all the outgoing
telephone lines at the plant. The people that the
plant staff were required to notify would not accept
the fact that they had received a basic series of data.
They wanted and needed more information. They said,
"Are you sure, is it really that way?" The phone calls
that theoretically were to take 2 minutes in reality
took 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 45 minutes, or an hour of
continuous data exchange. It is not realistic that in
the case of a real accident the staff at an emergency
center will pick up a phone, listen to someone say,
"I've just had a LOCA. I've released 15 thousand
curies of iodine, I will call you back later with
additional data," and then smoothly take action in re-
sponse to a statement of that sort. It simply will
not work that way.
We also found that the receiving organization, i.e.,
the people who were given data during the notifica-
tions, did not have a preset or preestablished list
of the types of information that they needed to have.
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Many of the questions they asked were unrelated to the
actions that they had to take at that time. They want-
ed to know "why it occurred." You don't need to know
"why it occurred." You only need to know what oc-
curred and what actions should be taken. But much of
the time of both the NRC contact and the licensee was
really spent examining "why" it happened, not "what"
happened. In a real emergency you are interested in
knowing "why" and this ties up valuable time and
people. In a drill, you only want to know what hap-
pened and then everybody runs around the way they are
supposed to. In the real case, this won't happen, at
least not without a lot of experience and training.
CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Themes
There is no room for complacency in nuclear accident pre-
paredness. As the number of reactors increases and as the early
reactors age, the past rate of very roughly one significant acci-
dent every five years may increase. The persons with perhaps
the least reason to be complacent are the government authorities
who, in the event of an accident, would be faced with difficult
decisions concerning countermeasures (e.g., shelter vs evacuation
vs no action)--decisions that involve the weighing of the social
risks of each alternative. These decisions must be made under
time pressure, often on the basis of incomplete technical acci-
dent assessments.
The Need for ResiZience to Confusion
Three Mile Island exposed a basically unanticipated type
of accident, one that developed slowly and in a poorly under-
stood manner. This forces us to ask how many more unanticipated
accidents may be associated with the technology, and how we can
best prepare for them. The uncertainty and confusion of TMI
caused anxiety among the general public, contributed to a re-
arrangement of the roles of the agencies involved, and caused
great difficulties in the communications necessary for both on-
site and off-site accident management. There is a clear need
to redesign management plans to make them more resilient to the
confusion generated by such an accident. The plans must provide
clear roles for all agencies, predecide as many decisions as
possible, and aid accident managers in making decisions based
on the often limited information actually apt to be available
in the course of an accident.
Some aspects of current plans are definitely not oriented
toward handling the extreme uncertainty that may be associated
with a nuclear accident. For instance, countermeasure guidelines
based on projected dose assume an accident that is understood
clearly enough to project that dose. As well, criteria for
determining whether an accident is taking place are sometimes
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constrained by preconceived ideas of what an accident is going
to look like.
One of the most important lessons of the TMI experience,
then, is that accident management plans must be able to deal
with confusion and uncertainty. Yet it is difficult to tell if
the plans of any country are in fact resilient to these features
of accidents, or if changes incorporated since TMI have made the
plans more resilient. Perhaps the most promising way to increase
resilience is to pay most attention to the aspects of plans that
involve the rapid marshalling and organization of people with
appropriate expertise.
The Need for Institutional Mechanisms for Learning
from Rare Events
TMI showed that adequate accident-to-accident learning at
a detailed engineering level and at a more general level requires
deliberate institutional mechanisms. However, the rarity of nu-
clear accidents makes it difficult to modify plans and institu-
tions in response to actual accident experience. Not only are
there few accidents to learn from; there are long periods of
time between accidents, during which lessons learned tend to
fade as interest in accident management wanes. In addition,
lessons from specific accidents are often difficult to apply to
different countries and reactors.
The Need for Candor
Because issues in nuclear accident preparedness and manage-
ment are embedded in larger questions of the acceptability of
nuclear power, discussions on the topic may be affected by biases
for or against this energy source. One consequence of these po-
litical factors is that the process of accident planning, includ-
ing the degree of candor, is important to the acceptance of nuclear
power. Because accident preparedness cannot reduce nuclear acci-
dent risks to zero, candor is essential.
The Need to Consider the Human Element
Because the human element contributes in a major way to the
risks that remain associated with nuclear facilities in spite of
accident preparedness, plans must specifically address this ele-
ment. Included here are the problems of deliberate or unantici-
pated departures of key staff, operator behavior under stress,
and terrorist action. The human element must be taken into ac-
count in the exercises and drills designed to maintain prepared-
ness, although it is extremely difficult to design an exercise
that in fact prepares its participants for the surprise, stress,
and confusion of an actual accident.
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The Special Problem Posed by Rare Events
Nuclear accident preparedness and management challenge hu-
man abilities to develop and maintain institutions for managing
the risks of a rare event. Such institutions must handle an
essentially unique combination of problems. It is difficult to
incorporate lessons learned from rare events into established
institutions, to test preparedness, and, above all, to develop
really effective plans. Accident management plans have been
developed on the basis of hypothetical accidents and the few
accidents that actually have occurred. Yet while hypothetical
and past accidents are well understood, a future accident is apt
to be poorly understood while it is occurring. It may be so
poorly understood that it is difficult even to recognize when
it starts. This was the case at TMI.
But beyond these problems, the fact that nuclear accidents
are rare makes it extremely difficult to maintain preparedness.
The long time periods between accidents, especially between acci-
dents in a given country or involving a given type of reactor,
mean that an individual's incentives for career advancement or
local government officials' concerns for staying in office may
not be compatible with maintaining effective preparedness.
Can We Maintain Preparedness?
Anyone who has witnessed recent achievements in national
space programs can appreciate the achievements of technical
organizations in obtaining reliable performance in very complex
systems, even when the human element is a part of those systems.
But these examples involve one program per country, vast expense,
and systems that are in critical operation for only a few hours.
Nuclear accident preparedness involves several facilities per
country, economic constraints, and base load systems that operate
essentially all of the time. The systems considered here must
maintain preparedness for a potentially catastrophic rare event
in the course of a routine operation--an operation so routine
that it was once described as "just another way to boil water".
As this discussion has pointed out, nuclear accident pre-
paredness and management involve a unique combination of prob-
lems. It is no easy task for institutions to develop effective
plans, to adapt those plans in the light of scarce experiences,
and to test and maintain preparedness for a rare but potentially
costly event. The accomplishment of this task is a key issue
in the acceptability of nuclear power--a promising and perhaps
necessary source of energy, with many political, environmental,
and economic advantages.
Most participants at the IIASA workshop felt that it is
within the realm of human and institutional capabilities to main-
tain adequate preparedness for nuclear accidents. Many of the
following papers reflect this point of view. However, unique
institutions must be developed and maintained to overcome the
obstacles to preparedness. In the aftermath of TMI, a clear
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need has been identified for fundamental and innovative change
in politically established organizations. To some degree, these
changes have been set in motion. However, as the reader goes
on to the following papers, reviews the themes discussed above
and the changes called for by the lessons of TMI, he would do
well to keep in mind the closing paragraph of the Rogovin Report
(1980):
With every passing day, TMI draws less attention.
[Current crises] push the nuclear safety question into
eclipse. Just as the last major reactor accident, the
Browns Ferry fire, slipped beneath the surface of the
sea of daily concerns 4 years ago, so can Three Mile
Island join it in the coming years. It will take dog-
ged perseverance in the nuclear industry and in the
Government to truly learn the lessons of TMI. We are
not reassured by what we see so far.
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II. THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND: THREE PERSPECTIVES
While the IIASA workshop did not focus only on the accident
at Three Mile Island, that event provided an instructive example
of decision making under extreme uncertainty. There have been
other nuclear accidents, but none has so dramatically combined
problems of population safety with the management of a confusing,
slowly developing accident. In this Section three key decision
makers involved in managing the Three Mile Island accident pre-
sent their interpretations of the events that began on March 28,
1979.
The accident itself is not described in detail here. The
reader is referred to the reports of the Kemeny, Rogovin, and
NRC Commissions for excellent and exhaustive reviews of the acci-
dent (see p. 12). Instead, the papers in this Section emphasize
organizational and procedural problems in accident preparedness
and management.
A valuable component of the workshop was the candor of the
authors of these papers--representatives of the organizations
most deeply involved in the accident, namely, the owner/operator,
the regulator, and the emergency management agency. While each
paper looks at the accident management problem from a different
perspective, a common element is that all three authors have
actually been through the experience of coping with a nuclear
accident.
The first paper, written by the President of General Public
Utilities, highlights particular accident management problems
encountered at TMI, touching on communications, interactions with
the regulator, and the organization of technical support. The
second paper, contributed by the Director of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission TMI Support Staff, explains the functions of the NRC
at the ac~ident site, including diagnosis, technical and logisti-
cal support, and approval of unusual operations. The third paper,
authored by the Head of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency, recounts lessons learned from TMI from the point of view
of an administrator used to general emergency management, who is
suddenly faced with a new kind of accident.

This paper is based on an edited transcript of
presentation. It has been edited only very
to preserve his general tone and informal
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THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
THE OWNER/OPERATOR*
Herman Dieckamp
President
General Public Utilities Corporation, USA
INTRODUCTION
In this presentation I would like to share my impressions
of how the Three Mile Island accident unfolded and the kind of
organizational responses that occurred in various phases of the
accident. I do not presume to tell you what is the right way
to respond to accidents or to organize for them. What I would
like to do is to describe the sequence of events, to give you
a basis for assessing what you think is valuable and important.
I must say that I feel like the third blind man to examine an
elephant this afternoon.** I do have one advantage that I am
not sure this parable included, i.e., I have heard the explana-
tions of the other two blind men. Perhaps when you take all
three discllssions together, you will obtain a pretty good explana-
tion of what happened.
I would like to make it clear that I do not intend to argue
with the comments of the other speakers. In general I find my-
self very much in agreement with their characterizations of the
accident, though of course there are always different impressions
to be gained from different points of view.
*Editor's Note:
the author's oral
lightly, in order
speaking style.
**While this was the last presentation of the three in this Sec-
tion, the author's short description of the accident makes it
appropriate to place this paper first.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
Because some of you may not be too familiar with the detailed
time sequence of the accident, I would like to outline some of
its important features. One critical characteristic of this
accident was its protracted time scale--not only the time scale
of the physical aspects of the accident, but also the long inter-
val during which General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU) as
management, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as regulators,
and others began to realize what had happened and what future
challenges would be involved in responding to the accident.*
Let me begin by briefly outlining my perception of the major time
phases.
As is well known, the accident started at 4:00 a.m. on
Wednesday March 28, 1979, with a feedwater shutoff. The plant
staff should have been able to handle this malfunction. The
crucial problem occurred during the ensuing ~eriod when a stuck
valve caused a net reactor coolant inventory loss, and the opera-
tors did not recognize this further malfunction. One can speak
at length about reasons why the operators failed to recognize
the situation. This would be an important topic for a discussion
about accident prevention, but I will concentrate here only on
the accident itself. The critical events were the overheating
of the reactor and the release of fission products. The bulk of
the damage occurred between about 5:40 a.m. and the time when
the block valve was closed--about 6:20 a.m. Before this period
the reactor coolant pumps were circulating a two-phase mixture
of water and steam, and the core was probably being reasonably,
though not perfectly, cooled. When the last pump was turned off
at about 5:40 a.m., the water and the steam phases separated
and the core essentially became uncovered and overheated.
At about 7:00 a.m., shortly after monitors began to indicate
a potential for releases of radiation, appropriate off-site
authorities were notified. These notifications conformed to
previously established criteria based on gross measurements of
radiation in the containment vessel. There has been much discus-
sion about the timing of these notifications, i.e., whether the
operators should have recognized the situation earlier. I think
we should examine this question by asking, Did the operators per-
form according to previously established procedures and the
requirements set forth in the Amergency plans? The answer is
affirmative, in terms of their notification of the NRC, the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), and others.
Still, the question remains whether or not the operators should
have been able to recognize earlier the potential seriousness
of the situation. They did not. They acted on the basis of
the identified requirements in their emergency plans.
*General Public Utilities Corporation is the parent company
of Metropolitan Edison (Met-Ed), the operator of the Three Mile
Island plant.
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The next phase of the accident lasted from the morning of
March 28th to approximately 8 o'clock that evening, at which
time a reactor coolant pump was successfully restarted and the
plant was returned to forced circulation. During the period
preceding the restarting of the pump the plant operators
struggled with significant amounts of noncondensible gas; it
was very difficult for them to understand how the plant behaved,
how it responded, how to get rid of that gas, and how to deal
with what appeared to be a steam bubble. Finally, after deciding
simply to inject water, they got to a point where the reactor
coolant pump could run. With the pump restarted, the operators
achieved a period of stability--apparent stability.
It is important to recognize that during the 16 hours from
the beginning of the accident to the pump restart--particularly
the early time period--the operators did not have the ability,
for a range of reasons, to fully diagnose what was happening.
The plant was behaving so unusually, so far outside the bounds
of normal definitions of plant behavior, that the operators just
could not understand the situation. This in turn led to problems
with the evaluation or synthesis of observations about plant
performance within the plant and subsequent communication of
this information to people outside the plant, including both
company management and regulators. The communication of plant
status and plant behavior was so inadequate and confused that
the outside world as well lacked a full recognition of what
was going on.
The following phase in the development of the accident
covered a rather quiescent period lasting from Wednesday evening,
March 28, until about 8 a.m. Friday, March 30, when a major
release of radioactivity occurred. During this time period
the pump was running and the plant seemed to be in a reliable
cooling situation, although there was a softness in the system.
The presence of the hydrogen bubble was identified and analysis
of its features began sometime late Thursday night or very
early Friday morning. Things seemed to be stable. However, it
was not recognized that the presence of the large quantity of
noncondensible gas (including hydrogen) dissolved within the
coolant was affecting the plant's external support systems. Gas
was building up in the letdown tanks, then leaking out as it
was transferred to the waste decav tanks--a transfer that was
necessary for maintaining systems-operations. It was this pro-
cess that resulted in the release of radiation that caused so
much concern Friday morning.
As I would like to focus here on the organizational aspects
of the accident, I will be very brief in summarizing the remaining
phases of the accident. Friday was marked by a communications
problem stemming from the release of radioactivity early in the
day and subsequent reactions to it. The period from Friday
evening through Sunday, April 1, was dominated by concern about
the possible flammability of the hydrogen bubble and strategies
for diminishing the size of the bubble. The next milestone
occurred on April 27, when a transition was made to cooling by
natural circulation, so it was no longer necessary to operate
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the pumps for cooling. At this point it became possible to think
in terms of a cold shutdown. During the 28-day period from
March 31 to April 27 the very large amount of fission products
released into the primary cooling circuit inhibited the use of
the decay heat removal system that would normally be used for
putting the plant into a cold shutdown state. There was a great
reluctance to expose the external parts of the plant, i.e., the
auxiliary building, to the intensely radioactive primary coolant,
which would have occurred if the normal decay heat removal system
had been used. As a result it was necessary (and still is neces-
sary) to remove heat from the plant by means of a steam oenerator
through the secondary system to the condensor and finally to the
environment.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS
Let us turn now to the organizational problems that arose
in managing the accident. The organization evolved through vari-
ous stages, and I will attempt to superimpose these stages onto
the brief account of the accident provided in the foregoing sec-
tion. Let us begin with the first three days of the accident,
from the point of view of the plant. The central problem was
that the plant staff did not possess sufficient technical capa-
bility to look at all the events that had occurred and all the
conflicting parameters in the available data, to somehow reach
the simple conclusion that the core was so overheated that fuel
cladding was oxidized, hydrogen was released, and the core was
in a state of disarray. That summary picture could not be
pieced together for roughly three days. Once that conclusion
was deduced, it significantly influenced the impressions and
the attitudes of people outside of the plant in terms of the
need to quickly supply support.
In order to understand some of the problems of accident
management during the first days of the accident, we have to
look at the lines of communication--both the intended lines and
the actual ones. As indicated in Figure 1, communications from
the plant were supposed to follow three paths. The first path
to be established provided for communication between the plant,
the management of the operating utility (Metropolitan-Edison
(Met-Ed)) and GPU. The second communications path linked the
plant to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), the
State Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), and the office of the
Pennsylvania Governor. The emergency plans called for the
plant staff to analyze the radiation situation and to communicate
their findings to BRP and PEMA; the government was then to make
decisions about evacuation or other protective measures, and to
disseminate all relevant information to the public. This was
not a bad circuit for communicating actual radiation measurements
outside the plant. However, I am sure that it was an inadequate
circuit for communicating to PEMA or BRP how continuing plant
operations could create some vulnerability or probability for
future releases. The emergency plans did not anticipate the
need to be able to look ahead and say, "Continued operation is
going to result in continued generation of gas, which in turn
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Figure 1. Communications paths between the Three Mile Island
plant and Metropolitan-Edison (Met-Ed), General Public
utilities Corporation (GPU), Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency (PEMA), Bureau of Radiation Protec-
tion (BRP), Governor of Pennsylvania, Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC), the media, and the public.
These paths were in effect on March 28th, 29th, and
30 th, 1979.
is going to stress the systems to the point where we have to
release gas." The need to predict events with some uncertainty
was not recognized until the events actually happened. The third
communications circuit linked the plant with NRC headquarters in
Bethesda, near Washington, with the NRC regional office in
Philadelphia, and with NRC staff on site.
Of course, each of the paths involved the communication of
information that was a little bit fuzzy, due to the limited
ability of the plant staff to understand the meaning of the
events that were occurring. Another problem was that communica-
tions from each involved party then went to the media and sub-
sequently to the public. There was no good, solid cOMmunica-
tions system that put all this information into the proper context
before the public was told what to expect and what to do. We
found ourselves with several communications links to the media,
which bypassed any organized system, and which caused a great
deal of concern in the public early on with more or less unfiltered
random thoughts.
In the early stages of the accident we at GPU thought that
the plant had gone through some kind of shutdown, probably
accompanied by some local overheating of the core and some
release of fission products or gases from ruptured fuel claddings--
implying that fission products and gases had leaked into the
cooling system, and to some degree into the containment. We
were also aware, quite early on, that there had been some loss
of water through the failed-open pilot-operated relief valve.
On the second day of the accident, the 29th of March, we dispatched
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a team of about 6 or 8 specialists to the site to begin a post-
mortem analysis of the accident, i.e., to study why it happened,
what could be done to prevent it from happening in the future,
etc. But when the team arrived at the accident site and began
talking to the plant staff, piecing together various inputs,
it soon became apparent that the fuel materials had been very
badly damaged and that it was necessary to contend with a large
volume of gas.
As of the 30th of March two different sets of technical
staff were present at the plant: the technical support from
GPU and the NRC staff members who had begun arriving at the
site. This situation is depicted in Figure 2. Beginning on
March 29 we found that the situation at the plant had an insati-
able appetite for analysis, contingency planning, what ifs,
.--
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Figure 2. Groups providing technical support to the Three Mile
Island plant on March 30th, March 31st, and April 1st:
National laboratories, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU),
Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), and other nuclear steam
supply vendors.
procedures, plans, fallbacks, and the like. The level of suoport
effort and the kinds of problems faced are described in a paper
by Long, Crimmins, and Lowe (1979). For a while everybody sent
by GPU to the site became absorbed in the technical support
operation, which went on around the clock, in two twelve-hour
shifts, and provided direct support to the plant. As the NRC
staff members arrived at the site, they began to quiz the plant
people with such questions as, "What I s going on? What are you
doing about this? How about this? How about the other?" The
NRC soon became nervous because it was not getting good answers,
or the best possible answers that it could have expected. The
NRC somehow was not fully aware that a GPU backup support team
was in place. The level of information possessed by the NRC
was limited by the inability of the plant staff and the technical
support staff to adequately translate what was going on.
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One of the problems that arose during this period stemmed
from the overlapping actions of the GPU and the NRC groups.
For instance, the GPU technical support group contacted Babcock
& Wilcox (B&W)--the nuclear steam supply vendor for Three Mile
Island--and other nuclear steam sup~ly vendors. At the same
time the NRC began to contact their consultants, B&W, and
other nuclear steam supply vendors. At this point we underwent
a day or two when the system was not only strained, but poten-
tially overstrained, by having more people asking questions than
answering questions. One conclusion that should be drawn from
this is that a plant dealing with such an accident needs a tre-
mendous amount of support; this support should indeed aid the
plant and not just divert energy and resources. When we called
General Electric or Combustion Engineering they would often
react in the following way, "But we have already talked to the
NRC about that. Who is asking what question? Whose question
should we answer?" There were also dual circuits of communication
with B&W. It is clear from this experience that it is necessary
for participants to coordinate their efforts very quickly and to
assign priorities to questions, so that important procedures can
be carried out without diverting energy to just asking or answer-
ing an infinite variety of questions. At TMI this sort of ques-
tioning occurred with the greatest intensity on March 30th,
March 31st, and perhaps April 1st. As time went on, people
began to communicate better with one another and some of these
problems became less intense.
The release that generated the most concern occurred on
Friday, March 30th, during the period of inadequate communication.
The most significant feature of that event was not the release
itself, but the fact that the problems it caused could have been
prevented by better communication. The release was anticipated
by the plant, and even though it caused high measurements of
radioactivity over the stack for a short time, it was small and
did not last long enough to have a significant off-site impact.
Yet the plant staff somehow failed to communicate this to the
NRC and the state.
When the make-up tank was vented to a waste gas tank through
a leaky header, a plant official called in a helicopter for mea-
surements. The helicopter measured 1200 millirem per hour 130
feet above the stack, directly in the plume. An NRC staff mem-
ber had calculated that an exposure of 1200 millirem per hour
on ground level at the site boundary would correspond to a seri-
ous plant situation, i.e., the rupture of the waste gas tank.
Communication then became bogged down concerning the difference
between the stack and ground level measurement points, and this
triggered various and sundry actions. My intent here is not to
blame anybody. My point is simply that such communications must
be very loud and clear and direct in order to minimize the oppor-
tunity for confusion and mistakes.
It is hard to describe the communications problems at TMI
because the system had so many loops among so many organizations.
The arrival of new people caused a certain amount of fuzziness
in the loops involving the company, the state, and the NRC.
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As Figure 3 shows, three major operational groups covering
plant modifications, radioactive waste management, and technical
support were put into action, in addition to the plant operations
group. The plant modifications group was created because we
recognized the need to move quickly to reinforce certain plant
hardware systems, in order to compensate for effects of the
accident and to prepare for possible contingencies. For example,
because of the large amount of noncondensible gas, we were
critically dependent upon forced convection, and thus upon elec-
tric power for pumping, for a few days. As most of you may know,
very few (if any) light water reactors are designed so on-site
emergency power diesel engines can be used to operate the primary
coolant pumps. TMI was not an exception, so we were critically
dependent upon outside power and transmission lines. We worked
to improve the security of the transmission system, and to bring
more diesels onto the site. We also acquired additional ventila-
tion systems and filters to back up the-plant's existing built-in
filter systems.
As I mentioned earlier, we were critically aware of the prob-
lem of using the decay heat removal system; this led us to ask
questions about the reliability of that system for dealing with
water with high concentrations of fission products. We then
acted to supply a backup system to provide reliable decay heat
removal. We also found that instruments were failing, so we had
to look at ways to independently measure water inventory, inde-
pendently assure that the system was pressurized, etc. These
were part of a whole host of plant modifications that we had
to carry out to reinforce the plant's safety systems. These
tasks generally required engineering and construction work.
The second operational group was charged with managing
radioactive wastes. As you know, in effect, we had to turn off
all effluent systems. As you can imagine, after these systems
are turned off you quickly begin to swim in your own juices.
So we had a critical problem of taking care of radioactive wastes,
both solid and liquid. The second support group was assigned
the tasks of managing tankage, putting in place backup tankage,
and generally figuring out how to handle the radioactive waste
problem.
The third operational group provided general technical sup-
port, backed up by the industry advisory group (lAG) mentioned
earlier. The lAG started out with 25 or 30 people, including
several key people from the Electric Power Research Institute,
almost every reactor supplier, architect engineers, and so forth.
During its period of existence, which was about 5 weeks, over
110 people contributed to this group's work. The first lAG
contingent arrived on site Saturday, March 31. I told them to
begin by examining basic problems separately from the existing
plant operations support groups. I told them that we needed
supportive people who were not drawn into the day-to-day battle--
people who had a broad range of technological expertise, who
could step back a bit from the front lines and think about
important strategic problems. I gave them four basic tasks.
First, they were to identify any pitfalls involved in cooling
55
At the same time second-hand information was passed along on
the direct link between NRC Chairman Hendrie and Pennsylvania
Governor Thornburgh. Decisions made at the headquarters level
sometimes ignored information flowing among the lower levels.
It is important to keep in mind that in the midst of this
confusion the communication links from the accident to the media
functioned very, very strongly and effectively in terms of
impact on the public. The question we must try to resolve is,
Can we make the official communication links strong enough to
dominate the short circuits to the media that upset the public
and perhaps lead to inappropriate decisions?
Prior to the release of radioactivity on Friday the 30th,
I had been lulled into a degree of security by the apparent
stability at the plant. From late Wednesday to Thursday night,
I was not aware that the continuing operations involved an
accumulation of gases that would have to be occasionally trans-
ferred, resulting in some off-site exposure. On Friday morning,
when we had the release that caused so much concern, I became
painfully aware of the significance of the problem. By that
time I knew about the generation of hydrogen, its implications
for core overheating, and the difficulties of cooling given the
presence of a large amount of noncondensible gas. Starting
early Friday morning, GPU began to seek further outside help,
specifically from people in the nuclear industry, vendors,
suppliers, architects, engineers, other utilities, and some of
the national laboratories, where I happened to know people.
The people who responded to our requests came to be known as
the industry advisory group (lAG). The lAG was an important
part of the organization that GPU officially put into place in
the next few days. Figure 3 shows this organization schematically.
GPU
Joint Working
Group (NRC,
GPU, Met-Ed,
lAG, B&W, etc.)
I I I I
Technical Plant Plant RadioactivelAG r--. support operations modifications waste
management
Figure 3. The organization of the TMI accident recovery staff
as of April 4th, 1979. (NRC is Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, GPU is General Public Utilities, Met-Ed
is Metropolitan-Edison, lAG is Industry Advisory
Group, and B&W is Babcock and Wilcox.)
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the plant; given the large volume of noncondensible gas and a
great deal of dissolved gas, the plant was critically dependent
upon continuation of forced convection and maintenance of pressure
in the system. Second, they were to begin analyzing the degree
of damage to the core and the significance of that damage or
disarray for reliable core cooling and prevention of further
problems. The third task consisted of analyzing future radiation
confinement problems, i.e., difficulties with charcoal filters,
with released radioactive water, and so forth. Finally, the
lAG contingent was to think about necessary plant modifications.
The lAG was deliberately kept separate from the large,
integrated organization dedicated to the day-to-day, minute-by-
minute management of the plant. It was conceived as a group of
scientists and engineers standing off to one side, which could
give problems an additional level of analysis, and perhaps extend
that analysis further into the future than people involved in
day-to-day operations were able to do. In the beginning the
lAG suffered some of the same problems, i.e., providing new
staff with sufficient knowledge about plant status to permit
effective functioning, that the support staff had experienced
earlier. Each time additional resources are introduced to pro-
vide assistance in such an accident situation, there is a sizable
time period when these resources are nothing more than a burden
on the plant. Until the new staff members come up to speed they
constitute a real problem.
As indicated in Figure 3, we established a joint working
group with a task management function, in addition to the opera-
tional groups and the lAG. It brought together the heads of
each of the other groups and the NRC representative. Responsi-
bility for reviewing important questions of forward planning,
important strategic questions, and critical procedural questions
came to be vested in this group. It was the mechanism for cross-
functional coordination and included NRC views in its considera-
tion of all major actions to be undertaken. I should point out
that, while I think our relationship with the NRC was reasonably
cordial during the early stages prior to the formalization of
the joint working group, there seemed to be a little more stand-
offishness. The dialogue essentially took the following form,
"What are you going to do? Whatever it is, you have to give
it to me to approve." I should reiterate that initially I had
no problem philosophically with accepting the NRC's role. But
when we went over to the organization shown in Figure 3, with
an official process for NRC input to the accident management
organization, it felt as if somebody had just turned on the
lights. All of a sudden, the NRC had direct access and input
to what was going on, with the NRC representative reporting back
to all of the NRC staff.
One of the most important observations I will make today
concerns the tremendous difference in effectiveness between the
early modes of organization and the type of organization indicated
in Figure 3. The latter structure permitted much more of a com-
mon understanding, i.e., a joint definition or development of
priorities and working relationships. The difference was almost
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like night and day. I think we should develop ways to quickly
establish an organization that allows all the participants to
contribute to the management of the accident as effectively as
possible.
The organization indicated in Figure 3 took several days
to evolve, then stayed essentially intact until cold shutdown
was achieved. I am sure there is nothing fundamental about
this organization, but I would like to suggest that its major
elements will probably be needed in any organization formed to
respond to an accident. One must anticipate that the plant is
going to need a tremendous input of technical support, that
modifications will have to be made to reinforce safety systems,
and that managing radiation wastes will pose a tremendous prob-
lem. The industry advisory group was valuable because it pro-
vided a degree of assurance to GPU, the NRC, and the public
that some of the best minds in the country were working to
manage the accident. Finally, the joint working group provided
a clear mechanism for coordinating all the groups involved in
managing the accident, for focusing their efforts, for establish-
ing priorities, and for getting the job done.
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL
This review of the accident would not be complete without
some consideration of procedure development and approval. I do
not ever want to be interpreted as objecting to the need--even
under prolonged accident conditions--for some levels of indepen-
dent review, impartial thinking, and approval. In the event of
an emergency this process is just as important as it is during
normal operations. 'Normal operations' means that the plant
operator is performing tasks, making changes, and establishing
procedures in the context of some approved package of technical
specifications. In an emergency the plant is suddenly in a state
where nobody can identify the appropriate envelope of operations.
The only solution is for all those involved to work carefully
together to manage the event. However, you must keep in mind
that you are not the master in the accident environment. You
do not have control of the schedule, the timing of certain
actions, and initiatives. You have to look ahead and try to
anticipate contingencies and you must always try to arm the
plant with a set of fallback positions and procedures. While it
is desirable to have independent review and approval of these
procedures, the pressure of the accident situation can require
that certain procedures be carried out before their approvals
have been completed. Since the plant staff has to be in a
position to move quickly, the review mechanism has to be treated
as somewhat of a back-up system, which identifies current prob-
lems, anticipates future problems, etc.
These considerations also apply in the area of plant modifi-
cations. Existing requirements for design control, quality
control, etc., provide a baseline for decision making, but in an
accident situation you have to make critical judgments concerning
trade-offs between quality and time. Keeping in mind that you
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do not have control of the time element, you are faced with
questions like "Are we going to have something on time that is
reasonably effective, or are we going to insist upon perfection
and perhaps have it ready a minute too late, or a day too late,
or a year too late?" In an emergency you cannot respond accord-
ing to your own planning or scheduling or your own logic. Instead
you are forced into a reactive mode. The only thing you can do
is to try to look ahead and be prepared for those occasions that
require a reaction.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I would like to repeat what I see as the three
main points of this talk. First, communications are paramount.
Strong, well-organized, predetermined lines of communications
are needed to form a system capable of providing a cohesive
picture of what is going on. This system should keep the public
fully aware, in clear terms, of progress in accident management
and plant status. Second, the organization of technical support
must be clear and well understood, with predetermined roles
and modes of interaction for all involved agencies. Approval
mechanisms must be carefully maintained, but the possible need
for speedy action should be recognized; such action should not
be unnecessarily obstructed by slow approval chains. Finally,
I cannot overemphasize the magnitude of technical support called
for in an accident such as the one at Three Mile Island. The
total activity at the site included about 2,000 people two weeks
after the accident, and peaked at about 2,800 or 2,900 people
a few weeks later. One ends up throwing an almost inconceivable
amount of manpower at the problem to try to take care of every-
thing that has to be done.
As I end this presentation, I urge you to read the three
reports listed below. All were presented at the American Nuclear
Society/Atomic Industrial Forum meeting in San Francisco, November
1979.
REFERENCES
Dieckamp, H. 1979. The accident at Three Mile Island--the
owner-operator's assessment. American Nuclear Society
Transactions 33.
Keaton, R.W., T.L. Van Witbeck, T.G. Broughton, and P.S. Walsh.
1979. Analysis of TMI-2 sequence of events and operator
response. American Nuclear Society Transactions 33.
Long, R.L., T.M. Crimmins, and W.W. Lowe. 1979. Three Mile
Island accident technical report. American Nuclear Society
Transactions 33.
4THE NRC'S ON-SITE RESPONSE TO THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT
Richard H. Vollmer
Director, Three Mile Island Support Staff
united States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Following the accident at Three Mile Island on March 28,
1979, a series of notifications and events occurred that pre-
cipitated action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
other state and federal agencies. This paper focuses on the
on-site activities performed by the NRC in the following areas:
analysis of the event as it was proceeding;
projection or anticipation of future events that could have
had health and safety impacts;
provision of NRC technical resources to assist the licensee
to cope with the day-to-day demands of the accident;
provision of long-term NRC resources, in support of site
activities;
facilitation of communication between the NRC and the community
affected by the accident and its aftermath.
Significant off-site activities provided by the NRC and other
agencies to monitor releases of radioactive effluents and to
provide other off-site emergency functions are not examined in
this paper. Rather, this discussion is limited to actions taken
by the NRC that dealt directly with the assurance and maintenance
of facility safety.
The chronology of events and the general accident scenario
has been discussed in several documents. The most detailed account
is given in a report entitled "Investigation into the March 28,
1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and
Enforcement" (USNRC 1979). The NRC and other authorities were
notified about four hours following the accident. Soon thereafter
a team of inspectors from the NRC's regional office were dispatched
to the site and arrived there at about 10:15 on the morning of
March 28. A large technical staff meanwhile assembled in the
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NRC's Washington office to monitor activities on-site via direct
phone lines, in an attempt to diagnose the situation and provide
technical guidance. It gradually became clear that this activity
would not succeed because of inadequate communications. Late in
the evening of March 28 I was asked to assemble a team of two
reactor systems specialists, two radiological specialists, and
two instrument and control specialists, to proceed to the site
early the next morning. By that time the NRC already had 11
people on site, as well as a mobile laboratory van for the analysis
of the radiation content of environmental samples. In addition,
teams provided by the Department of Energy were performing some
environmental monitoring and aerial surveys.
When our team arrived at the site just before noon on
Thursday, March 29, we found a lull in activity because radiation
readings at or near the plant were not alarming and no radio-
iodine had been detected. The reactor system itself seemed to be
performing in a stable manner, except for a "soft system," which
implied the presence of noncondensable gases in the primary sys-
tem. Plant operators were also unable to stop periodic discharges
of noble gases. The full significance of the situation did not
become clear until later, when analysis of the primary coolant
sample showed significant core damage, when the hydrogen bubble
problem became apparent, when the hydrogen burn in the reactor
building was recognized, and when several more significant
releases of radioactivity occurred.
Even on Thursday, a relatively quiet time, the communication
capacity at the site was far overtaxed. In our role as lead staff
trying to perform on-site analysis, we were severely hampered
both by lack of communication and the inability of utility per-
sonnel to provide cogent information on system parameters.
By late Friday afternoon, when the severity of the situation
was quite evident, over 80 NRC staff members were on site. It
then became a problem to decide how staff members should be
allocated. It was apparent that the licensee needed technical
assistance in four vital areas:
(1) Diagnosing the current plant situation and projecting
the operational maneuvers needed to preclude further
reductions in plant safety;
(2) Developing procedures quickly to instruct plant operators
on their course of action, as off-normal techniques were
required for dispersing the hydrogen bubble and for
performing other necessary operations;
(3) Coping with significant health physics and radwaste
problems;
(4) Considering and planning for procedural and equipment
contingencies--for example, planning a contingency
method for providing additional core cooling, by off-
normal means if needed to assure long-term safety, and
planning for the installation of additional systems.
To provide help in these areas, the NRC technical staff was
divided into two groups that operated around the clock in two
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12-hour shifts. Some of the staff was responsible for assisting
the utility in preparing procedures and in resolving health
physics and radwaste problems. Since these activities could at
times conflict with the facility license as it existed at the
time of the accident, the NRC had to give explicit written approval
for the implementation of all new or revised procedures. This
policy was instituted to ensure that the licensee would not
violate its facility specifications and, more importantly, to
provide a technical quality assurance check on the effectiveness
and safety of the proposed activity. In many instances this
policy required that the TMI staff consult the NRC on each step
of the operation, so the NRC could independently monitor the
operation and system's parameters. Because the utility did not
have enough staff familiar with the plant to write effective pro-
cedures, this policy proved very worthwhile.
Other NRC staff members had the task of independently assess-
ing minute-to-minute operations, looking for trends, and searching
for clues that would indicate incipient problems. This task
involved monitoring operational parameters, analyzing trends,
and developing criteria to establish when alternate courses of
action might be taken. Another group of NRC representatives, in
conjunction with an industry advisory group assembled on site,
assisted in planning for activities that would cope with fore-
seeable contingencies and provide for a long-term safe shutdown.
At this time the NRC directed most of its response activity from
the site itself, although it utilized large resources and tech-
nical talent from the Washington office, NRC regional offices,
and NRC contractors.
Finally, the NRC provided support activities to obtain ser-
vices, equipment, or supplies that otherwise would have been
difficult for the utility to acquire quickly or that perhaps
would even have been unavailable to industry. In the early days
of the accident many demands arose for equipment and supplies.
These demands were generally filled through NRC contacts at
various labs dealing with nuclear matters, and then shipped on
an expedited basis with the aid of US Air Force facilities. For
example, thousands of pounds of lead for shielding were flown
to the site on a priority basis. Several robots were made avail-
able in case they were needed for taking highly radioactive
samples or performing other activities in environments hostile
to humans. (They were not used, however.) National laboratory
facilities were also made available for the quick analysis of
samples to determine the extent of radioactive releases.
For a month to six weeks following the accident, all the
above activities constituted important responses. By the end
of this period most contingency measures had been developed, the
reactor itself was in a safe shutdown configuration, and the
general extent of contamination was reasonably well known. The
remaining tasks included development of a long-term decontamina-
tion and cleanup program and maintenance of the facility in a
safe configuration. In this context the NRC has established
an on-site group responsible for long-term operations. In keeping
with its tasks, this group is composed primarily of systems
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engineers, radwaste engineers, and health physicists, about 15
professionals in all. They are currently responsible for the
review and approval of all systems designs and modifications,
as well as operational plans and procedures for the recovery
process. They must also deal with the local public and press--
a job that has proven very important as a result of the public
concerns generated by the accident.
The long-term operations group is also involved in the
preparation of environmental analyses that are required for
evaluating various approaches to cleaning up the facilities and
for dealing with the waste generated. We anticipate that this
level of participation will continue for at least three to four
years--perhaps even longer if portions of the cleanup process,
such as removal of the damaged core, take significantly more
time than anticipated.
Recently the NRC opened an office in Middletown, Pennsylvania,
in an effort to improve public access to the NRC and to documents
of public interest. We consider convenient public access to this
information important both from a public relations viewpoint and
as a means of helping to dispel public anxiety about the accident
and its aftermath. This is the first office of this type that
the NRC has opened. The anxiety and concern still expressed by
the local population over such issues as the cleanup process and
the possible future start-up of either unit 1 or Unit 2 requires
that the NRC maintain close community links.
SUMMARY
Early evaluation of the Three Mile Island accident pointed
to a need for significant technical and logistic resources that
the utility alone could not supply. It is unlikely that any
utility in the US could have provided all these resources. During
the accident it became clear that the NRC would have to go beyond
its traditional licensing and inspection role and assume more of
a participatory role to meet the needs of public health and safety.
The need for NRC staff to work closely with the licensee as tech-
nical consultants and to be involved in each step of the post-
accident facility operation has provided the rationale for some
of the requirements now being examined in the course of the NRC's
"Lessons Learned" activities and ongoing investigations. NRC's
involvement in the accident pointed out that more planning and
a significantly higher level of resources must be developed by
both the nuclear industry and the NRC for utilization in the
unlikely event of another serious nuclear accident.
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5EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA--THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT
Oran K. Henderson
Director
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, USA
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the emergency response mechanism and
legal basis in effect in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at the
time of the Three Mile Island incident. It reviews the sequence
of events as they directly affected the Pennsylvania Emergency
~1anagement Agency and examines the method used by the Agency to
discharge its responsibilities. Finally, the paper lists some
of the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island experience.
I do not wish to take sides in the debate about how much we
need nuclear energy or how easily we can do without it. It is
sufficient to say that many knowledgeable people argue that this
country's use of nuclear power to meet a small portion of its
energy needs cannot be eliminated without very serious and damaging
economic consequences. During the past year, small reductions in
oil imports have reminded us of this fact. Thus it is reasonable
to assume that we will continue to utilize nuclear energy and
that we may become more dependent upon it in the future. Logic
dictates that if we must have nuclear power, then we should try
to minimize its risks, and to be prepared to meet the consequences,
should all else fail.
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency functions as a
semi-independent Agency under the office of the Governor. Through
this organization the Governor exercises his emergency responsi-
bility for the protection of the health, safety, and well-being
of Commonwealth citizens faced with man-made or natural disasters
or enemy attack.
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The Pennsylvania legislation governing emergency preparedness
and response is patterned after the model act developed by the
Council of State Governments. Many states have used the model
act as a guide, modifying it to meet special needs and to accom-
modate individual organizational arrangements. The Pennsylvania
legislation calls for a Council and prescribes its membership.
This Council, chaired by the Lieutenant Governor, is responsible
for both developing overall policy and providing guidance to the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. The Council membership
includes the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, four members of the
State Senate and House and ten Secretaries of Departments having
major emergency responsibilities.
The law prohibits the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency from duplicating the functions of any other State agency.
Consequently, the tasks of the Agency are to maintain a close
liaison with all State agencies, to determine gaps in missions
and roles, and to develop integrated plans to assure continuing
identification of State resources and the ~rompt assignment of
these resources to reduce the vulnerability of people involved in
emergencies. The Emergency Operations Center of the Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency and its three Area Centers are aug-
mented, during times of disaster, with representatives from other
State agencies that have an emergency role. These representatives
have the authority to perform on behalf of their respective
agencies and to commit resources in accordance with predetermined
procedures.
The day-to-day role of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency involves analyzing problem areas and vulnerabilities, plan-
ning for possible emergencies, and training staff and County
Coordinators. The Agency conducts quarterly exercises with
response team members to assure the maintenance of understanding
and knowledge about the Agency's Standing Operating Procedures.
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Emergency
Operations Center is located in an underground, protected facility
in the Ca~itol complex in Harrisburg. Three Area underground and
protected facilities are strategically located to extend the
Agency's coordination and management role. The Harrisburg Center
communicates with its three Area Centers by telephone, radio, and
a dedicated teletypewriter system.
Each political subdivision of Pennsylvania is required by
law to have an emergency management organization. (The Commonwealth
has a total of 2,636 political subdivisions--67 counties, 52 cities,
966 boroughs/towns, and 1,551 townships.) Each Emergency Management
Coordinator is appointed by the Governor, on the basis of recom-
mendations from the elected officials of the political subdivision.
Information flows from boroughs, towns, and cities to the county
level, then to Area, and finally to State levels, and vice versa.
There are four fixed nuclear sites within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. Two additional sites are under construction
and scheduled to begin o~erations in 1982 (Berwick) and 1983
(Limerick) .
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In the past the State Bureau of Radiation Protection, Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources, had responsibility for planning
state response to emergencies at fixed nuclear sites. In 1975
the Bureau of Radiation Protection forwarded a plan governing
nuclear emergencies to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but
failed to receive concurrence for it. The plan was revised in
September 1977, but not formally submitted to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission. On the basis of the 1977 plan the Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency (which had assumed responsibility for
emergency planning) added a section on "Nuclear Incidents, Fixed
Facility" to the Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan, a document
which provided guidance to State agencies and political subdivi-
sions. All planning was based upon a five-mile protective action
distance around each site. As of March 1979 county plans in
support of the State Disaster Operations Plan were "in place"
and had been reviewed and updated during the summer and fall of
1978.
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
At 7:02 a.m., on March 28, 1979, the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency watch officer received a telephone notification
from the Three Mile Island Plant Supervisor that Three Mile
Island had declared a site emergency. In accordance with the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency standing Operating
Procedure (SOP), the watch officer proceeded to notify, in order
of priority, the following:
(1) Duty Officer, Bureau of Radiation Protection, Department
of Environmental Resources
(2) Dauphin County (host county)
(3) York County (within 5 miles of Three Mile Island)
(4) Lancaster County (within 5 miles of Three Mile Island)
(5) Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Operations
Officer
At 7:20 a.m. the Duty Officer at the Bureau of Radiation
Protection advised the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
watch officer that he had concluded after discussions with per-
sonnel at Three Mile Island that there were no off-site consequences.
The watch officer, in turn, passed this information to the affected
counties.
In the meantime, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
Operations Officer arrived at the Emergency Operations Center and
relayed the Duty Officer's report to the Director of the Pennsyl-
vania Emergency Management Agency. The Operations Officer,
together with early staff arrivals, relieved the watch officer.
Subsequent actions were handled through the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency Emergency Operations Center.
At 7:35 a.m. the Three Mile Island Plant Supervisor notified
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Operations Officer
that conditions were worsening and that a general emergency had
been declared. The Plant Supervisor recommended that the
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Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency be prepared to evacuate
Brunner Island and the Borough of Goldsboro. He reported that a
radiation release to the atmosphere had been and was still occur-
ring, and that winds were in the direction of 30°. The Pennsyl-
vania Emergency Management Agency Operations Officer passed this
information to the Bureau of Radiation Protection, alerted York
County to be prepared for evacuation of Brunner Island and the
Borough of Goldsboro, and advised Dauphin and Lancaster Counties
of the situation. The Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency notified the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
of the reported conditions. Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of
Radiation Protection advised that the release had been halted
and that no evacuation was required.
It was subsequently learned that the sequence of events which
ultimately led to the emergency notifications had actually begun
around 4:00 a.m. With this exception, all reporting and notifica-
tion procedures conformed to established procedures, and all tele-
phone circuits were functioning.
On the 28th and 29th of March, the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency and the three affected counties made a con-
siderable effort to flesh out existing plans. As a precaution,
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency maintained a scaled-
down 24-hour operational capability in its Emergency Operations
Center. Reports received on the 28th and 29th of March, although
frequently conflicting, generally reflected progress towards a
cold shutdown of the reactor. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
representatives repeatedly acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison
personnel were doing a superb job and were demonstrating dedication
and professionalism. National news media were seeking stories away
from the scene relating to nuclear safety and several articles
treated speculative events. The film "China Syndrome" was showing
in several area theaters.
At 8:40 a.m., on the 30th of March ("Black Friday"), the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency received two simultaneous
telephone messages from Three Mile Island. Three Mile Island
personnel reported a general emergency condition due to a radia-
tion reading of some 1200 mR/hr. They informed the Agency that
the facility was preparing to evacuate nonessential personnel and
recommended that the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency be
prepared to evacuate downwind areas. This information triggered
an alert to the affected counties and the initiation of the full
activation of the State Emergency Operations Center.
At 9:15 a.m., the Bethesda, Maryland Office of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission advised the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-
ment Agency that it also recommended a downwind evacuation of the
Three Mile Island facility within a 10-mile range. The Bethesda
Office reported that this recommendation had the support of senior
personnel at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Subsequent discussions between the Bureau of Radiation
Protection and Three Mile Island personnel and between Governor
Thornburgh and the Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission determined that existing conditions did not warrant such
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a radical step. Instead the Governor issued an advisory at
approximately 10:00 a.m., March 30, for all people within ten
miles of the Three Mile Island facilitv to remain indoors until
further notice. This was followed by a further advisory shortly
after noon for all pregnant women and preschool-aged children
to evacuate the area within five miles of the facility.
Selected units of the Pennsylvania National Guard were placed
on a "white alert." They were directed to be prepared to support
each county at risk with one battalion and to provide a backup
battalion in support of each committed battalion. The pennsylvania
State Police were prepared to bring maximum force into the area
as well. Both the National Guard and the State Police were
ordered to be prepared to assist with any evacuation and to pro-
vide traffic control and security for any area evacuated. For
the most part, the local police, fire, and emergency medical forces
in the area at risk were fully activated and in an advanced readi-
ness posture.
PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCES
Following the Governor's advisory for partial evacuation, a
number of people commenced an orderly, voluntary movement out of
the area. Commercial banks and savings institutions were immedi-
ately besieged with people wishing to withdraw funds. Hospitals
began to reduce their patient loads by discharging some patients
and rescheduling elective surgery cases. During this period, the
Pennsylvania State Police aerial traffic observer reported no
abnormal traffic patterns. Analysts subsequently determined that
reportable traffic accidents/incidents were approximately 25%
lower in counties in the affected area during the Three Mile
Island incident, compared to a similar period prior to and a
corresponding period after the incident.
Immediately following the Governor's 10 a.m. 'take cover'
advisory, a telephone overload occurred. For approximately
three hours, 30- to 40-minute time delays were experienced through-
out the Harrisburg exchange. Both the news media and public
inquiries totally saturated the 100-plus lines servicing the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Emergency Operations
Center.
As a result of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's recommen-
dation to evacuate the area within a radius of ten miles, the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Department of
Transportation, and the Pennsylvania State Police made a hasty
traffic analysis and reassigned major route priorities to the
risk counties. Personnel from the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-
ment Agency and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency were
assigned to the risk counties to assist in the planning effort.
Direct telephone lines between the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-
ment Agency and the affected risk counties were installed, and
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency voluntarily put a radio
system into operation linking the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-
ment Agency and the counties at risk.
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At approximately 8:30 a.m., on Friday, March 30, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission advised that it would be prudent to develop
plans for an evacuation of the area within a radius of 20 miles
from the Three Mile Island facility. This increased the counties
at risk from three to six and enlarged the population at risk
from 30,000 to 750,000. Neither the existing five-mile county
plans nor the preliminary plans for a ten-mile evacuation were
compatible with the problems posed by a 20-mile evacuation scenario.
For all practical purposes, NRC's advice cancelled all earlier
plans and evacuation guidance and set a new course of action in
motion. The pace of planning took on an increased degree of
urgency. In addition to the six counties at risk, 21 additional
counties were alerted for an evacuation hosting role.
In the course of the new evacuation planning, a considerable
number of new problems surfaced. These included
movement of seriously ill patients, patients on life support
systems, and newborn babies;
care and disposition of pets and livestock;
degradation in the availability of medical personnel and
volunteer forces;
leadtime requirements of business and industry;
security of prisoners and other institutionalized persons;
responsibility for associated costs;
stockpiling and issuance of radioprotective drugs;
movement of the seat of government;
sounding of sirens both inadvertently and purposely.
Handling of rumors and misquotes in the news media proved to be
extremely time-consuming. Governor Thornburgh and Harold Denton,
the Nuclear Regulatory senior official on site, retained consider-
able credibility as sources of information. Other Federal agency
and Metropolitan Edison spokespersons received little acknowledge-
ment. A large number of people reported that they didn't believe
anyone.
The experiences of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency during the Three Mile Island incident were in many respects
similar to those encountered in previous natural disaster events
--differing primarily in degree or magnitude. Perhaps the single
exception is that the perception of a danger (aura of mystery)
that cannot be seen, felt, smelled, or tasted resulted in an atti-
tude not generally shared in other emergency responses. Anti-
nuclear and/or concerned individuals and groups were extremely
outspoken on this point. The Pennsylvania Emergency Hanagement
Agency had to convey an attitude of restraint and caution during
an incident that threatened to be catastrophic for the general
public.
The following are some of the lessons learned from the Three
Mile Island incident:
• We can no longer take for granted that nuclear power plants
are safe. Our planning should not treat an accident only
as an extremely remote possibility.
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• We need to obtain radioprotective drugs and plan for their
dissemination and use.
• We need to focus more attention on the handling of people
under special care in homes, hospitals, and institutions.
• We need to improve the level of information concerning nuclear
radiation in all segments of the population.
• We need a fully integrated and adequately redundant in-place
communications system.
• We must do a better job of bringing county and local government
officials into the decision-making process.
• We must recognize emergency management's dependency upon vol-
unteers and volunteer forces and we must understand that they
may not always be available.
• We must improve our capacity for handling the news media and
assuring their continuous access to coherent sources of in-
formation.
• We must develop a more formal system for tests and exercises.
• Our planning effort must assure total integration between all
levels of government.
• We need, on the national level, a uniform emergency nuclear
incident classification system.
• We need to standardize procedures for the systematic study
of the social, econumic, and health aspects of an incident.
• We need to improve our record keeping.
• And, finally, we urgently need to seek solutions to the prob-
lems associated with fixed nuclear power facilities--not on
the basis of the emotionally-charged rhetoric of the moment,
but using dispassionate, reasoned analysis.
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III. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS:
PERSPECTIVES
INTERNATIONAL
This Section contains discussions of emergency planning and
preparedness in six different countries--countries that have been
fortunate enough not to have experienced an accident like TMI.
Principles underlying the criteria for dose-based countermeasure
guidelines are presented. as well as zones as bases for plans. and
criteria for accident classification. Attention is also given
to the content of accident management plans. including the divi-
sion of responsibility among government and private agencies.
measures for information management. and strategies for maintain-
ing preparedness.
The Section provides a broad survey of international ap-
proaches to the problems of emergency planning and preparedness.
It is the task of the reader to ask how well the plans and orga-
nizations described in the papers address the problems and issues
raised by the TMI accident.

6NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
Robert D. Martin
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents views on the essential aspects of the
actions that must be taken to prevent and--if these actions are
inadequate--to manage nuclear reactor accidents. These views
are based upon the perspective of the Office of Inspection and
Enforcement within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It is
presumed that design review and accident analysis evaluation have
been conducted or are in progress, using the most current criteria.
Accepting this premise, the individuals charged with the
inspection and enforcement of regulatory requirements base many
of their activities on two further assumptions:
Existing regulatory requirements have a sound basis for assur-
ing public health and safety.
Existing regulatory requirements are not adequate for eliminat-
ing every possible threat to public health and safety.
The first point leads the Office of Inspection and Enforcement
to implement programs designed to assure that licensees adhere
to regulatory requirements and, when adherence is not demonstrated,
to set corrective action into motion. Such corrective action
must not only reestablish compliance with requirements, but must
also be sufficiently comprehensive to preclude recurrence of the
violation.
The second point gives recognition to the evolutionary nature
of the regulatory process; the development of regulatory require-
ments is dependent upon an effective feedback network that accounts
for lessons learned from actual operating events and facility in-
cidents. This feedback system provides the technical basis for
refining and updating the regulatory requirements imposed on a
given licensee.
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These perspectives serve as the basis for the observations
that follow. It must be stressed that the actions discussed in
this paper presuppose that design review, safety evaluation, and
safety research are being aggressively pursued. Otherwise the
climate would be unsatisfactory for accident prevention and,
should the occasion arise, accident management.
ACCIDENT PREVENTION
The prevention of accidents at nuclear reactors reauires the
rigorous application of quality measures to achieve two funda-
mental goals:
To assure that the condition of plant safety systems is such
that they can perform their intended function when required.
To assure that all activities conducted at the facility are
critically reviewed to identify system, component, organiza-
tional, or procedural deficiencies and to permit prompt and
appropriate corrective action.
From an inspection and enforcement standpoint, these goals should
be applied to at least the following functional areas:
Surveillance and system testing;
Maintenance and modification activities;
Evaluation of the technical adequacy of procedurally controlled
and other activities;
Reviews of events.
Each of these functional areas will be discussed in further detail
below, accompanied by observations on the sharing of the responsi-
bility for their implementation.
System Testing
The testing of plant systems to assure functional capability
requires that an appropriate test be conducted during the pre-
operational or start-up phase. This test must truly demonstrate
that the system conforms to design parameters. The successful
completion of the test then serves as a basis for the development
of abridged surveillance tests. Such surveillance tests are
utilized throughout plant life as continuing indicators of system
capability.
Since the safety-related systems being tested serve either
as control systems to prevent accidents or as mitigating systems
to limit accident consequences, it is necessary to vigorously
pursue and adhere to the testing programs. The procedures for
conducting system tests must be developed with a full recognition
of the control (or post-accident) bases underlying the system
design. We continue to find instances in which a test utilizes
acceptance criteria which do not appropriately reflect the differ-
ence between test conditions and a system's functional require-
ments. For example, the ventilation system for the annular space
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between a freestanding reactor containment and the shield building
typically has the functional requirement to establish a negative
pressure within a certain elapsed time following a Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA). The acceptance criteria for the system test
must account for the absence of the LOCA thermal loads to the
annular space. Here it is necessary to establish appropriate,
shorter-time-frame criteria to test system performance.
Similarly, the results of such system tests must be reviewed
most critically. The review should assure that such conditions
as marginal conformance to acceptance criteria are not indicative
of a long-term inability to assure system functional capability.
After the initial demonstration of system capability, it is
necessary to establish and then vigorously follow the surveillance
testing program to be used during the lifetime of the plant.
The tests must be meaningful, and the results must be critically
evaluated. Since unnecessary challenges to safety systems should
be avoided, it is often necessary to conduct surveillance testing
in a piecemeal fashion so as not to adversely affect plant opera-
tion. However, such ~iecemeal tests must orovide for enough
overlap of subsystem tests to assure that they are meaningful.
Special quality measures must be established for this purpose.
Several instances of such inadequate overlap of subsystem tests
have occurred; as a result entire safety functions have not been
tested for prolonged periods. In some cases, the protective
mechanism had been improperly installed, and the problem was not
discovered due to the lack of adequate testing. Surveillance
programs are needed to overcome such deficiencies. They must be
appropriately implemented to assure that safety systems have the
functional capability to perform in preventing or mitigating
nuclear reactor accidents.
Modification and Maintenance Activities
The testing activities described in the preceding section
are designed to confirm the functional operability of systems;
but it is clear that such testing (as well as other circumstances)
often identifies the need for corrective maintenance or system
modification. Such corrective or modification activities must
be carried out using the strictest quality measures in order to
assure the reestablishment of the operability of the affected
system.
As explained above, the technical basis for the surveillance
test is a previous successful system test, including detailed
testing of pump run-in, valve stroke times, electrical support
system performance, and so forth. Maintenance or modification
activities disrupt the technical basis for the surveillance test.
For this reason oost-maintenance or modification testing must
adequately demonstrate that the system has been returned to a
state of readiness appropriate for surveillance testing. The
surveillance test alone does not serve this function.
For example, the replacement of seals on all low pressure
injection pumps at a plant provides the potential for a common
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mode failure problem. If the pumps are required to operate for
30 days following a major accident, the standard 15-minute pump
surveillance test does not assure that the new seals were cor-
rectly installed. Only an appropriate post-maintenance/modifica-
tion testing program can provide this assurance.
Technical Adequacy Evaluations
The technical adequacy of all activities conducted at a
site are crucial to the prevention, if not the mitigation, of
nuclear reactor accidents. We have already mentioned the need
for acceptance criteria for technical adequacy of system, surveil-
lance, and post-maintenance tests. Other operational activities
that deserve vigorous evaluation for technical adequacy include
all procedural controls, including routine operations, emer-
gency operations, surveillance, maintenance, and radiological
activities;
all staff training activities, including activities that are
considered to fall under the skill-of-the-craft of various
staff members.
The evaluation program must take the form of a dynamic pro-
gram conducted throughout the life of a plant. The present reg-
ulatory requirements call for licensee plant review groups,
corporate review groups, regular audits of activities, and, more
recently, organizations assigned the task of assessing operational
experiences. But clearly the act of institutionalizing these
mechanisms does not assure that they will be vigorously pursued.
Only through the careful selection of personnel--with regard to
their commitment to safe operation, as well as their background
and specific training--will these mechanisms serve their intended
purpose. Their purpose should be to
review every new safety-related control or activity undertaken;
re-review existing controls or activities in light of new
information or operating experience;
re-review controls or activities in light of changing regula-
tory requirements.
These measures will not be sufficient to prevent accidents if
they are applied primarily to satisfy the requirements of the
regulatory agency. Rather, they must be aoplied within the con-
text of a mission of safety. For example, emergency procedures
should be "walked through" by experienced personnel to try to
identify every procedural weakness prior to implementation.
Similarly, whenever a given procedure needs to be implemented in
a real event, it is necessary to reevaluate its effectiveness
in controlling the evolution of the accident. The lessons learned
from the evaluation of the specific procedure must then be applied
to every other emergency procedure subject to similar faults.
This recommendation does not aim to constantly increase the num-
ber of procedures and controls, but rather to continually test and
improve the effectiveness of technical adequacy evaluations.
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Reviews of Events
Reviews of events, as a means of preventing accidents, are
inextricably tied to the issue of technical adequacy evaluations.
The critical review of events is a primary procedure for identify-
ing and subsequently resolving system, component, or operational
deficiencies. Examples of identification of such deficiencies
from event reviews are numerous. The following three are partic-
ularly relevant.
• A plant trip, initiated as part of a start-up test program,
resulted in a hanger anchor bolt failure that led to identifi-
cation of industry-wide deficiencies in anchor bolt installa-
tions;
• A review of reportable occurrences identified industry-wide
deficiencies in plant seismic analyses of the as-built con-
figurations of the plants;
• A review of reportable occurrences identified deficiencies in
safety-related relay manufacturing controls.
These examples show the benefits of reviews of off-normal events
for plant safety. A case can also be made for critically reviewing
normal operational events to assure that transient analvses are
correct or, conversely, to identify when the plant or some sub-
system is exhibiting characteristics that were not predicted.
As a result of this mechanism, each operating plant becomes,
in essence, an experimental laboratory; the lessons learned from
every facet of plant operation can help to improve general plant
performance and safety. Of course, each issue raised in such
reviews of events may well lead to extended plant shutdowns and/or
major capital expenditures by plant operators. However, the
feedback needed to improve plant safety and thereby prevent reac-
tor accidents will occur only through such actions on the part
of the utilities and the regulatory agencies.
The results of reviews performed to date support the earlier
contention that the regulatory requirements applicable to nuclear
plants are not sufficient to assure public health and safety.
The evolutionary process of review, identification, and resolution
leads to the refinement of regulatory requirements--often to the
dismay of the industry--and contributes to enhanced public safety.
Clearly, the greatest benefit of critically reviewing opera-
tional events and transients can be derived from scutiny of serious
nuclear incidents. Detailed reviews of the accident at Three Mile
Island Unit 2 on March, 28, 1979, for example, have prompted pro-
found changes in approaches to accident prevention, both on the
part of plant managers and the regulatory agency. Further changes
will be instituted in the future, as well they should, to assure
the full use of the lessons learned from the accident. Long-term
changes in approaches to accident prevention are reflected in
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the long-term recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force
(USNRC, October 1979);
the recommendations of the NRC Special Inquiry into Three Bile
Island (USNRC Special Inquiry Group, January 1980);
the recommendations of the President's Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island (President's Commission, October
1979);
the tasks identified by the NRC Action Plan currently under
development (USNRC, February 1980).
The bibliography at the conclusion of this chapter provides the
sources of more detailed information about these recommendations
and tasks.
Despite the scope of the above activities, the value of
carrying out further reviews of plant operations remains undimin-
ished. This view is confirmed by the NRC decision to establish
the Office of Analysis and Evaluation. As well, the nuclear
industry has established the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
and the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. In addition to these
large organizations, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Headquarters and NRC regional offices are taking steps to enhance
their capability to critically review operational events. Licensee
operating organizations are undertaking similar activities.
Clearly, it is inappropriate to assume that the accident at Three
Mile Island revealed all the lessons we have to learn.
Responsibilities
Facility operating organizations and the responsible regula-
tory agencies share a parallel responsibility to achieve the goals
discussed above. A facility operating organization must apply
test, maintenance, evaluation, and review measures to its own
facility and must then inform the regulatory agency of its find-
ings. In the US the NRC is currently taking steps to further
clarify the kinds of issues about which it requires prompt and
detailed information. However, it is difficult to impart to
regulatory requirements the totality of coverage needed to ad-
dress all issues. For this reason the utilities must follow
the "spirit" as well as the "letter" of such regulations. Such
a recognition will substantially enhance plant safety.
The regulatory agency in turn has the duty to refine and
implement its inspection and review processes. It must assure
the public that deficiencies are being identified, evaluated,
and resolved. Moreover, it must aggressively pursue the identi-
fication and resolution in all facilities of deficient conditions
discovered in anyone facility. It is clear that the efforts of
the NRC to fulfill this obligation have increased substantially
since the accident at Three Mile Island. The following table
shows the measures taken by the Office of Inspection and Enforce-
ment. A similar tabulation could be made for generic letters and
orders issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
While some of the information dissemination and recommenda-
tions for action shown in Table 1 were directly related to TMI,
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Table 1. Measures of actions taken by the NRC Office of Insoection
and Enforcement to identify and resolve deficient con-
ditions, before and after the Three Mile Island accident.
Bulletins issued
(requiring licensee action)
Circulars issued
(recommending action)
Information Notices issued
(providing information)
9 months 9 months
prior to TMI subsequent to TMI
12 30
12 20
Sa 29
arnformation Notice System initiated on February 2, 1979.
the majority were not. The step-up in activity after the accident
reflects the agency's recognition that the TMI accident, as it
evolved, may well have been prevented, if such measures had been
pursued more aggressively earlier.
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Because other papers in this volume discuss emergency planning
and preparedness on the part of utilities, local civilian authori-
ties, the state, and the federal sector, it would be redundant to
discuss these issues here. Rather, this paper examines the opera-
tional aspects of accident management at plants, as this applies
to facility staff and the regulatory agency.
A basic requirement in accident management is that the immedi-
ate participants have a thorough understanding of the facility
design and operational characteristics. The operating staff of
the plant has this knowledge, and it is clearly their immediate
responsibility to deal with evolving accident conditions. However,
the shift operating staff are responsible for both plant safety
and continued plant operation; for this reason it is advantageous
to have a technically astute advisor immediately available to
provide insight about the significance of plant conditions. The
recently mandated shift technical advisor (STA) is supposed to
provide this service, but the full scope of the STA's responsibil-
ities still needs to be clarified. Several important issues have
yet to be resolved--for instance, the consequences stemming from
the failure (inadvertant or by choice) of plant staff to follow
the advice of the STA.
Several inquiries have revealed that the philosophy of acci-
dent management was too limited in scope in the case of TMI. Prior
to TMI, it was assumed that accidents would "run their course" in
a very rapid time sequence and thus that the utility and the
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regulatory agencies would assemble emergency staff for ~ost­
accident recovery, not accident management. The TMI experience
showed the error of this view; as well, TMI raised the new issue
of the adequacy, on a real time basis, of communications with
all the organizations needed to help manage the accident.
Here reference is made to the broadest meaning of the term
"communication", i.e., the exchange of information. The pro-
tracted nature of the Three Mile Island accident demonstrated
the need for a viable information and technical su?port network.
To meet these needs several new requirements have been established
for nuclear power plants since the TMI accident:
the provision of a technical support center at each facility
to provide engineering support during an accident;
the provision of dedicated telephone lines between the facility
and the regulatory agency;
the expansion of the resident inspector program to place at
least two resident inspectors at every site to provide an on-
site interface between plant conditions and the information
needs of the regulatory agency.
Investigations of the TMI accident showed that the effective-
ness of both the utility and the regulatory agency was partially
dependent on the information flow between and within each group.
Many of the problems associated with the orderly flow and analysis
of information on plant conditions during an accident remain to
be resolved. Further studies are underway to determine the
practicality of monitoring critical plant parameters at the
operations center of the NRC, either on a continuous basis, or
on a selective basis after the start of an incident.
SUMMARY
The prevention of nuclear reactor accidents requires a con-
tinuing critical application of quality measures for testing
safety-related systems, for maintenance and modification of
safety-related systems, and for technical adequacy evaluations
of all plant activities. Reviews of operational events are also
needed to assure that the analyses performed for the plant are
valid or that systems are performing in accordance with their
design. Within this framework, it should be possible to determine
the corrective actions necessary to assure a continuing low
probability of reactor accidents.
Should these measures prove inadequate, and a reactor acci-
dent occurs, actions have been initiated by both licensees and
the NRC to provide for the management of an accident that evolves
slowly. Both the licensee and the NRC may need to take further
actions. The necessity for effective communications during such
a period is evident; whether the steps taken to date are adequate
remains to be evaluated.
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7EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR FACILITY ACCIDENT:
PREPLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS BY OFF-SITE ORGANIZATIONS
Harold E. Collins
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
INTRODUCTION
In the past quarter century of commercial nuclear power
development, with its attendant supporting fuel cycle facilities,
the record of nuclear safety has been excellent in general terms.
But it has not been flawless and we have received some serious
warnings. The 'defense-in-depth' concept, i.e., multiple bar-
riers between radioactive materials and man and the environs,
has governed the practical uses of nuclear energy and materials.
These multiple barriers have been breached in some of the
accidents that have occurred in nuclear industry--resulting in
radiological exposures to man and contamination of the environ-
ment. Fortunately, in most of these accidents, off-site radio-
logical consequences were relatively minimal, but the ootential
for more serious consequences existed.
The last bastion in the 'defense-in-depth' concept is a
proper and effective emergency planning and preparedness program
to support nuclear facilities. Generally speaking, radiological
emergency response planning, and attendant preoaredness as it
relates to nuclear facilities, has never had high visibility
within the nuclear industry or within governments. Historically,
the numbers of personnel, resources, and funds devoted to it
have been relatively small, as a percentage of the total resources
used to construct, operate, and maintain nuclear facilities.
There are a variety of reasons for this state of affairs.
First, relatively low priority was assigned to emergency planning
and preparedness; this has at its roots the individual, political,
societal, governmental, and industrial perceptions of a high-
technology human endeavor. Second, two long-cherished notions
contributed to this low priority, namely, that nuclear facilities
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were designed, constructed, and operated with such integrity
that the chances of a se~ious accident occu~~inq we~e ext~emely
~emote, and that because of the integrity of design, construction,
and operation any pe~ceived accident would have little effect in
te~ms of off-site ~adiological consequences.
Serious rethinking of the "chances" or "probabilities" of
accidents has taken place. It has been realized that basing
emergency planning and preparedness solely on "probabilities"
may not be entirely valid. The notion that little would happen
in terms of off-site consequences in the event of an accident
is to some measure still supported by the integrity of retention
provided by the nuclear facilities themselves. One cannot say
too much with respect to the human role in the control of these
facilities when accidents have occurred, except to note that
some correct moves were made, but at the same time, many incorrect
moves were made as well. The point is that a degree of good
fortune in some of the nuclear facility accidents led either to
an absence of or to relatively minimal radiological consequences
to man and his environment.
A great deal of good, if not excellent, technical emergency
planning and preparedness guidance has been developed and pub-
lished over the last few years by small groups of people at the
national and international levels, but much rem~ins to be done.
For many reasons, overall emergency planning and preparedness
for nuclear facilities has not yet reached a prudent and necessary
level.
In summary, the justification and need for proper emergency
planning and preparedness programs supportive of nuclear facili-
ties stem from the fact that serious accidents have occurred,
especially in recent times, and the fact that the expansion of
the nuclear industry means many more facilities will become
operational by the end of the century. An additional factor
is that the first generation of nuclear facilities may become
more prone to failures as they age and this could result in
serious accidents. The last bastion of the 'defense-in-depth'
concept has not received the support that it deserves. A high-
visibility, adequate emergency planning and preparedness program,
including satisfactory training programs, can help alleviate
many of the fears surrounding the operation of nuclear facilities.
Such a program would contribute to the overall safety of a high-
technology industry; while it calls for an augmented commitment
of dedicated, competent people, it involves a relatively small
commitment in funds and resources to do the job properly.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT
Nuclear facility operators have the initial, unequivocal
responsibility for accident assessment. This includes p~ompt
notification of off-site authorities, accompanied by initial
recommendations about any protective measures that off-site
authorities should implement to protect the public health and
safety. Prompt accident assessment and notification is partic-
ularly important for fast-breaking accidents. For slow-breaking
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events quick assessment and notification are also important, as
a means for putting off-site authorities on a standby or alert
status for mobilizing any required off-site response. Initial
accident assessment should be followed by prompt specialized
off-site radiological assessment by qualified governmental
authorities. Until these authorities arrive on the scene, the
nuclear facility operator should field radiological monitoring
teams in the environs of the plant. The initial information
gathered by these teams should be used to augment the information
acquired by the nuclear facility operator from in-plant instru-
mentation. In the United States a new emphasis on in-plant
identification of potential hazards represents a change from
the previous emphasis in many operator response plans on measure-
ment of actual levels of radioactivity before notification of
off-site organizations and recommendation of actions to protect
the public (USNRC 1979).
Time Factors Associated with Accidents Leading
to Radiological Releases Off-Site
The planning time frames used by the NRC are based on design
basis accident considerations and the results of calculations
reported in the US Reactor Safety Study (USAEC 1975). The Reactor
Safety Study's guidance cannot be very specific because of the
wide range of time frames associated with the spectrum of acci-
dents considered. Therefore, it is necessary for planners to
consider the possible time periods between the initiating event
and arrival of the plume, as well as possible time periods of
releases in relationship to time needed to implement protective
actions. The Reactor Safety Study indicates, for example, that
major releases may begin in the range of a half hour to as much
as 30 hours after an initiating event and that the duration of
the releases may range from a half hour to several days, with
the major portion of the release occurring within the first day.
In addition, significant plume travel times are associated with
the very adverse meteorological conditions corresponding to
large potential exposures far from the site. For example, under
the poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds,
two hours or more might be required for the plume to travel a
distance of five miles. Higher windspeeds would result in shorter
travel times, but would provide more dispersion, making high
exposures at long distances much less likely. Therefore, if
early notification of off-site authorities occurs for major
releases of radioactive material, significant advance warning
of high concentrations should be available in most cases. The
warning time could vary somewhat for reactors whose containment
characteristics differ from those analyzed in the Reactor Safety
Study (USAEC 1975). The range of times given below, however, is
judged suitably representative for the purpose of developing emer-
gency plans.
A planning basis for the time dependence of a release can
be expressed as a range of time periods in which to implement
protective action. This range of values prior to the start of
a major release is on the order of a half hour to several hours.
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The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may
be expected to be released is on the order of a half hour (short-
term release) to a few days (continuous release). The US guidance
(USNRC/EPA 1978) on the initiation and duration of releases may
be summarized as follows:
Time from the initiating event to start of atmospheric release:
0.5 hr to 1 day.
Time period over which radioactive material may be continu-
ously released: 0.5 hr to several days.
Time at which major portion of release may occur: 0.5 hr to
1 day after start of release.
Travel time of release to exposure point (time after release):
5 mi - 0.5 to 2 hr, 10 mi - 1 to 4 hr.
The time available for action is strongly related to the time
consumed in the process of issuing a notification that conditions
exist that could cause a major release or that a major release
is occurring. Therefore the NRC is encouraging development and
periodic testing of procedures for rapid notification.
Radioloqical Characteristics of Releases
To specify the characteristics of monitoring instrumentation,
to develop decision aids for estimating projected doses, and to
identify critical exposure modes, planners will need information
on the radiological characteristics of potential releases.
Three dominant exposure modes have been identified for
atmospheric releases from nuclear power facilities:
whole body (bone marrow) exposure from external gamma radiation
and from ingestion of radioactive material;
thyroid exposure from inhalation or ingestion of radioiodines;
and
exposure of other organs (e.g., lung) from inhalation or inges-
tion of radioactive materials.
Any of these exposure modes could dominate (i.e., result in the
largest exposures) depending upon the relative quantities of
various isotopes released. Radioactive materials produced during
the operation of nuclear reactors include fission products and
transuranics generated by neutron exposure of the structural
materials and other materials within and immediately around the
reactor core. The fission products consist of a very large num-
ber of different kinds of isotopes (nuclides), almost all of
which are initially radioactive. The amounts of these fission
products and their potential for escape from their normal places
of confinement have the greatest potential for consequences to
the public.
Radioactive fission products exist in a variety of physical
and chemical forms with varied volatility. Virtually all activa-
tion products and transuranics exist as nonvolatile solids. The
characteristics of these materials show quite clearly that the
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potential for releases to the environment decreases dramatically
in this order: gaseous materials, volatile solids, and non-
volatile solids. For this reason, NRC guidance for source terms
representing hypothetical fission product activity within a
nuclear power plant containment structure emphasizes the develop-
ment of plans covering the release of noble gases and/or volatiles
such as iodine. However, particulate materials should not be
completely neglected. Table 1 provides a list of dominant typical
radionuclides for each exposure pathway.
Table 1. Radionuclides with significant contribution to dominant
exposure modes.
Radionuclides with sig-
nificant contribution
to thyroid exposure
Radionuclides with sig-
nificant contribution
to whole body exposure
Radionuclides with sig-
nificant contribution
to lung exposure*
RadionuclideRadionucl ide
Half-life
(days) Radionuclide
Half-l ife
(days)
.-~~~-_.._----------
Half-life
(days)
1-131
1-132
1-133
1-134
1-135
Te-132
Kr-88
8.05
0.0958
0.875
0.0366
0.280
3.25
0.117
1-131
Te-132
Xe-133
1-133
Xe-135
1-135
Cs-134
Kr-88
Cs-137
8.05
3.25
5.28
0.875
0.384
0.280
750
0.117
11,000
1-131
1-132
1-133
1-134
r-135
Cs-l34
Kr-88
Cs-137
Ru-l06
Te-132
Ce-144
8.05
0.0958
0.875
0.0366
0.280
750
0.117
11,000
365
3.25
284
*Derived from the more probable Reactor Safety Study core melt categories and
from postulated design basis accident releases. Lung exposure is the dominant
mode only when thyroid dose is reduced by iodine blocking or there is a long
delay prior to releases.
SOURCE: llSNRC/EPA (1978).
Emergency Communications
Because of the potential need to take immediate off-site
action in the event of a significant nuclear accident, notifica-
tions to appropriate off-site response organizations must be made
directly by the facility operator over reliable 24-hour/day
communications systems with backup communications systems. The
off-site response organizations that receive these notifications
should have the capability to effectively communicate to members
of the public immediate, predetermined actions based on recom-
mendations from the facility operator. Since effective communica-
tions systems are the heart of any emergency plan, a great deal
of attention must be paid in the emergency planning process to
communications equipment, procedures, and periodic testing of
88
the entire communications scheme. Radio communications to radio-
logical monitoring teams in the field and the use of public radio
and television to communicate with the public are key elements
in emergency communications plans.
AN ADEQUATE PLANNING BASIS
What is an adequate planning basis for radiological emer-
gencies at fixed nuclear facilities? This question (rephrased
as, What kind of an accident at a nuclear facility should we
plan for and prepare for handling?) was essentially asked by
many US States and local governments and their national organiza-
tions some years ago. As a result of this inquiry, two US Federal
agencies, the NRC and the EPA, launched an effort to determine
an adequate planning basis for handling nuclear emergencies.
In August of 1976, a joint US Nuclear Regulatory Commission/
US Environmental Protection Agency Task Force on Emergency
Planning was formally appointed to look into this matter. In
December of 1978, after 2 years of work, the joint NRC/EPA
eleven-member Task Force unanimously concurred in and published
its report, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and
Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in
Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (NRC/EPA 1978).
The "bottom line" on this Task Force report is that there
is no specific nuclear power plant accident that can be identified
as the accident that plans and preparedness programs should
address. Rather, the Task Force stressed the need for planning
for consequences, with only minimal concern for the uncertainties
as expressed by probabilities. And, as a basis for improved
planning, the Task Force recommended that essentially generic
Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) be established around all nuclear
power facilities in this country. The Task Force further deter-
mined that the US Low Population Zone (LPZ) concept used for
siting purposes had little real meaning in terms of off-site
emergency planning and preparedness. The Task Force, in essence,
rejected the concept of the "LPZ" for definitive and comprehensive
emergency planning off-site. Further, the Task Force recognized
the need to develop an emergency planning basis for addressing
the so-called "Class 9" accidents, i.e., accidents resulting
in extensive damage to, or melting of, the nuclear fuel core.
This need for a capability to accommodate emergency situa-
tions beyond the so-called "design basis accidents" used in
plant and site evaluation makes generic rather than site-specific
areas appropriate. The Task Force decided that the establishment
of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) of about 10 miles for the
airborne "plume" radiological exposure pathway and about 50
miles for the ingestion or food radiological exposure pathway
would be sufficient to define the areas in which planning for
the initiation of predetermined protective measures is warranted
for any given nuclear power plant. The Emergency Planning Zone
concept is illustrated in Figure 1.
Independent of the work of the US NRC/EPA Task Force, the
Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Nuclear Safety Division, has
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developed
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Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power facilities
in the USA, as established bv the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission/Environmental Protection Agency
Task Force (USNRC/EPA 1978).
an Emergency Planning Zone concept very similar to
recommended by the NRC/EPA Task Force. The Swiss have
an inner flFast Alarm Zone" of about 2 to 6 kilometers,
zone of 20 kilometers (12.5 miles), and a third zone
ingestion pathway) with no radius prescribed.
Although it was accompanied by some initial controversy
and resistance from many quarters, the Task Force report is a
major milestone along the way toward defining an adequate radio-
logical emergency response planning basis. The report and the
recommendations contained in the report were formally endorsed
by the Commissioners of the NRC on October 5, 1979 and by the
EPA Administrator on January 15, 1980. Steps are now being taken
to put the Emergency Planning Zones concept into place around all
power reactors in the US.
TRAINING
Emergency planning and preparedness programs have little
value unless they are accompanied by well-conceived, comprehensive
training programs. Training must be provided to personnel of all
organizations who are perceived to have a role in both planning
and operational response to emergencies, i.e., the preparedness
function. Further, depending upon the functional roles of the
various persons in the overall emergency response program,
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training needs are variable both in terms of subject matter and
length of training programs.
A number of different types of training may be identified,
corresponding to the various categories of organizations and
personnel. Table 2 illustrates the possible involvement of
various organizations in training programs. The NRC envisages
two basic types of training: training in emergency planning
and training in operational response. Exercises and drills
are key components of the training programs.
Table 2. Training categories appropriate for various organiza-
tions and personnel involved in radiological emergencies.
P is Training in Planning; G is General Operational
Response Training; C/DM is Coordination/Decisionmaking
Operational Training; ST is Special Technical Opera-
tional Training; E is Training in Exercises; and C is
Coordination (only) Operational Training.
Organi z a tions and Pe._r_s_o_n_n_e_l _
International organizations
International (Regional)
National Governments
State/Provincial/Local Governments
Response-Oriented Subunits of Governments
(Police, Fire, Civil Defense, Health,
Environmental, Medical, etc.)
Specialist Technical Teams
Nuclear Facility
P, C, ST, E
P, C/DM, ST, E
P, C/DM, ST, E
P, C/DM, ST, E
P (if not covered
by planning func-
tions of foregoing
organizations) ,
G, ST, E
ST, E
P, C/DM, ST, E
._----
Training in planning is required for governmental organiza-
tions down to the level of individual, usually operationally-
oriented, subunits. This type of training stresses learning how
to put together effective organizational and interorganizational
relationships. It also encompasses the development of emergency
plans and the identification of what may be called 'essential
planning elements'--the factors that should be considered in
plans, such as accident assessment, protective measures, com-
munications, notification schemes, and the identification of
resources.
Training in operational response to a radiological emergency
is required by all involved organizations and personnel. Train-
ing in operational response can be divided into three main types:
general, coordination/decisionmaking, and special technical.
Generally, the staff of response-oriented subunits of
government will be well trained to perform their primary func-
tions, such as law enforcement, fire fighting, civil defense,
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and provision of health services. But these general response
personnel need additional training to understand the nature of
radiological accidents and the special considerations surround-
ing these accidents that may modify the way in which they per-
form their normal emergency duties or carry out additional duties.
Radiological training for these general emergency response per-
sonnel need not be complex, but it should be comprehensive
enough to enable them to work safely in or near a radiological
environment. Some specialized training will have to be given
to any response-oriented government sUbunits that will act in
a special capacity, such as radiological monitoring teams.
At nearly every level of government there is a role for
coordination and decisionmaking personnel during a radiological
emergency. Training for these personnel should stress effective
coordination of operational responses and analysis of incoming
data, which is necessary for an effective decisionmaking process.
In the operational response to radiological emergencies, there
will also be a need for special technical teams of highly trained
personnel.
Exercise scenarios should be developed to test emergency
plans and operational response at all organizational levels.
Standardized scenarios for different types of postulated acci-
dents should be prepared. The scenarios should be designed to
simulate meaningful on-site and off-site consequences requiring
both on-site and off-site organizations to respond. Training
programs focusing on the preparation of scenarios, conduct of
exercises, and observation and evaluation of exercises are
required at virtually every level of planning and response
organizations.
An exercise is a training event that tests a major portion
of the basic elements existing in an emergency plan; in effect,
exercises test the operational response organization's overall
ability to cope with a radiological emergency that could result
in on-site and off-site consequences. Scenarios are required
to effectively conduct an exercise.
As opposed to an exercise, a drill is a supervised instruc-
tion period aimed at developing and maintaining skills in a par-
ticular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise,
such as a communications drill, a radiological monitoring drill,
or a fire-fighting drill. Drills to test small portions of
the emergency plan should be conducted more frequently than
exercises. Training in drills can generally be developed by
supervisory personnel who handle such things as communications,
radiological monitoring, and fire fighting on a day-to-day basis.
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INTRODUCTION
All nuclear power stations operated by the Central Electricity
Generating Board (CEGB) must prepare a detailed emergency plan
before raising their reactors to power. Each emergency plan must
be capable of dealing adequately with any feasible emergency situa-
tion. This includes situations that may give rise to the release
of radioactive material or the emission of ionizing radiation,
which could present a hazard to the public. The emergency plans
are submitted to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NIl) of
the Health and Safety Executive (H&SE) for approval. Before the
reactors are raised to power a demonstration is held in the
presence of NIl representatives, and they must be satisfied of
the adequacy of the station's Plan and Procedures.
This paper outlines in general terms the emergency plans
that exist for operational stations of the Central Electricity
Generating Board. The paper draws attention to the organizational
aspects of the plans, rather than to the techniques employed for
the measurement of radiation, for the control and repair of
damage, and so forth. The paper ends with a brief comment on a
review of these plans, which is currently being carried out within
the CEGB.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
The CEGB operates eight sites on which there are twin gas-
cooled magnox reactors. Twin advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs)
are operational at one of these sites, and further AGRs are under
construction elsewhere. At six of the magnox sites, the reactors
have steel pressure vessels. At the two remaining sites, pre-
stressed concrete pressure vessels are used. The consequences of
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a fault developing within the core differs for reactors with
steel pressure vessels and those with prestressed concrete pres-
sure vessels. Nevertheless, no distinction will be drawn between
the two in this paper; the plans outlined refer more particularly
to the steel pressure vessel stations.
Consideration of the accidents which could occur with such
reactors led to the conclusion that plans should be prepared for
dealing with the consequences of a fuel channel fire in a reactor
with a fracture in one of its main coolant ducts (see Dale 1969).
It is anticipated that such an accident, together with the resul-
tant depressurization of the reactor, would give rise to doses
in excess of 1 Emergency Reference Level (ERL) to people within
1 to 1.5 miles of the station. An ERL is defined as the radiation
dose below which countermeasures are unlikely to be justified.
The ERLs used in Britain are those recommended by the Medical
Research Council (MRC 1969). As shown in Table 1, they include
dose values in rem for the whole body and for a number of individ-
ual body organs.
Table 1. Emergency Reference Levels of dose recom-
mended by the Medical Research Council.
Organ or Tissue
Whole body
Thyroid
Lung
Bone
Endosteal tissue
Marrow
Gonads
Superficial tissue irradiated by
Brays
Any other organ or tissue
10
30
30
30
10
10
60
30
A significant implication of such an accident is the need
to have evacuation plans for people living within about 1.5 miles
of the station.
Ef1ERGENCY PLANS
Each station's plan is written to meet a legal requirement
under the Site Licence and therefore relates to the particular
station. Nevertheless all such plans follow guidelines laid
down by the CEGB's Health & Safety De~artment (HSD), and con-
sequently they are very similar in outline.
Two documents must be prepared at each site. The first is
the Emergency Plan; it contains the principles of the scheme, the
actions to be taken, and the responsibilities allocated to individ-
uals. This Plan is the document that is approved formally by the
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Health & Safety Executive. The second document is the Emergency
Handbook; it gives details of the arrangements needed to put the
Plan into operation. Both documents are regularly reviewed and
updated and are distributed to representatives of all supporting
organizations. A "Basic Emergency Plan," which is essentially
applicable to any CEGB site, is published by the CEGB and de-
posited with libraries adjacent to all stations. A more complete
description of the content of Emergency Plans is given in
Emmerson (1969).
FUNCTIONS OF A SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
A site emergency organization has the following responsibil-
i ties:
To assess the extent of any potentially hazardous situation
on the site.
To issue appropriate warnings at the correct time.
To mobilize personnel and equipment to deal with a hazardous
situation.
To take measures to control the extent of a hazardous situation
on the site.
To carry out measurements of radiation and radioactive con-
tamination both on the station site and in the areas surround-
ing the station.
To assess the extent of any possible hazard to the public and
to issue the appropriate warnings at the correct time.
To provide advice and information for the control and movement
of persons present in the vicinity of the station.
To provide information for the control of milk supplies and
other foodstuffs.
To establish contact where necessary with the following bodies:
CEGB Headquarters (National and Regional); Government Depart-
ments, in particular the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate;
County Emergency Services, e.g., Police, Fire, and Ambulance;
County and Local Authorities; Meteorological Office; River
Boards and Water Undertakings; National Farmers' Union; United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.
To provide information to the Public Relations Officer for
issuing to the news media and to the public.
To provide information on the resumption of normal conditions.
To provide a record of events for later study.
STAFFING FOR EMERGENCY
A station is only staffed for normal operations. During
normal (day) working hours, there will typically be some 300
people on site. At other times the total shift staff may only
number up to 50 or so.
Senior Staff Positions. In the event of an emergency, the
most senior officer would take charge of the emergency organiza-
tion. The order of seniority is as follows: Station Manager;
Deputy Station Manager; Operations Superintendent; Maintenance
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Superintendent; Shift Charge Engineer on Duty. If emergency
action was initiated by the Shift Charge Engineer, he would act
as the Emergency Controller until relieved by a more senior
officer.
The Emergency Controller is supported by staff trained as
Emergency Health Physicists, Emergency Reactor Physicists, and
Emergency Administrative Officers. Arrangements exist to ensure
that staff trained to perform the duties of the above three
officers are available "on call." They would be contacted
immediately in the event of an incident and should be able to
reach the site within a short period of time. Additional support
staff could be summoned as necessary.
Other Staff. In the event of an emergency it is essential
that all staff, together with any visitors or contractors on the
site, assemble rapidly at designated muster points for a roll
call. Subsequently the staff members would disperse to undertake
the specific emergency duties for which they have been trained.
The following teams would be formed:
(1) Health Physics Teams. Trained survey teams from the shift
staff would be available to monitor radiological conditions both
on and off the site. Their movements would be determined by the
Emergency Health Physicist. Information on wind speed and direc-
tion, available on site, would indicate the path of any release
of radioactivity.
Specially equipped health physics vehicles would be taken
beyond the station security fence to determine the extent of
any off-site contamination and to indicate whether or not any
members of the public were at risk. A more complete explanation
of these aspects has been given in Macdonald et al. (1977). On
the plant site a similar assessment of radiological hazards would
be carried out by teams equipped with portable instruments. The
results of these surveys would be reported to the Emergency Health
Physicist. He would then assess the radiological measurements and
advise the Emergency Controller on the precautions required.
Arrangements would also be made for the emergency issuance and
processing of personal dosimeters (CEGB film badges) .
(2) Fire Teams. A trained fire team from the shift staff
would be available. The National Fire Service would be called
to assist whenever necessary.
(3) First Aid. Two fully equipped first-aid centers must be
maintained on site, one in or near the reactor block and the other
in the Administrative Building. Persons trained in first aid
would be nominated from each shift. Medical advice would also
be available from the Station Nurse or the Regional Nursing and
Medical Advisers.
(4) Incident Assessment and Control. A small team (the
Incident Assessment Team) led by a trained engineer and including
a Health Physics Monitor would make an initial rapid survey of
the scene of an incident. During the initial survey, this team
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would be in direct communication with the person in charge of
on-site activities. On completion of the survey, the team leader
would establish an Incident Control Point in the vicinity of the
accident; he would then exercise local control of remedial action
from this point.
(5) Damage Control and Rescue Team. A nominated supervisor
would lead a damage control and rescue team, consisting of shift
maintenance personnel and a health physics monitor. The super-
visor would receive instructions from the Emergency Controller.
The team would have been trained and equipped to rescue casualties,
to contain and minimize the effects of the incident, and to stop
the initial damage from extending. A major aim of the team would
be to isolate the reactor from the atmosphere by temporarily
sealing the fractured coolant circuit.
CONTROL CENTERS
All emergency actions on the site, together with any related
off-site activities, would be directed from an Emergency Control
Center located in the station administration block. In addition,
there must be a second fully-equipped Emergency Control Center
at an off-site location. This would be used if the situation on
site made the use of the plant's own Control Center untenable.
If emergency action were initiated by the Shift Charge
Engineer, the Station Control Room would be used as the Emergency
Control Center until such time as the Shift Charge Engineer was
relieved by the Duty Emergency Controller.
A Health Physics Control Point must be set up either in the
Emergency Control Center or in a room adjacent to it. This facil-
ity is equipped with facilities for maintaining radio communication
with the survey teams both on- and off-site. The results of all
measurements of radiation dose rates, carbon dioxide concentrations,
surface and airborne contamination levels, etc., would be reported
to the Health Physics Control Point for interpretation. The
Emergency Health Physicist would advise the Emergency Controller
of any radiological precautions that may be necessary. The four
senior staff involved in controlling and advising on the emergency
situation, namely, the Emergency Controller, the Emergency Health
Physicist, the Emergency Reactor Physicist, and the Emergency
Administration Officer, would be located in the Emergency Control
Center.
Support staff is provided for handling messages, carrying out
plotting and calculations, etc., and this staff can be augmented
as necessary. Each Center is equipped with large wall maps and
charts in order to enable the radiological situation to be clearly
presented to the Emergency Controller. In addition, each Center
is stocked with radio communication equipment, public telephones,
and a private automatic telephone exchange (PAX). There are also
wind speed and direction recorders, monitoring instruments, ap-
propriate stationery, and a library of emergency data, together
with a full set of plant layout drawings.
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COMMUNICATIONS
For on-site communication, each plant has a public address
system that covers all operational areas, direct-wire telephones
from the Station Control Room to key points within the station,
a private automatic telephone system (PAX), and a staff-location
system. Portable UHF radios are used extensively for short-
distance communications and are particularly useful for the on-
site teams.
For off-site communications, the station is served by a
number of incoming Post Office telephone lines. There is also a
direct telephone link with the Grid Control system. A further
direct telephone link exists with the Public Relations Office,
which is located within a few miles of the site; this link would
be put into operation in an emergency. In addition, a VHF radio
system covers a wide area around each site; it can be operated
from the Emergency Control Centers and from the Health Physics
Control Point.
COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES
The organization, equipment, and technical skill available
at each nuclear site is designed to cope immediately with the
probable range of emergencies that may occur. Support arrange-
ments exist for providing additional resources, assistance,
guidance, and advice, should they be required. If the need
arises, the responsibility for dealing with evacuation and
related aspects would fall to the Public Services. This section
of the paper summarizes the contributions made by sup~orting
establishments and organizations under such circumstances.
CEGB Establishments.
(1) Other Nuclear Power Stations. In the event of any radio-
active contamination outside the site, additional survey vehicles
and trained crews would be dispatched from the nearest nuclear
power station. These additional teams would assist local personnel
in carrying out a survey of the area. If necessary, agricultural
samples would be collected by the survey teams and taken to the
District Survey Laboratory for assessment. All the CEGB's nuclear
power stations have radiochemical and district survey laboratories
available for evaluation of samples. There is a specialist facil-
ity at the Central Radiochemical Laboratory at Gravesend where
radiochemical analyses can be carried out; similar comprehensive
facilities also exist at the Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories of the
CEGB. All of these can be manned to provide assistance as needed.
(2) Nuclear Emergency Information Room (Region). A Regional
Emergency Information Room (REIR) would be set up in the region
in which the affected nuclear station is situated. It would be
manned by Regional Officers and support staff; their function
would be to receive information from the Station regarding the
cause of the emergency, the extent of injury to people, the
extent of damage to the plant, the extent of spread of contamina-
99
tion, and any other relevant information. This information could
then be disseminated to the senior management of the Region and
to Headquarters.
Officers would go to the REIR as soon as possible after an
incident has been reported. Personnel would be available to man
the room on a continuous basis if this is required. It would be
the responsibility of the staff in the room to answer requests
from the Station for provision of resources, additional staff,
specialist information, and so forth.
(3) Nuclear Emergency Information Room (Headquarters). A
central Emergency Room (NEIR) is situated in the London Head-
quarters of the CEGB. The duties of the officers manning this
room would be similar to those at the Regional Information Room,
but on a national rather than a regional scale. The Headquarters
staff would keep the Executive and senior management of the CEGB
informed of the situation, would collaborate with Government
Departments, the NIl, and the Atomic Energy Authority, and would
also have an important role to play in keeping Ministers advised.
It is clear that highly specialized information would be available
at the Headquarters that could be of value to the affected station.
NEIR would also keep the CEGB Headquarters Public Relation
Office informed of the situation, i.e., information would be
released to the media through the Headquarters Press Office as
well as through a local information center.
(4) Public Information Center. A Public Information Center,
equipped with a direct telephone line to the power station and
a number of Post Office telephones, would be set up within a few
miles of the affected station. Its function would be to issue
statements on the situation in collaboration with the CEGB's
Headquarters Press Office.
Outside Organizations
(1) Police, Fire, Ambulance, and Welfare Services. The
County Police and the Local Authority must develop a comprehensive
emergency plan for police, fire, ambulance, and welfare services.
This plan forms part of their overall scheme for dealing with
emergency situations in their area, such as flooding, fire, and
major transport accidents. The Emergency Controller would inform
the police of any emergency, and the police would then become
the channel of communication with senior officials of the other
emergency services and of the County Council. The Emergency
Controller might also make direct requests for assistance from
the local fire brigade or ambulance service. The police would
set up a communications center near the Emergency Control Center
and, if necessary, take steps to prevent access to affected areas
near the site. Plans exist to issue potassium iodate tablets to
the general public if a hazard arises from the emission of radio-
iodine (see Gregory 1972). The police would be responsible for
issuing these tablets. If evacuation of particular areas becomes
necessary, this would also be arranged by the police; they would
proceed in accordance with their contingency plans, making use of
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the Ambulance Service for moving people who are sick or infirm.
The Emergency Controller would give advice on action in these
situations.
(2) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (MAFF). The
MAFF is responsible for controlling the distribution and consump-
tion of milk and other foodstuffs which may be affected by an emer-
gency, and also for controlling animal feed. The Ministry has
prepared emergency plans to meet short- and long-term requirements.
The function of MAFF would be, where possible, to ensure that no
one was exposed to undue risks by consuming contaminated food, to
make alternative foodstuffs available, and generally to mitigate
any effects of the accident on agriculture, fisheries, and food.
The Regional Controller of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries & Food, or one of his deputies, would receive direct
warning of an emergency from the Emergency Controller. The
Regional Controller would then send a representative to the site
to direct actions that fall within the responsibility of the
MAFF. In collaboration with the Emergency Controller, this
representative would assess the results of surveys for radioactiv-
ity around the site. If it is necessary to collect samples for
analysis from potentially contaminated areas, field officers of
the MAFF would be made available to organize the collection.
(3) united Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. It has been
arranged that the Atomic Energy Authority would provide assistance
if required within three hours of a request. The Authority would
dispatch to the site vehicles with two-way radios operating on
the same frequencies as those used by the CEGB radiation monitor-
ing equipment, as well as trained Health Physics staff. The
Authority would also prepare stocks of emergency equipment for
transport to the site if they are needed.
(4) Meteorological Office. The Meteorological Office would
provide frequent forecasts of weather conditions aiid wind direc-
tion in the area around the affected site. These data are essential
for forecasting the path taken by any emitted plume of radio-
activity, and also for carrying out assessments of probable
exposures resulting from emissions from the site. Submission of a
request for a weather forecast is a basic emergency procedure
at all CEGB sites.
TRAINING OF STAFF
Adequate training of staff is essential for the correct
functioning of emergency arrangements. The Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate requires that such training be carried out system-
atically. This places a considerable w0rk load on each of the
nuclear stations.
The training programs
Health Physics Department,
into normal working hours.
small groups of six to ten
are usually prepared by the station
and the training periods are fitted
It has been found that training in
persons is effective. Over the last
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few years increasing use has been made of training films and
low-cost portable videotape recording units (see Emmerson 1969)
EXERCISES
Nuclear Site Licences require each station to "rehearse"
its emergency arrangements. Currently each nuclear establishment
carries out an annual demonstration emergency exercise, attended
by observers from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and
from the CEGB Health & Safety Department.
In addition to this demonstration, it has been found desirable
to carry out exercises for each of the four or five shifts in-
volved at each station, so that everyone is involved in a full
scale exercise once a year.
Considerable ingenuity has been used to make the exercises
as realistic as possible (Orchard and Walker 1977). Umpires
provide instrument readings that may occur in real accidents (e.g.,
radiation dose rates, CO 2 in air, etc.). Casualties are usually
"made up" to depict typical injuries, and active samples for
counting purposes are substituted for the on-site and off-site
air sample packs. Noise and smoke generators have been used to
good effect in some exercises.
It is usual for some of the outside authorities involved in
the emergency plans to take part in the exercises. The extent of
participation varies, but the police forces take part in most
exercises and the fire and ambulance services also turn out on
many occasions. It is customary to perform "communications
exercises" with local authorities, Ministries, and other parts
of the CEGB's organization.
INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT EMERGENCY PLANS
From the very outset of the Nuclear Power Programme, the
CEGB has made determined efforts to keep the public informed
of its intentions, and to explain the operations that are carried
out at nuclear stations. To this end, a Local Liaison Committee
(LLC) chaired by the Station Manager has been set up at each
site. The members of this Committee represent local inhabitants
and organizations, typically elected representatives and officers
from local government and councils, representatives from local
utilities such as the Water Boards, medical officers of health,
and representatives from the police, the ambulance service, and
the Farmer's Union, etc. The Committee meets with the Station
management at least once a year. Representatives of the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate and the CEGB's Health & Safety Depart-
ment attend this meeting, as do representatives of the Government
Departments that authorize discharges of effluents from the site.
Local Liaison Committees receive clear explanations of the
purpose of the Emergency Plan and the steps that would be taken
to cope with any emergency situation. They are free to ask
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questions about implementation of emergency schemes. There is
no doubt that the members of these Committees have helped to
establish a sound organization for dealing with emergencies,
by acting as ambassadors for the CEGB. They have explained the
extensive emergency arrangements that have been prepared to their
Council friends, neighbors, and constituents in the areas. The
establishment of the LLCs has helped the local population to accept
nuclear power stations; as well, the public has become accustomed
to seeing exercises carried out.
CURRENT REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
In common with virtually all utilities throughout the world
since TMI, a review of our present plans and procedures is now
being carried out. Because this review is still taking place,
firm recommendations have yet to be made. The following areas
have been singled out for closer consideration:
The need to make provision for coping with an influx of large
numbers (several hundreds) of newspaper, radio, and TV reporters
to the area of the accident.
The need to ensure that information supplied to the media is
checked, to avoid conflicting reports and information.
The possible need to assess collective doses in areas at con-
siderable distances from the site of the accident.
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9RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR CONTROLLING DOSES TO THE
PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVITY
Roger H. Clarke
G.A.M. Webb
National Radiological Protection Board, UK
INTRODUCTION
The dosimetric criteria employed within the UK to limit
the radiation exposure of members of the public resulting from
unplanned discharges of radioactivity were originally recommended
in a series of UK Medical Research Council reports (MRC 1959,
1960, 1961). These reports suggested the radiation doses that
would warrant consideration of remedial action following the
accidental escape of radioactive material to the environment;
they also included data on the concentrations in air or in food-
stuffs of several radionuclides, notably 90Sr , 131 1, and 137Cs,
which would lead to these doses. In 1975 the Medical Research
Council reviewed its original recommendations and presented
revised and more comprehensive calculations, based upon metabolic
and dosimetric data that had become available since the publica-
tion of the original reports (MRC 1975).
In August 1977 the Secretary of State for social Services
directed the National Radiological Protection Board to provide
guidance to Government Departments and other appropriate bodies
on the derivation of Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs). The
Directive explained ERLs in the following terms:
Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) means the level of
radiation dose below which countermeasures are unlikely
to be justified. In the event of an accident involv-
ing, or likely to involve radiation doses to the public
in excess of the dose limits set out in Direction
76/579/Euratom of 1 June 1976 laying down safety stan-
dards relating to Ionising Radiation, guidance to those
with responsibilities for the protection of the public
as a whole shall include guidance as to application of
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Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) of dose. Within
their function under Section 1 (1)b of the Radiologi-
cal Protection Act 1970 the Board shall be responsible
for specifying ERLs of dose. The Board shall also be
responsible for providing guidance to Government
Departments and other appropriate bodies on the deriva-
tion of ERLs relating to radiation exposure and radio-
active materials in the public environment.
In an interim guidance report (NRPB 1978a), the Board
suggested that the 1975 MRC recommendations should continue
to apply while the Board consulted with regulatory bodies and
other organizations who may utilize ERLs. This paper presents
the current views of Board staff; they have resulted from con-
sideration of the recommendations of the International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1977), as well as discussions
with both operators of nuclear installations and those Government
Departments who have a need for radiological protection guidance
in the event of unplanned release of radioactivity.
The Board is now preparing a draft consultative document
outlining its view on radiological protection in accident situa-
tions. Following discussions with all interested parties, the
Board will finalize its advice to the operators and Government
Departments concerned.
THE MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL'S EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS
The ERLs of dose for members of the general public proposed
by the Medical Research Council in 1975 were set equal to the
doses that could be received over two years by workers occupa-
tionally exposed to the "Maximum Permissible Annual Doses" then
in effect for individual organs and tissues--as specified by
the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP
1966). The ERL of dose to the thyroid, however, was set at the
dose that could be received by a worker in a year. This value
was chosen because the thyroid tissue of juveniles may be more
radiosensitive than that of adults (ICRP 1966).
These currently recommended ERLs of dose are given in Table 1.
The separate identification of endosteal tissue and bone marrow
(rather than the mineral bone itself) represents a departure from
the 1966 ICRP recommendations; these two tissues have been identi-
fied as the relevant tissues at risk following irradiation. The
ERLs of dose applied to the whole body or to each organ or tissue
irradiated separately. In the event of simultaneous irradiation
of several organs, the tissue receiving the greater dose relative
to its ERL became the critical tissue for comparison with the
ERL and determination of countermeasures. The MRC (1975) defined
the ERL as the radiation dose below which countermeasures are
unlikely to be justified; it stated that when a radiation dose
seems likely to exceed the ERL, countermeasures should be under-
taken--provided that a substantial reduction in dose is likely
to be achieved and provided the countermeasures can be undertaken
without undue risk to the community.
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Table 1. Emergency Reference Levels of dose recom-
mended by the Medical Research Council
(1975) .
Organ or Tissue Dose (rem)
Whole body 10
Thyroid 30
Lung 30
Bone
Endosteal tissue 30
Marrow 10
Gonads 10
Superficial tissue irradiated by
13 rays 60
Any other organ or tissue 30
The ERLs were not put forward as firm action levels, but
rather as dose levels which responsible authorities should use
to judge whether countermeasures should be introduced, taking
full account of the disadvantages and risks that these counter-
measures might create. When a release of radioactivity is uncon-
trolled, as after an accident, public exposure can only be
limited by countermeasures that interfere with normal living
conditions, such as evacuation, the closing of areas, sheltering,
the control of food supplies, and in the special case oE the
release of short-lived isotopes of iodine, the administration
of tablets containing stable iodine to the exposed population.
PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING REVISED RADIOLOGICAL
PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR ACCIDENTAL RELEASES
The National Radiological Protection Board is now reviewing
ERLs and the criteria that should be developed for the protection
of the population from unplanned releases of radioactivity; this
review is being performed in the light of the publication of
the latest recommendations of the ICRP (1977) and present know-
ledge of the risks of deleterious effects following irradiation.
ICRP recommendations (1966, 1977) have consistently stated
that in the event of an accident the hazard or social cost in-
volved in any remedial measure must be justified by the resulting
reduction of risk. Because of the great variability of the
circumstances in which remedial measures might be considered,
the ICRP has not recommended "intervention levels" appropriate
for all occasions. However, the ICRP feels that for foreseeable
types of accidents it may be possible to gauge--by an analysis
of the accident and remedial action--levels below which it would
not be appropriate to take action.
The latest ICRP recommendations (1977) emphasize that the
decision to initiate remedial action will have to be based on
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the particular circumstances prevailing at the site at the
time of the incident. These include geographical, meteorological,
and social conditions. In general, the principle involved in
deciding whether to institute countermeasures is that the social
cost and risk of the countermeasures should be less than those
that would otherwise result from exposure. Consequently, those
responsible for health and safety at any nuclear installation
will have to prepare an emergency plan that includes the dose
levels at which the various countermeasures would have to be
considered. ICRP has left the setting of such levels for par-
ticular circumstances to national authorities.
In developing radiological protection principles, it is
important to distinguish between criteria established for the
introduction of countermeasures and the possibly different
criteria for returning to a normal situation following the
accident; in the latter case long-term consequences may have
to be taken into account. The emergency criteria discussed
below relate to the introduction of short-term countermeasures,
not to the lonqer-term avoidance of dose--for example, by the
banning of foodstuffs. Decisions on the imposition of a food
ban or replacement animal feeds can usually be left until a
later stage in the development of the accident sequence, when
the extent of public exposure can be better estimated. The
time scale envisaged for this process is a day or two.
The costs and risks to the population associated with the
banning of foodstuffs such as milk are minimal, except in the
event of a catastrophic accident when there might potentially
be an overall shortage of food supplies. Consequently, the
decision to ban foodstuffs would probably be made at a rather
low level of dose to the individual, lower than that for the
introduction of other countermeasures.
SPECIFICATION OF THE RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH EXPOSURE TO IONIZING RADIATION
Effective Dose Equivalent and Annual Dose
Limits for Members of the Public
Publication 26 of the ICRP (1977) specifies risk coefficients
for certain health limits for occupationally exposed workers.
The risk coefficients apply to the incidence of fatal cancer in
a range of human body organs and tissues, together with the risk
of hereditary effects in the two subsequent generations. These
risk coefficients are shown in Table 2, together with the rela-
tive weighting factors WT to which they correspond; the ICRP
used these factors to define the Effective Dose Equivalent HE:
where HT is the dose equivalent in tissue T.
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The principle involved in establishing the Effective Dose
Equivalent is that the level of risk to the individual should
be the same, whether the body is irradiated uniformly or whether
selective organ or partial body irradiation occurs.
Table 2. Risk coefficients and weighting fac-
tors set forth in ICRP Publication 26
(1977) .
Tissue
Gonads
Breast
Red bone marrow
Lung
Thyroid
Bone
Other tissues
-4 -1
Risk (10_ 6Sv -1)(10 rem)
40
25
20
20
5
5
50
0.25
o•15
0.12
0.12
0.03
0.03
0.30
TOTAL
._---
165
----_.
1 .00
-----
The quantity Dose Equivalent is considered suitable for
describing the incidence of stochastic effects of doses received
following accidental releases of radioactivity; for stochastic
effects the probability of an event occurring rather than its
severity is regarded as a function of dose without threshold.
The stochastic dose limit for members of the public, as recommend-
ed by ICRP and endorsed by the Board (NRPB 1978a), corresponds to
an Effective Dose Equivalent of 5 mSv (500 mrem) in a year.
Nonstochastic effects are those for which the severity of
the effect varies with dose and for which, therefore, a threshold
may occur. For continuously exposed workers and members of the
public, the ICRP (1977) introduced nonstochastic annual dose
limits to prevent the incidence of such effects, which are
specific to particular tissues; these effects include cataract
of the lens of the eye, nonmalignant damage to the skin, cell
depletion in the bone marrow causing hematological deficiencies,
and gonadal cell damage leading to the impairment of fertility.
For members of the public, the ICRP recommends a nonstochastic
annual dose limit of 50 mSv (5 rem) to any organ or tissue, with
the exception of the lens of the eye; this tissue has a limit of
30 mSv (3 rem). The annual dose limits for nonstochastic effects
are clearly intended to limit lifetime exposure to particular
tissues and will not be applicable in an accident situation.
It is necessary to consider whether the Effective Dose
Equivalent is a sufficient quantity to express risks to individual
members of the public in the event of unolanned releases of radio-
active materials. According to the data in Table 1, the risk
of fatal cancer is 1.25 x 10- 2Sv- 1 (125 x 10-6rem- 1) for uniform
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whole body irradiation; for individual single organ irradiation,
such as the thyroid, the same risk of fatal cancer is achieved
by giving a dose to that organ 25 times higher than the whole-
body dose. This is a particularly important point because of
the likelihood of selective thyroid irradiation following a
reactor accident. Such an accident may release isotopes of
iodine that concentrate in the thyroid. For routine exposure
this problem does not arise as severely; the nonstochastic dose
limit will ensure that the dose to anyone organ is no more
than 10 times higher than the stochastic dose limit.
Radiation Risks not Included in the Definition
of Effective Dose Equivalent
Hereditary Effects in all Future Generations
The quantity Effective Dose does include a component of
genetic risk, i.e., the incidence of serious hereditary ill
health in the first two generations following irradiation. The
total incidence in later generations is of the same magnitude;
thus inclusion of the hereditary effects in the first two genera-
tions accounts for half the total number of effects. For the
purposes of decision making in accident situations, it is con-
sidered sufficient to include the genetic effects in the first
two generations. Thus Effective Dose is satisfactory from the
point of view of estimating risks to individuals. But for the
purposes of calculating total detrimental health effects in the
population following an accidental release of radioactivity, the
hereditary effects in all future generations should be included.
Nonfatal Cancer Incidence
The risks of irradiation discussed so far do not include
the incidence of nonfatal cancers. These are defined as cancers
for which survival is high, although there may be appreciable
loss of quality of life for physiological or psychological reasons.
It is now thought that the incidence of nonfatal cancers could
be two or three times the incidence of fatal cancers following
uniform whole-body irradiation. These cancers would arise
mainly in the breast, skin, and thyroid (ICRP 1978). Clarke
and Smith (1980) have suggested the nonfatal incidence of cancers
averaged over age and sex shown in Table 3. The values are in
line with estimates given by the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for thyroid, breast,
and skin cancer incidence and fatality (UNSCEAR 1977).
Of particular interest here is the high incidence of thyroid
cancer. (This does not include the numbers of benign nodules
that may occur.) Nonfatal thyroid cancers may be accompanied by
severe physiological and psychological problems. Nonfatal skin
cancers may be more easily treated and cause less long-term
distress. Because of the possibility of the release of isotopes
of iodine from reactor accidents and its selective concentration
in the thyroid, it is felt to be necessary to limit thyroid irradia-
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Table 3. Incidence of cancer following irradiation and
percentage fatality.
Incidence Nonfatal incidencePercentageOrgan
___~v-~~~E;m~~-L . :atal i t y___ Sv-2.- ..(re~=-~ _
Breast 5.0 x 10- 3 (50 x 10-6 ) 50 2.5 x 10- 3 (25 x 10-6 )
Skin 10- 2 (100 x 10- 6 ) 1 9.9 x 10- 3 (99 x 10-6 )
Thyroid . ~~_1~Q.Q.:_!.Q.=-~L~ __5 ~.:2"':".~Q.- 3_J~>:.....l 0-6 )
SOURCE: Clarke and Smith (1980).
tion under these circumstances on the basis of the incidence
of thyroid cancer, rather than just on the basis of fatal cancer
risks to the thyroid.
Thus, if the risk of fatal cancer following uniform whole
body radiation is taken as about 10-2 Sv- 1 (10- 4 rem- 1 ), averaged
over age and sex (ICRP 1978), the risk to the thyroid of malig-
nancy-if that organ is irradiated in isolation-is considered
to be the same.
APPLICATION OF THE RISK CRITERIA
Principles
The ICRP (1977) has indicated that its dose equivalent
limits are intended to apply only to conditions where the source
of exposure is under control. The Commission emphasizes that
its recommended limits are set at a level thought to be associated
with a low degree of risk; thus, unless a limit were to be ex-
ceeded by a considerable amount, the risk would still be suf-
ficiently low as not to warrant countermeasures involving sig-
nificant risks or undue cost. Therefore, it is clear that it is
not obligatory to take remedial action if a dose equivalent limit
has been exceeded.
However, there may well be the possibility of deciding
upon a level of dose below which it would be unnecessary to con-
sider the possible introduction of countermeasures. There will
be, similarly, some upper level of exposure at which counter-
measures will definitely be instituted, e.g., attempts to avoid
early effects of acute irradiation.
Thus, the philosophy for dealing with radiation protection
in accidents is to propose a two-tier dose system, as shown
schematically in Figure 1. Beyond the lower dose bound one must
continually consider the possibility of introducing countermeasures
in the short term (evacuation, distribution of stable iodine tab-
lets to prevent radioiodine uptake in the thyroid), while com-
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Figure 1. proposed principles for establishing radiological
protection criteria for accidents: a two-tier dose
system.
paring the risks from the irradiation with the risks of the
countermeasures. The risks associated with the countermeasures
are extremely difficult to quantify. They will probably depend
upon the size of the population, its distribution, and certainly
on the local geography and the conditions pertaining at the time
after the start of the incident; for example, the risks of evacua-
tion in extremely adverse weather conditions will be very dif-
ferent from those that might otherwise apply.
The staff of the National Radiological Protection Board
therefore consider that it should be left to individual sites,
in their preparations for emergency planning, to consider the
range of consequences of various countermeasures that might be
invoked. Each site should agree upon Action Levels with regu-
lators, depending on the nature of the accident and conditions
existing at the time.
Establishment of the Lower and Upper Dose Bounds
for Decision Making in Accident Situations
For planned releases involving exposure of members of the
general public to radioactive wastes, the Board has advised
that the dose equivalent limit to the whole body should be 5 mSv
(0.5 rem) in a year (NRPB 1978b). This figure is based on risk
considerations and the possible lifetime exposure of the individ-
ual. Publication 26 of the ICRP implies, on the basis of risk con-
siderations, that the annual dose equivalent limit for individual
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members of the public is 1 mSv (0.1 rem), if the dose is actually
received as a lifetime exposure of the whole body.
It thus would seem reasonable that if the estimated exposure
of individuals was not likely to exceed an Effective Dose Equiv-
alent of 5 mSv (0.5 rem) in an unplanned release, there would
be little need to consider short-term countermeasures. This
effective dose corresponds to a level of fatal risk of about
5 x 10-5 ; it would require a cohort of 20,000 people exposed
at this level to give rise to a prediction--on the linear hypoth-
esis relating dose to risk--of one statistical death in a time
period of perhaps 40 or 50 years following the irradiation.
On the basis of the incidence of thyroid malignancy, the
same dose level of 5 mSv (0.5 rem) can be taken as the lower-
bound dose of thyroid irradiation, below which short-term
remedial actions would be unwarranted. In the interests of
developing simple principles, the same lower dose bound is
proposed for irradiation of the skin. This level of dose to
the skin corresponds to the same risk of cancer incidence as for
the irradiation of the thyroid, although the consequences are
much less severe.
The principle followed in setting the upper dose bound is
that attempts should certainly be made to avoid the risk of early
adverse effects of acute irradiation. Although the LD50 (dose
corresponding to 50% chance of lethality) for whole body irradia-
tion is about 350 rad without medical supportive treatment, a
considerably lower dose would be appropriate for a general
population including the young, the old, and the chronically sick.
In fact, it is felt that all attempts should be made to avoid
the early nonfatal effects of acute radiation; as a consequence,
the Board is suggesting an upper dose bound of 0.5 Sv (50 rem)
effective dose equivalent. If it is likely that population
groups would exceed this level of dose, then countermeasures
should be considered mandatory.
In the case of selective irradiation of the thyroid and
the skin, upper bound dose equivalents of 0.5 Sv (50 rem) have
again been chosen--partly on the grounds of providing simplicity
and partly on risk grounds. The dose of 0.5 Sv to the thyroid
corresponds to a risk of malignancy of 0.5 x 10-2 to the individ-
ual. This is considered to be a high level of risk, and the
risks of administration of stable potassium iodate or of evacua-
tion are virtually certain to be less than this figure.
In summary, the proposed dose range for action following
accidental releases of radionuclides are shown in Table 4.
The doses are effective dose equivalents, or dose equivalents
to thyroid or skin. These proposed criteria apply only to the
introduction of countermeasures; different principles will be
followed for the return of the population, once evacuated, to
contaminated buildings or lands.
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Table 4. Proposed dose range for action following accidental
releases of radionuclides.
Dose range Action
0-5 mSv (0-0.5 rem)
5-500 mSv (0.5-50 rem)
>500 mSv (>50 rem)
Contamination of Foodstuffs
No action
Continual consideration of intro-
ducing countermeasures
Certain action
In many accident scenarios, ground contamination will follow
the accidental release, and contamination of foodstuffs, partic-
ularly milk, can be foreseen as a consequence of the release.
In the case of contamination of foodstuffs, there is probably
more time to make a decision regarding the banning of consump-
tion--typically a day or two. In this case there is time to
assemble an expert team to advise and consider the exposure of
the public and the effects of countermeasures. There is very
little penalty in not distributing fresh milk, and it may be
that decisions could be made to instigate milk bans to restrict
the dose to members of the public to well below the suggested
lower bound dose equivalent of 5 mSv (0.5 rem).
SUMMARY
The principle to be followed in planning the protection of
the population from unplanned releases of radioactive material
is that the risks of the countermeasures should be less than
the risks of the radiation that would otherwise be received.
The risks of countermeasures are variable depending upon
the size of the population, its composition and distribution,
the location, and the conditions pertaining at the time of
release. For these reasons it is not considered possible to
recommend any single level of dose as a reference for preplanning
radiological protection for accident situations.
On the basis of risk considerations, the National Radiological
Protection Board staff propose a two-tier system of reference
doses for use in preplanning for an accidental release of radio-
activity to the environment, as well as for short-term decision
making in the event of such a release. The lower dose bound is
set such that no action is necessary if doses are unlikely to
exceed this dose. If doses are likely to exceed the lower dose
bound, then the introduction of countermeasures should continually
be evaluated on the basis of net risk avoidance.
The development of Action Levels for the introduction of
countermeasures above this lower dose bound is considered to be
the joint responsibility of operator and regulator. The Action
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Levels should be based on a complete analysis of potential
accident sequences and consequences for the particular plant
and its actual location. Action Levels are, therefore, expected
to be site-specific. The Action Levels must also demonstrate
flexibility, so that conditions prevailing at the time of an
accident may influence the decisions on the introduction of
countermeasures.
The upper dose bound has been set at a level of dose at
which countermeasures are certainly expected to be implemented.
The principle proposed here is the avoidance of any early effects
of acute irradiation in the general population.
The above recommendations apply to short-term decision
making in the event of an accident. In the case of contamina-
tion of foodstuffs, there is a longer time scale to evaluate
the consequences to the public; the social cost and health risk
to the public from the banning of fresh foodstuffs or the intro-
duction of supplementary feeding of grazing animals will generally
be very small. Therefore, there is incentive to introduce con-
trols on foodstuffs at doses that may be significantly below
the lower dose bound proposed here.
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RISK ~~NAGEMENT AT THE NECKARWESTHEIM PLANT IN THE FRG
Siegfried Bernhardt
Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Neckar GmbH, FRG
The GKN-Neckarwestheim nuclear power plant, which is located
between Stuttgart and Heilbronn, began operation in 1976. The
KWU (Kraftwerk Union Aktiengesellschaftl 3-loop 9ressurized
water reactor has a net output of 800 MWe. The plant's special
accident management features include
Four redundant emergency installations in four secure and
separate buildings. These are equipped with diesel generators
and all electronics and switching systems necessary to main-
tain a safe standby shutdown of the plant for up to 10 hours
without human intervention.
An automatic shutdown system for cases of small- and medium-
sized leakages. This system ensures that the reactor is
cooled down before leakage water is pumped back.
Small safety valves for every secondary loop. These are able
to release the shutdown power in hot standby without electric
drive. These safety valves can be lsolated if a defect occurs.
A loose-particle monitoring system for the primary circuit.
A system of TV cameras at several points within the contain-
ment.
An acoustic system to transmit the containment noise into the
control room.
A special computer that indicates criteria
an intended operation can be performed and
catching" tape-recording system that holds
for the interpretation of fast transients.
the usual recorders and process computer.
Most of these systems were installed after our plant began
operation. They result from lessons learned from failures at
other plants or from theoretical discussions. The installation
of these systems results from our belief that risk management
should not be ignored until an accident occurs and that prepared-
ness implies much more than just administrative action. The
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necessity for continuous appraisal and subsequent installation
of special devices to improve a plant is not widely appreciated.
I am glad that the owners of the plant discussed in this paper
are willing to bear the costs for such installations. Although
we do not allow ourselves to believe that the plant will never
have an accident, we feel that the operating team has an excellent
opportunity to detect failures in good time and to find ways of
combating them.
Several measures can be taken to improve plant safety,
including
Qualitv control during the construction phase;
Repeated inspections of the materials and functioning of
systems and components during the lifetime of the plant;
Automatic systems for accident management;
Well-trained operators.
However, all such measures taken together are not capable of
totally precluding failures.
In case of a sudden event, everything that must be accom-
plished in seconds must be carried out by automatic systems. To
date, I do not know of any failure that could not be contained
within several minutes by the available automatic systems, even
in the case of a tube rupture. Because of the presence of re-
dundant and diverse systems, many parallel failures in the plant
can be managed without serious consequences_
A good control room team needs only a few minutes to deter-
mine that something is wrong and that action is necessary. If
all indicators show characteristics of a type of accident that
had been previously analyzed, the team should be able to identify
required actions in a short time. Actually, in such cases the
operators could be replaced by a computer. However, I think it
is impossible to predict all combinations of failures in such
a way that correct emergency procedures can always be prepared
in advance. Space flight experience has shown that even the
best automatic system is not perfect and that human thinking
is still vital in unpredictable situations.
If there is an unexpected, uncalculated series of failures
in a plant, one's philosophy may be based on one of two modes of
desired action: (1) The operators may be allowed to act only
as they have been instructed and trained. If there is a sequence
of unforeseen failures, they must call for assistance and wait,
whatever happens. (2) The operators may be told to behave as
instructed for as long as possible, but to pay careful attention
to special complications and to react--if necessary--appropriately.
Engineer-operators are not required for the second mode, because
knowledge of which actions to take results largely from a high
degree of familiarity with the plant and plant operations. This
familiarity is typically found in people with more than 10 years
of local experience and is not typically found in engineers.
We consider the second mode to be the correct procedure,
because in practice one can only expect optimal, not perfect,
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preparation. Minor inadvisable, yet harmless, action is better
than no action whatsoever, with an unforeseeable risk. To date,
no event has occurred that has not been foreseen. Hopefully
inadvisable decisions will never be made, because the situation
that could lead to such a decision will never occur. However,
as such situations cannot be excluded totally, shift foremen
should always be available for decision making.
If any incident occurs at the plant that the operators
consider abnormal, they must call for engineers and specialists
on standby. This staff should be at the plant within about
half an hour and form the basis of the pZant staff's risk manage-
ment team. Within two hours at the most, a staff of engineers
(including experts in operations, processes, mechanics, electric
systems, electronics, and computers), a physicist, a chemist,
and a radiologist should assemble to analyze the incident and
determine the actions required. This group needs working space
close to the control room. While the operators keep the plant
in a stable state, this specialist staff should study computer
printouts and other records, compare the facts thus obtained
with the plant's technical documents, evaluate possible con-
sequences, and, if necessary, inform the government authorities'
crisis staff and call specialists for assistance.
The plant staff is headed by the plant superintendant or
a deputy. He gives orders about the operation of the plant
to the shift foreman through the operation branch manager. It
is helpful if there is someone to write minutes and another
person to handle necessary telephone or telex messages and to
look for additional information. Only limited and well-prepared
statements and information should be disseminated outside the
plant. Only the head of staff should give or order such state-
ments. If required, an expert from the government authorities
can be recruited to give advice to the staff and forward ques-
tions to any external group of experts; but he should not give
orders to the plant staff or make statements or give information
that have not been cleared by the head of staff.
For maximum effectiveness, the staff should consist of
not more than about fifteen people (with not more than one per-
son from outside the plant). In order to avoid diversions,
telephone messages to the staff should only be made through the
telephone operator. Only certain connections should be allowed.
In addition, the plant staff may have a direct emergency tele-
phone. Permission to enter the plant should not be given to any-
one who does not have to be there. This is a necessary rule,
not only in case of crisis, but also in less serious cases--to
prevent the situation from developing into a crisis~
For efficiency, the plant staff should be isolated. There-
fore another team must be available close to the plant to obtain
information from the on-site staff and provide all public
institutions including the press, the owners of the plant, and
the local authorities, with up-to-date reports. This information
staff also should act as relief to the plant staff, for instance
to arrange transportation for personnel and supplies and to
PRE 14 _ I
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accept all telephone calls from the outside except those from
other personnel to the plant staff. This information staff
should be headed by a responsible member of the plant administra-
tion and he should be assisted by other plant experts. This
group's most important task is to coordinate information about
the plant in order to avoid public confusion, such as that
experienced during the TMI accident.
The CPisis staff of the appropriate authorities should get
direct information only from the plant staff. This crisis staff
should be the sole connection between the plant staff and all
authorities and public institutions such as the police during
a crisis. Another paper in this volume (see Chapter 12) deals
with how the crisis staff makes decisions.
The radiological investigations and laboratory activities
necessary in the vicinity of the endangered plant should be
performed by the staff of neighboring plants, supervised by one
of the affected plant's own radiologists. Four nuclear plants
have contracts to give mutual assistance to the Neckarwestheim
plant. The plant personnel must be vigilant 24 hours a day.
In case of an evacuation, a rendezvous point is designated 5
miles away; from this point the police can transport supplies
to the plant.
Another contract for planned assistance from specialists
on the staff of the construction company is in preparation.
By means of an on-line telephone and telecopy system, it should
be possible--within a few hours of an accident--to exchange
information, records, questions, and advice between the plant
staff and the staff of the construction company. Thus, the
plant staff should have every possibility of giving the best
instructions to the shift foreman and the best information to
the crisis staff. Figure 1 summarizes the groups of actors
involved in the management of a crisis at a nuclear plant.
Maintenance
Radiological sampling
Laboratory analysis
Off-site
information staff
Crisis staff
Construction
company staff
Expert staff
Press
Utilities
Local authoritie'S
Materiel
Transport
Other authorities
Police
Radiation control
forces
Public
Specialists
Experts
Figure 1. Organization of risk management staff to be mobilized
in the case of a crisis at the Neckarwestheim nuclear
power plant.
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A practice exercise in 1978 showed that it is very important
for personnel to have experience in communications. In particular,
a reliable personal understanding of procedures must be gained
without the stress of an accident situation.
It is unacceptable for representatives of government author-
ities--as good as their technical knowledge may be--to give in-
structions to the plant staff. It is not considered restrictive,
for example, if the plant superintendent and a government official
decide jointly at what time radioactive gases are to be released,
but all decisions about the plant itself must be made only by the
plant superintendent, assisted by his own staff. These decisions
must be the result of the best estimate of the plant staff. Esti-
mates of an extremely conservative worst-case nature should be
considered in theoretical discussions but should not be incor-
porated into risk management. The situation must never arise
where, during a case of a serious failure, the plant staff's
decision making is affected by panic outside the plant. Neither
political nor financial pressures should be tolerated while
danger to the environment remains.
The people within the plant bear quite a lot of personal
risk. Trust and assistance are the best means of helping the
people who must operate the plant--even when the plant has
suffered failures.
It is hoped that accidents that constitute a crisis will
never occur. In any case, with the measures undertaken, such
incidents should be very rare. Thus, ironically, it is very
difficult for personnel to gain knowledge about the potential
and real risks that are experienced during operation of nuclear
plants, and the accident-management staff has very little chance
of experiencing other realistic exercises such as military
maneuvers. But one has, of course, to be thankful that, in
preparing this paper on the Neckarwestheim plant, one difficulty
was the absence of data from an actual crisis incident. I hope
that this situation will remain unchanged and that the prepara-
tions already made for crisis management in all nuclear facilities
will be sufficient, but never tested by actual experience.
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EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE VICINITY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
A. von Gadow
Federal Ministry of the Interior, FRG
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear installations have to be planned, designed, con-
structed, and operated in such a way that no incident could
threaten the health of the public. Strict supervision on the
basis of stringent technical and radiological regulations must
ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities.
In spite of great research and development efforts in the
field of reactor safety, a certain statistical risk remains and
has to be borne and managed. For this reason, the general sys-
tem of disaster control in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
has been reinforced by additional specific countermeasures to
be implemented in the vicinity of nuclear power plants.
ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The states within the FRG are responsible for planning,
equipment, and training in the field of emergency response.
The Federal Government provides equipment and personnel from
its Civil Defense resources and offers advice in specific nuclear
matters. The measures taken by the various states of the FRG
are coordinated and enable emergency planning and action across
state borders with minimal delay.
The authorities of the various states have prepared detailed
emergency plans for each nuclear power plant, in accordance with
a document worked out by the states, the "Basic Recommendations
for Disaster Control in the Environment of Nuclear Installations"
(Bundesministerium des Innern 1975). Delegation of responsibility
to local authorities has proved to be a sensible step. Knowledge
of local circumstances and personal acquaintance with the appro-
priate officials save time in communication and implementation
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of necessary countermeasures. Many of the people involved are
volunteers.
RADIATION DOSES REQUIRING COUNTERMEASURES
The maximum permissible dose for a radiation worker is 5
rem per year. This value is also the maximum design guide
dose for an individual per incident (Strahlenschutzverordnung
1976). Three major measures that can be taken in an accident
situation are
staying inside the house, i.e., taking shelter (almost every
house in the FRG has a cellar),
taking iodine tablets for protection of the thyroid gland,
evacuation.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a list of countermeasures for various
dose levels. From these tables it is clear that the aim of all
measures is to keep radioactivity and human beings apart, by
sheltering or by physiological blocking of the intake of radio-
active material, or ultimately by removal from the place of
possible hazard.
Table 1. Recommended countermeasures for whole-body irradiation
by external exposure and inhalation, by dose level.
Whole-body
dose (rem)
200
100
50
25
10
Recommended emergency measure
Shelter
Mandatory until evacuation
Mandatory
Recommended
Evacuation
Mandatory
Recommended
None
SOURCE: Hardt et aZ. (1977).
ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
Figure 1 shows how interaction among Federal and State
authorities, the operator of a nuclear power plant, and the local
authorities is organized. According to this scheme, the responsi-
bility for emergency planning and management lies with the local
government of a district. The Federal and State governments
each send experts to the emergency operation control staff to
give specific nuclear advice, as does the licensee of the plant
in question.
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Table 2. Recommended countermeasures for irradiation of the
thyroid gland by inhalation of radioiodine and radio-
tellurium, by dose level.
Dose to the Recommended emergency measure
thyroid gland
(rem) Shelter Iodine tablets Evacuation
1000 Mandatory Mandatory
until Mandatory
500 evacuation Recommended
200
100 Mandatory
Mandatory Not necessary
50 Recommended
25
10 Recommended Not necessary None
SOURCE: Hardt et al. (1977) .
The organizations participating in emergency management are
equipped with instruments for specific purposes, e.g., to measure
the degree of possible contamination of a victim. Organizations
such as the Red Cross plan and organize the training of their
members (many of which are volunteers) under the supervision and
on the basis of recommendations of the state and Federal author-
ities. Exercises organized at irregular intervals ensure an
adequate level of training for emergency personnel. The public
does not participate in the exercises, since possible disturbances
may cause more harm than the positive effects of the exercise.
EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM EXERCISES AND THE THREE MILE ISLAND
ACCIDENT
After an incident has been reported to the authorities by
the operator of a nuclear installation, an immediate assessment
has to be made of the possible extent of the problem. This
initial evaluation provides the basis for all countermeasures
to be taken. The accident at the Three Mile Island plant took
such an unfortunate development because of the lack of correct
information on the status of the plant.
The government of the FRG will improve the standard of
education and training of plant personnel and will provide recom-
mendations for better drill and ergonomic equipment. For the
teams carrying out measurements in the respective area, better
instruments and a more thorough education are necessary_
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INuclear sup rVISlon1
.---_---.;L.-__---,
State Ministry
of the Interior
Local government
State Ministry
of Health
Federal Ministry
of the Interior
I
Reactor Safety
Commission
Radiation
Protection
Licensing department
of the responsible
state ministry
'\. Comm""o0.J /
Expert /
r-------,
Public
services
such as the
Red Cross
Fire
brigade
Emergency operations
control staff
Civil Defense I
~
x
UJ
-
if
requested
Expert
i
Nuclear installation
Federal services
such as
military experts
Off-site
measures
(1) Alerti ng!alarm ing
(2) Assignment of measuring teams
(3) Public information
(4) Traffic control
(5) Distribution of iodine tablets
(6) Evacuation
(7) Warning to downriver water supply plants
(8) Decontamination
Figure 1. Organization scheme for management of a nuclear
emergency in the FRG-
Communication links between the plant, the state agencies,
and the Federal authorities did not prove satisfactory in a
number of exercises, because the lines were frequently over-
burdened by numerous calls and inquiries from the press, the
public authorities, and concerned private individuals. Additional
telephone and telex connections and radio communication facilities
are to be installed between the responsible authorities.
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The Federal Ministry of the Interior has formulated the
main objectives for research and development efforts in the
field of emergency planning. These objectives include the
classification of unexpected radiation exposures and the develop-
ment of adequate countermeasures; it is hoped that this research
can be applied to better evaluate possible accidents, and to
improve the effectiveness, planning, and optimizing of emergency
measures, as well as the organization of the best possible medical
treatment.
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND ACCEPTANCE
The Ministries of the Interior of the states within the
FRG have issued a brochure for public information, in which the
principles of reactor safety, alarm signals, countermeasures
by the emergency management authorities, means of protection,
and recommendations on how to behave are illustrated and
explained in simple language. This information has been dis-
tributed within a radius of 10 kilometers of each nuclear power
plant and is available to any person upon request.
Speaking of only the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
nuclear accidents are almost the only threat felt by the public.
In the FRG 13 nuclear power plants now in operation and 2
nuclear research centers have led to acceptance of this form
of energy generation. Still, planning and construction of addi-
tional nuclear plants at other sites have caused protest or even
violence. The means of ensuring steady progress in an atmosphere
of confidence is information and education.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR ALARM EXERCISE PERFORMED AT
THE NECKARWESTHEIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Dieter Kaspar
Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Welfare,
Baden-W~rtternberg, FRG
INTRODUCTION
In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) both reactor owners
and government authorities must take action in the event of an
emergency at a nuclear power plant. The owners' responsibilities
are to stabilize the reactor, to alarm the authorities, to make
data pertaining to the event available in as much detail as pos-
sible, and to send a specialist to the government authorities.
The authorities must ensure that the health of the population
is protected and must prepare a plan of action for the very
improbable case of a nuclear catastrophe.
In October 1978 a nuclear alarm exercise was carried out at
the Neckarwestheim plant in Baden-WUrttemberg, FRG, to test the
effectiveness of existing emergency plans. The Ministry of the
Interior in Baden-WUrtternberg organized and led the exercise, in
cooperation with the Ministry for Labor, Health, and Social
Welfare--the government agency with special expertise in the area
of nuclear problems. The president of a smaller administrative
district within Baden-W~rttemberg, the Stuttgart RegierungsprMsi-
dium, organized and directed the emergency staff mobilized for the
exercise. The counties of Ludwigsburg and Heilbronn, both adjacent
to the Neckarwestheim reactor, also participated in the exercise.
Also involved were several communities and private organizations,
such as the nuclear power plant itself.
The goals of the exercise were
To educate and train emergency staff;
To study the practicality of existing catastrophe plans;
To test the routing of alarms;
To test communication systems; and
To demonstrate preparedness for nuclear accidents.
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THE EXERCISE
The responsible government authorities prepared the exercise
carefully, in cooperation with experts from the Neckarwestheim
power plant. Although a detailed script for the "emergency"
was written, it was not released to the participants from the
Stuttgart Regierungspr&sidium. As would happen in an actual
event, the emergency staff received all its messages from the
plant through normal telephone channels.
During the exercise a separate evacuation plan, a special
part of the emergency plan, was tested. This involved a simulated
evacuation of three small villages east of the plant. The
Technischer Oberwachungsverein Rheinland in Cologne neveloped
a computer program called EVAS {Evakuierungs-Simulations-Modell
(Evacuation Simulation Model)) for this purpose. EVAS proved to
be a valuable aid for planning and analyzing evacuation processes.
Its range of application includes
demarcation of the evacuation area and division of the area
into subsectors,
assignment of people from areas affected by the emergency to
reception areas,
determination of evacuation routes,
deployment of motor vehicles,
determination of the capacity of the emergency stations and
reception centers.
About 200 invited representatives of other States of the
FRG, foreign countries, and the press watched the exercise. All
activities undertaken by the emergency staff were filmed and
transmitted to a large screen in a nearby hall, where the
observers were assembled.
The accident scenario started with a loss-of-coolant accident.
Because this event alone would not cause the release of radio-
activity, it was postulated that other failures also occurred;
pumps and valves were assumed to fail at the same time as the
LOCA, so that only 25% of the emergency cooling system was in
operation. Two and one-half hours after the initiating event,
a leakage in the containment was assumed to occur. According to
the scenario, a great deal of radioactivity was released for four
hours. Then the emergency core cooling system was brought into
full operation, the leakage was sealed, and the release of radio-
activity was stopped.
The first alarm call from the reactor carne at 8:35 a.m.
The content of the message was roughly as follows: "We have had
a LOCA; no persons are hurt; there has been no radioactive
release to the environment up to now; the situation is not clear;
we recommend that a prealarm be set up." A prealarm calls for
the emergency staff to assemble, for a radiation expert to corne
to the assembly room, and for a communications system to be put
in place. In response to this message the president of the
Stuttgart Regierungsprgsidium immediately (at 8:37 a.m.) set up
a prealarm. At 8:48 the emergency staff was ready for operation.
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At 9:07 a second alarm call reached the emergency staff, reporting
that the situation in the plant had worsened. The pressure and
temperature had risen, and the possibility of a release of radio-
activity could no longer be excluded. The reactor crew recommended
that an alarm be called.
After a short discussion between the staff, the radiation
protection expert, and a member of the reactor operation crew who
had just arrived, the leader of the emergency staff decided, at
9:20 a.m., to declare a catastrophe alarm in two counties. This
step meant that the following measures were to be taken:
Determination of the area affected by radioactivity;
Implementation of traffic restrictions and deviations;
Distribution of iodine tablets;
Utilization of a special siren alarm to tell the pUblic to
switch on a radio or a television and to wait for news;
Preparation of a broadcast message;
Preparation of evacuation as a precaution; and
Dispatch of special police troops with measurement sets to
the affected area.
Only the last measure was implemented in reality. All others
were just simulated.
At about 11:00 a.m. another piece of bad news came from the
reactor crew: a leakage in the containment had occurred and
radioactivity was being released up a stack. After a second
conference, the president decided to continue and accelerate the
evacuation. By this time 60% of the population had already left
the region. It was decided to set up emergency stations, where
all evacuees would be registered and measured for contamination.
If necessary, people could be decontaminated at such stations
and could receive first aid from expert physicians. The setting
up of seven emergency stations was simulated. During the same
period of time many measurement results were radioed to the
emergency staff.
At 3 p.m. the reactor crew announced that the release of
radioactivity had been stopped. The reactor was under control,
and the exercise was terminated.
EVALUATION OF THE EXERCISE
In the weeks and months following the simulated alarm all
participants evaluated their actions and reactions during the
exercise. They concluded that the purpose of the exercise had
been successfully fulfilled, i.e., the government authorities
had demonstrated their preparedness for nuclear accidents. Still,
they recognized that several problems remained to be solved and
certain measures needed improvement. The sections below outline
the results of the evaluation for each of the goals that had been
set for the exercise.
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Education and Training of Emergency Staff
It would perhaps be unfair to conclude directly from the
exercise that the emergency staff was well trained. After the
first alarm call the emergency staff was ready for action within
only a few minutes. But this was not difficult, since everyone
knew the exact starting time of the exercise and what he had
to do. Clearer proof of the preparedness of the emergency staff
became available only some months after the exercise, as the
result of a second, completely unannounced alarm exercise. The
Ministry of the Interior asked the chief of operations at the
Neckarwestheim power plant to initiate another alarm exercise,
whenever he wished during normal working hours. When this alarm
was called the members of the emergency staff assembled as quickly
as they had during the first exercise a half-year before.
Assessment of the Practicality of Existing Catastrophe Plans
The exercise revealed the necessity to improve the form
and convenience of some parts of the plans. It became clear that
the following components of the plans should be specified in
greater detail:
The role of the radiation protection expert,
Channels for notifying people off-site,
The strategy for evacuation, and
The role of emergency stations.
(1) The roZe of the radiation protection expert. When an
emergency alarm is called, the Regierungspr~sidiumpresident, as
leader of the emergency staff, immediately confers with all his
advisers and experts. One of the most important participants in
these discussions is the radiation protection expert. In the
early stages of a nuclear catastrophe he is the only person who
can judge the situation more or less correctly.
During the preparatory work for the alarm exercise it became
clear that one man would not be able to carry out all the necessary
tasks, and therefore two experts were mobilized. But even two
persons proved to be insufficient to perform all the necessary
work--to get an overview of the situation in the reactor and of
conditions both on-site and off-site, to recommend appropriate
countermeasures, and to evaluate all measurement results from
the environment.
During the alarm exercise, the expert recommended that people
be evacuated from three villages. This, however, could not be
justified by the real situation at the time of the decision, for
there was no release of radioactivity. The expert had based his
decision on the only information he had, information pertaining
to the bad situation in the reactor itself. Knowing that tempera-
ture and pressure were increasing, he recommended the major step
of evacuation.
The Ministry for Labor, Health, and Social Welfare in Baden-
WUrttemberg has now started to organize workshops for all radiation
131
protection experts in the region. The purpose of the workshops
is to permit the experts to become familiar with the problems
of other sites, to exchange experiences, and to meet plant staff.
If a catastrophe should occur anywhere, all experts should prob-
ably be brought to the site.
(2) Channels for notifying people off-site. Another com-
ponent of the plans in need of improvement concerned the dissemi-
nation of information to people living or working in areas near
the reactor. Radio stations, which operate around the clock in
the FRG, were selected as the medium for broadcasting information.
The plans require the broadcasts to be based on a quite universal
text, now in the hands of all district government authorities.
This text, supplemented by up-to-date information on evacuation
routes, assembly places, and so on, is to be telexed to radio
stations. This procedure was carried out during the exercise, but
the supplementary text got too long; the writer tried to give too
much information in just one message. This would have confused
rather than informed the public. The exercise also revealed that
writing the message and transmitting it by telex takes a very long
time.
One solution would be to deposit the universal text with the
radio stations and to transmit only the supplementary information
from the government authority. Other solutions are still being
discussed.
During the exercise questions were raised about means for
informing people working outside in vineyards or fields. Loud-
speaker cars could not reach all territory so a helicopter was
sent to cover remote areas.
(3) strategies for evacuation. During the exercise the
evacuation posed the greatest problems. Although an evacuation
should be put into effect only as a last resort, it must be care-
fully planned. The EVAS computer program was a big aid during
the exercise, but it did not resolve the question of how to
assemble enough vehicles and drivers. Large cities in the
vicinity of the Neckarwestheim reactor have a great many city
buses, but it is difficult to get access to them during the night
or during rush hours when all buses are running. Experts assume
that about one-third of the population would use their private
cars in an evacuation. This is an average figure--during the
night many more private cars would be available. In densely
populated regions of the FRG an evacuation would proceed very
slowly on any given route; thus it is very important to include
alternative routes in the plans. I
Another problem that surfaced during the exercise concerned
people who refuse to be evacuated. Is it possible to force them?
Certainly not, but in this case how are they to be supplied?
Special plans are also needed to cover the evacuation of schools,
hospitals, and homes for the aged.
(4) The role of emergency stations. The problem of emergency
stations follows directly on the problem of evacuation, for all
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evacuees are to assemble at such stations. Emergency stations
have the following tasks:
Registration of affected people
Measurement of contamination
Decontamination, if necessary
First aid (routine injuries only)
Classification of people by degree of exposure to radiation,
i.e., those not affected; those strongly affected by radiation,
who would be immediately transported to special hospitals;
and those with a medium degree of exposure, who would be
given a medical consultation during the following days.
During the exercise seven emergency stations were set up
to process evacuees from three villages. This experience was
later discussed in great detail and several conclusions were
reached. The leader of an emergency station should be a specially
licensed physician assisted by other physicians. All physicians
practicing in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant need more
information and education. All other personnel in the station
should corne from organizations specializing in providing protection
during catastrophes.
The Routing of Alarms
The third goal of the exercise was to test alarm routing
procedures. Here no difficulties could be observed. The alarm
system seems to be suitable for both night and day operation.
This was shown as well in several additional alarm exercises
performed over the period of a year.
Communications Systems
The existing communication systems, i.e., the public tele-
phone net, the police radio system, and telex machines did not
function well during the exercise. In the case of telex connec-
tions, much time was needed to write and transmit a long text,
and it was only possible to transmit letters and numbers. In
the future a telecopy set will be used instead. It is quicker
and permits the transmission of maps, handwritten messa~es, tables,
and so forth. Several telecopy sets have already been installed
in power stations and in the offices of government authorities.
They are used every day, for example for transmitting daily status
reports.
The exercise revealed that only well-trained people can use
a radio to communicate successfully. Many mistakes occurred
during the transmission of measurement results.
The public telephone was the communications channel used most
often during the exercise. This system functioned well, although
some problems did arise. Very often dialed numbers were occupied,
because smaller communities have only one line. The staff at the
Ministries, the Regierungspr~sidium, and the reactor used numbers
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not known to the public, so it was not difficult to make connec-
tions. But even these numbers would be occupied or dead in a
real catastrophe. The public would try to make personal inquiries,
the press would rush to all telephones, and the whole network
would break down. One can see this effect each day at 10 p.m.,
when the cheap "moonshine" telephone rate comes into effect.
To avoid a communication blackout during an emergency the
government authorities must try to obtain connections to special
networks, such as the police network, the electric power supply
companies' network, and the military network. The electric power
supply companies' network, which uses high voltage lines, seems
to be especially suitable.
CONCLUSION
The reaction to the exercise among members of the public,
and representatives of the press, radio, and television was
fairly- good. The most frequent criticism was that the exercise
was prepared too well, so that it was only a show. But all par-
ticipants in the exercise are convinced that they are well
prepared for an emergency case. They have identified the prob-
lems and they are trying to solve them as well as possible. And
they hope (in fact they are rather sure) that a real catastrophe
will never occur.
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NUCLEAR ACCIDENT RESPONSE AND POPULATION PROTECTION IN
THE NETHERLANDS: PHILOSOPHY, SOLUTIONS, AND PROBLEMS
Jan L. Baas
B.F.M. Bosnjakovic
Ministry of Health and Environmental Protection,
The Netherlands
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE NETHERLANDS
The nuclear energy program in The Netherlands is relatively
modest; there are two nuclear power plants, one at Dodewaard
(54 MWe BWR, operational since 1968) and one at Borssele (477
MWe PWR, operational since 1973). It is not clear at this
moment whether and to what extent there will be additions to
this capacity in the future. Several nuclear power stations
have been built in neighboring countries (Belgium, Federal
Republic of Germany), the nearest and most important one being
that at Doel, Belgium.
THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE EXISTING ORGANIZATION OF
RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND POPULATION PROTECTION
The Nuclear Energy Act of 1963 (Kernenergiewet 1963) broadly
outlines the Government's competences and the responsibilities
of the persons involved. The details of these guidelines are
given in general administrative orders. One example is the
Nuclear Installations Accidents Decree of 1976 (Besluit Ongevallen
Kerninstallatie 1976), with the corresponding detailed Ministerial
Orders concerning nuclear accident management (Beschikking
vaststelling Alarmregeling 1976). These formal administrative
measures are based on previous studies such as the Advice of
the Health Council concerning the emergency reference levels
(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid 1976b) and the report setting
forth 'General Principles of a Notification and Alarm System
in The Netherlands,' which was presented by the Interdepartmental
Commission on Nuclear Energy (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid
1976a). The main features of the nuclear accident management
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system can be described as follows (Beschikking vaststellung
Alarmregeling 1976):
(1) Initiation of the accident response is carried out by
the nuclear power plant.
(2) Definitions. The accidents are divided into 3 broad
classes, according to their consequences outside the nuclear
installation site:
Accident class 1: a gaseous radioactive release above the
licensed limit is imminent or taking place, but does not
exceed ten times the value of this limit.
Accident class 2: gaseous radioactive releases greater than
ten times the licensed limit are imminent or taking place,
and the amount released can still be approximately estimated.
Accident class 3: the unknown amount of radioactivity released,
imminent or actual, indicates the possibility of a major
catastrophe.
One of the purposes of this classification is to prevent unneces-
sary or even deleterious actions.
According to the Advice of the Health Council (Ministerie
van Volksgezondheid 1976b), the emergency reference level has
been defined as a value of the integrated individual radiation
dose below which it is improbable that measures to reduce the
radiation risk would be justified. The emergency reference levels
are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Emergency Reference Levels of Dose recommended by the
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygi~ne,
The Netherlands (1976).
------------
Dose (rem)
Organ or Tissue
External Radiation
Whole body
Skin
Internal Radiation
Whole body
Gonads
Bone marrow
Other organs
Children
5
30
5
5
5
10
Adults
15
90
15
15
15
30
Depending on the rate and duration of the release, meteor-
ological conditions, the geography around the nuclear installation,
and other factors, the radiation risk for a given locality can be
classified as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Radiation risk classes, which can be used to classify
specified geographic areas.
Radiation risk class Whole body dose
I
II
II 1 _
Less than 5 rem Less than 10 rem
5 to 15 rem 10 to 30 rem
More than 15 rem More than 30 rem
-------------------_._-----
Different action phases, characterized by combinations of
accident classes and accident situations, will not be discussed
here.
(3) Legal competences and responsibilities in the event
of a nuclear emergency are stated in Section VI, articles 38-44
of the Nuclear Energy Act (Kernenergiewet 1963) and can be sum-
marized as follows:
The Minister of Health and Environmental Protection and the
Minister of Social Affairs are to shut down the installation
(possibly on the request of the mayor) if there is danger to
public health, and to organize countermeasures to respond
to the danger.
The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries is to take measures
to protect the health of animals, plants, and the quality of
agricultural products.
The Minister of Public Works, Waterways, and Communications
is responsible for measures concerning water economics.
The mayor has the authority to take measures immediately,
subject to consultations with representatives of the Minister
of Health and Environmental Protection, the Minister of Social
Affairs, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the
Minister of Public Works, Waterways, and Communications.
The provincial electricity generation company has to inform
the authorities about the accident situation as rapidly as
possible.
Significantly, the Nuclear Energy Act does not explicitly mention
the Minister of the Interior (who is generally responsible for the
police, fire brigades, Population Protection Agency, etc.) in
the context of nuclear accident management regulations.
(4) The organizational structure for nuclear emergency
response centers on five groups. Their tasks are discussed
below, and the links between the groups are summarized in Figure 1.
The Operations Steering Group (Maatregelen Commissie) makes
decisions concerning adequate measures and gives necessary orders
to the available operational units. This group consists of the
following persons:
Provincial Governor;
Director of the Radiation Department, Ministry of Health and
Environmental Protection;
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Director of the Nuclear Inspectorate, Ministry of Social
Affairs;
Provincial Food Commissioner;
Director of Provincial Public Works and Waterways;
Mayors of municipalities facing potential radiation risk;
Regional Inspector of Environmental Health;
Regional Inspector of Industrial Health;
Expert from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; and
Expert from the Ministry of Public Works, Waterways, and
Communications.
The composition of the Operations Steering Group, chaired by
the Provincial Governor, guarantees that the legal responsibili-
ties of the Ministers are executed in the most responsible and
efficient way. As regards the broad-ranging power possessed
by a Provincial Governor and a mayor under the Provinces Act
(Provinciewet 1962) and the Municipality Act (Gemeentewet 1861),
the Nuclear Energy Act operates as a lex specialis and overrides
almost completely the powers based on the two earlier Acts.
The Tactical Staff Group (Tactische Staf) consists of the
heads of operational units. Its task is to carry out and report
on the necessary countermeasures ordered by the Operations
Steering Group.
The Technical Coordination Group (Technische Commissie) is
required to coordinate the measurements of contamination and
radiation, to assess the data, to keep in contact with the
nuclear installation regarding the course of the accident, and
to transmit information to the Operations Steering Group. The
Technical Coordination Group consists of the following govern-
mental experts:
Head of the Physics Laboratory, State Institute of Public
Health;
Expert from the Nuclear Inspectorate, Ministry of Social
Affairs;
Expert from the Radiation Department, Ministry of Health and
Environmental Protection;
Commander of ABC Services, Provincial Branch of the Population
Protection Agency;
Head of the Central Weather Service, Royal Netherlands Meteor-
ological Institute;
Expert from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
The operations Steering Group, the Tactical Staff Group,
and the Technical Coordination Group convene and operate in
a common sheltered site.
Data collection groups are required to carry out measure-
ments of radiation and contamination levels. Trained personnel,
operating four mobile measuring units, are to follow one or
more preplanned routes and collect data at agreed points. The
actual routes are routinely checked and, if necessary, modified.
A Back-up Unit, located at the responsible Ministrv, has the
task of communicating with the media, politicians, and so forth.
Back-up
unit
r-----------------------i
I I
I Operations steering I
group I
Technical
coordination group
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Operations units Data collection groups
Figure 1. Organizational scheme for emergency management of
nuclear accidents in The Netherlands.
(5) Notification concerning an accident is initially carried
out by the nuclear power plant. In the case of a Class 1 acci-
dent, the plant transmits a message to the local Mayor, to the
Nuclear Inspectorate within the Ministry of Social Affairs, and
to the Regional Inspector of Environmental Protection. In the
case of a Class 2 accident, the message is initially transmitted
to the local mayor, the Nuclear Inspectorate, the Radiation
Department, and the Regional Alarm Centre. The Alarm Centre then
passes the message to about 25 receiving points, such as central,
provincial, and local authorities, services, and institutions.
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It is probably a truism to say that nuclear accident resoonse
and population protection are characterized by a lack of practical
experience. Even the TMI accident has only partly changed this
situation, since only low or negligible off-site releases of
radioactivity occurred during that accident. This lack of prac-
tical experience leads to the questions of the motivation of
the agencies involved in nuclear accident response and the
importance of exercises in stimulating preparedness.
Members of the Operations Steering Group and the Technical
Coordination Group are specialists or leaders whose main responsi-
bilities do not concern nuclear accident response planning and
management. In a small country like The Netherlands, the rela-
tively limited contingent of nuclear radiation and emergency
management specialists are normally busy with a huge number
of day-to-day problems--problems that arise with a higher fre-
quency than serious nuclear accidents. So one problem can be
formulated as a question of motivation within a limited pool of
human resources.
The low frequency of nuclear accidents, combined with limit-
ed motivation, naturally enhances the importance of exercises
in nuclear accident response planning. Of course, exercises can
be very different in scope, both in breadth (numbers of people
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involved) and depth (degree of simulation). So far, the regular
exercises and drills that have been performed in The Netherlands
have had the following objectives:
To raise the level of motivation and consciousness among the
participants;
To test and improve the response time of the participants;
To check the adequacy (both in qualitative and quantitative
terms) of the communication lines;
To measure the time needed to coordinate the different decision
making and operational units;
To measure the time necessary to collect and transmit data,
and then evaluate them in the Technical Coordination Group;
To assess the work of the Operations Steering Group.
Within the limited scope of objectives, the four exercises
executed so far in The Netherlands have provided valuable results,
showing a satisfactory picture of preparedness for the tested
sections of the emergency organizations.
The TMI accident has focused renewed public and professional
interest on nuclear accident response management. In The
Netherlands this has led, in combination with the results of
exercises and relevant experience in other countries, to a review
of the existing philosophy and organization for protecting the
public. As a preliminary conclusion it may be stated that a
need for very radical changes was not found, but improvement
seems to be desirable or possible in a number of fields. These
will be discussed in the following sections.
Dose Estimates
Estimates of received or projected doses to the population
can be based on emission data from nuclear power plants or on
off-site measurements. Both methods must be available, although
the use of emission data is, in principle, preferred because it
gives more immediate information, because the information, if
combined with adequate meteorological data and evaluation methods,
is more complete and reliable, and because it is more cost-
effective.
The Bavarian Landesamt fBr Umweltschutz (Provincial Office
for Environmental Protection) has acted in accordance with this
philosophy; it has installed its own emission measuring instru-
ments in nuclear plants and connected them remotely to a powerful
data acquisition and processing system (Eder 1977). In The
Netherlands, it was realized early on that in addition to instru-
mentation suitable for normal operation, extra instrumentation
is needed that can function under accident circumstances, both
from the point of view of shielding and of measuring range
requirements (Bosnjakovic and Bogaerde 1978). The installation
of this extra instrumentation to measure emissions of noble gases
and radioactive iodine has been under way since 1977. The TMI
accident has confirmed that emission instrumentation deserves to
be reviewed with high priority (USNRC 1979).
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The second method of measuring population doses, i.e.,
using off-site instrumentation, can rely on mobile or stationary
units. As mentioned above, four mobile measuring units are
already in operation in The Netherlands. The existing net of
stationary measuring points around the Dodewaard power station
is shown in Figure 2. Currently the following extensions to
off-site monitoring capabilities are being studied: addition
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Figure 2. Off-site monitoring points around the Dodewaard nuclear
power plant in The Netherlands.
of an airborne measurement platform; extension of off-site gamma-
radiation monitoring capabilities; and extension of off-site
iodine measuring capabilities, either mobile, stationary, or both.
Off-site monitoring capabilities are of utmost importance for
determining individual and collective doses after an accident,
as well as for routine surveillance.
Data Transmission and Lines of Communication
As far as exercises are concerned, the existing means of
communication--cable and radio links, and a number of reserved
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telephone lines--have proven to be sufficient. The availability
of a considerable number of participating specialists is improved
by placing radio equipment in their private cars. The conges-
tion of telecommunication networks, which is rather probable in
the case of a real accident, cannot be easily simulated by exer-
cises. Therefore, an extension of the number of reserved tele-
phone lines (which would remain unaffected by a general telecom-
munications jam) is under consideration. All the details of the
emergency telecommunications system, such as actual telephone
numbers, are not published, to prevent possible misuse.
Notification of the Population, Vertical and Horizontal
Evacuation Capabilities, and Other Protective Measures
The Swiss authorities have developed an integrated, inter-
nally consistent concept of protective measures for the population,
based on the following elements (Eidgenossisches Amt fur Energie-
wirtschaft 1977):
Notification of the population as directly as possible, using
local sirens and a central radio station;
Emphasis on vertical evacuation during the first critical
hours, relying on existing (mainly private) shelters;
Horizontal evacuation only under exceptional circumstances,
such as in the case of high-level ground contamination.
All these elements are present in Dutch protective measures
for the population, but probably to a different degree. Because
of differences in soil properties and traditions, there are fewer
shelters in private houses. As well, the construction of shel-
ters to protect against wartime nuclear explosions has had a
different history in the two countries, due to different political
attitudes. Additional studies and improvements are certainly
desirable in the area of population protection, especially with
respect to the effectiveness of population notification procedures.
The questions of the use of emergency planning zones and
the administration of stable iodine have still not been resolved
in The Netherlands. The Kemeny Commission reported rather nega-
tively about the usefulness of emergency planning zones (Presi-
dent's Commission 1979), but the zone principle has been incor-
porated in a number of European population protection concepts
(Eidgenossisches Amt fur Energiewirtschaft 1977; Bundesministerium
des Inneren 1975).
The question of stable iodine distribution is also not fully
resolved, even though the Kemeny Commission and the US Administra-
tion seem to take a rather positive stance (President's Commission
1979; US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1978). It
seems that in European countries the view predominates that for
logistic reasons alone, administration of stable iodine during a
short, acute nuclear accident would only be justified for a
relatively small, critically exposed population group, say up to
10,000 persons. This argument is not necessarily valid for acci-
dents of longer duration. In addition, some minor medical contra-
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indications have been reported and should be taken into considera-
tion (Jongkees and Brouke 1975). Finally, one of the most impor-
tant considerations is our conviction that dose reduction due to
iodine tablets is of little use, if compromised by additional
external and internal doses stemming from iodine distribution
requirements.
Another controversial question relates to the risks, radio-
logical and nonradiological, connected with horizontal evacuation
(Haus and Sell 1974). According to the Kemeny Commission, these
risks may have been overestimated in the past. In this context
it may be worthwhile to study the chlorine gas accident near
Toronto where, in November 1979, more than 200,000 persons were
evacuated within a few hours (Neue Znrcher Zeitung, 14 November
1979) .
Strengthening of the Organizational Structure,
Improving the Preparedness of Local Authorities, and
Clarifying the Role of the Nuclear Plant Operator
At the central authority level, it would be desirable for
national organizations like state police, fire departments, and
the Public Protection Agency to playa more active role. The
operational execution of steps and measures necessitated by
nuclear emergencies is mainly the task of provincial and local
authorities. The planning of their task will be performed
according to an expected new law concerning municipal emergency
plans (Wetsontwerp 1977). The task will eventually require
detailed plans for hospitals, industrial plants, schools, and
so forth. The elaboration of municipal plans will naturally
require cooperation with nuclear and radiation specialists from
the central authorities.
An interesting question is whether the role and responsibility
of the nuclear power plant for off-site nuclear accident response
should be increased. This is the case in a considerable number
of countries (see for instance Matthews and Pepper 1981). There
are two strong arguments in favor of the expansion of the power
plants' role, namely the "polluter pays" principle, and the avail-
ability of high-quality expertise in the plant. Arguments against
it are that the government authorities should not transfer their
responsibilities to a third party, and that the plant experts
are needed to deal with events in the plant itself. The TMI
accident has shown that the number of specialists required is
considerable. Thus an increase in the number of available special-
ists should be aimed at, both through national efforts and through
international agreements.
International Cooperation
A system of coordination has existed between The Netherlands
and Belgium since 1975. This ensures that competent authorities
in the neighboring country can be quickly contacted and alarm
given if required, should there be an emergency in the nuclear
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installations at Borssele, Doel, or Mol. At the moment, negotia-
tions are being conducted to elaborate and refine the existing
regulations. In particular, a Ministerial Order concerning the
protection of the Dutch population in the vicinity of the Doel
power station is in the final stage of preparation.
An agreement regarding the exchange of information and con-
sultation with respect to nuclear projects close to the joint
frontier was concluded in a Memorandum between the uutch and
German authorities in 1977 (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid -
Bundesministerium des Innern 1977). A Dutch-German Commission
has been established to discuss all matters of mutual interest
in the nuclear energy sector. It is empowered to appoint work-
ing parties for specific purposes. In this context, one working
party has been appointed to treat problems of nuclear accidents.
Some other questions to be addressed include the following:
will it be possible to evacuate people across a frontier?
Will there be disagreement due to differences in Emergency
Reference Levels or different judgments about meteorological
conditions?
Will assistance be given by neighboring countries?
One may envisage trans frontier exercises of communication facili-
ties and emergency teams.
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ASPECTS OF ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
IN THE USSR
N.V. Beskrestnov
Ministry of Energy, USSR
V.Ph. Kozlov
Kyrchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, USSR
INTRODUCTION
In many countries nuclear power is being successfully used
for the production of thermal and electrical energy and the
nuclear energy industry is becoming an independent branch of the
economy. According to estimates given at the Tenth World
Conference on Energy (Istanbul, 1977), nuclear-based electric
energy may account for 45% of world energy production by the end
of this century. The program of economic development for the
USSR, as adopted by the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, envisaged the construction of nuclear
power plants in the European sector of the USSR.
Production of thermal and electrical energy at a nuclear
power plant involves the generation and accumulation of a large
amount of radioactive material. This creates a potential for
radiological exposure of plant personnel, the general population,
and the environment in the case of an accident. Safety require-
ments have been set forth for nuclear power plants to mitigate
this danger. An examination of the practical operating experience
of nuclear power plants in the USSR shows no cases of irradiation
that exceed the maximum permissible dose. Technical measures
adopted during the construction of an atomic power plant provide
a framework for the safe operation of plant equipment.
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
Safety requirements should ensure that any component failure
can be fully controlled, while the operational status of the
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facility is maintained. In the event of a failure, any effect
on plant personnel, the general population, or the environment
should be prevented (Sidorenko et aZ. 1977).
The problem of the "potential danger" of accidental exposure
of the general population became apparent in the early days of
nuclear energy and still exists. This concern led to the con-
cept of a "maximum rated accident" (MRA), defined by its radio-
logical consequences. Safety devices developed to respond to
a MRA are designed to localize any damage to the core and to
protect employees. When the scale of an accident is greater
than an MRA, such safety measures may not be effective; here
the concept of a "maximum possible accident" (MPA) must be
considered. Although an MPA is characterized by large-scale
radiological consequences, its probability of occurrence is so
small that no technical mitigating measures have been specified.
The siting of nucle~r power plants 25 to 40 km from cities,
combined with the planned accident response measures discussed
below, ensures the safety of the general population in the case
of such an accident.
The planning of safety measures is thus based on a classifi-
cation of accidents in terms of their radiological consequences.
The scale of an accident is determined by the quantity of radio-
active materials released, primarily from the reactor core. The
amount of radioactivity released outside the plant depends upon
the reliability of safety systems.
Accidents connected with losses of coolant from the primary
circuit have been classified in the following way (Atomenergo
1978) :
Category I: accidents involving fuel melting;
Category II: accidents involving depressurization of fuel
elements without fuel melting;
Categories III-V: accidents involving a failure in the
primary circuit and loss of coolant, without depressurization
of fuel elements.
In the case of Category I or II accidents, the reactor
should be scrammed in order to prevent the increase of vapor
pressure in the intact elements and the release of fission
products inside the plant. Accidents in Categories III-V are
characterized by the localization of radioactive products in the
fuel elements.
Three types of radiological consequences of accidents may
be distinguished: local (occurring inside the plant); regional;
and general. Radioactive consequences of local accidents are
determined by the structure of the power plant; radiation doses
to employees might be several times higher than those experienced
under normal operating conditions. Regional accidents are char-
acterized by radioactive releases within the region where the
power plant is located. In the case of a general accident, the
level of irradiation and environmental contamination violates
the existing USSR environmental standards for the operation of
nuclear power plants.
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SAFETY MEASURES
Only general accidents, including the concepts of "maximum
rated accident" (MRA) and "maximum possible accident" (MPA) , are
considered in the planning of safety measures. The maximum
release of radioactive inert gases and aerosols (including radio-
nuclides of iodine) permitted for normal operating conditions of
a power plant may not be more than five times higher than the
admissible standardized daily release (ASR).* Any release in
excess of this maximum amount should be compensated for by lower
releases during the subsequent time period (Atomnaya energiya
1979). It should be mentioned that the operational standard for
a nuclear power plant is lower than the ASR. The statistical
mean of radioactive releases determines the operational standard.
In the case of a maximum possible accident, planned safety
measures are taken when the expected equivalent whole body dose
exceeds 25 rem or when the dose to the thyroid (by inhalation
of radioactive iodine) is expected to exceed 150 rem for adults
and 75 rem for children (Ministry of Public Health of the USSR
1971).
The safety precautions include the following measures:
Temporary shelter;
Limited stay in the open air;
Decontamination of skin and clothing;
Limited consumption of contaminated food;
Iodine prophylaxis.
Temporary evacuation of the population is planned if the whole
body dose is expected to exceed 75 rem. Children are to be
evacuated when the forecast dose to the thyroid is greater than
225 rem. Hospitalization is planned for those who have received
whole body doses greater than 100 rem or thyroid doses greater
than 400 rem (adults) or 200 rem (children) (Turkin et at. 1977).
Integrating dosimeters are used to determine the gamma radia-
tion dose to the population. These are placed in different loca-
tions around the nuclear power plants. Continuously operating
dosimeters make it possible to monitor the development of an
accident.
ACCIDENT r~NAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
Accident management activities are based at a coordination
center set up in the power plant, and involve both plant personnel
and government authorities. The center is divided into sections,
each attending to one of the following problem areas:
*A standardized release has been normalized according to the
installed capacity (GWe) of the nuclear power plant.
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Constant surveillance of the operating conditions of the
power plant;
Radiation control;
Dosimetric inspection of the territory around the plant and
the environmental protection zone;
Protection of the population and provisional evacuation, if
necessary;
Medical aid for the population and plant personnel, including
iodine prophylaxis.
The source of information about the development of the
accident, the form and content of the information, and the method
used to provide the information vary according to managerial
level, as indicated in Figure 1. Many types of information are
needed for decision making about necessary safety measures, and
this must be provided within the short response times required
INFORMATION
• Complete information
• Radiological
situation
• Weather conditions
• Complete technical
information
• Size of radio-
active release
• Weather conditions
• Triggered alarms
AGENCY
Responsible
government bodies
Leadership of the
nuclear branch
Administrator I
Technical manager I
+
I
Operator
Nuclear
power
plant
ACTIONS
• Approve measures taken by
other agencies
• Take corrective measures
• Form a technical emergency group
• Inform authorities
• Form conclusion about radio-
logical situation in the region
• Put plan for population pro-
tection into operation (if
necessary)
• Form preliminary conclusion
about the category of failure
• Form conclusion about
consequences
• Compare accident with
theoretical accident categories
Figure 1. Hierarchies of information needs and actions for
accident management, by managerial level.
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in an accident situation. The hierarchies of types of informa-
tion, responsible agencies, and the possible actions associated
with the information are sketched in Figure 1.
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THE FRENCH APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT OF LARGE NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
A. Teste du Bailler
Electricite de France
Before dealing with the French aspects of management of
nuclear accidents, it may be useful to summarize the highlights
of the French nuclear program. Because of a severe lack of
natural resources in France, plans have been made to generate a
large amount of electricity from nuclear plants. As of November
1, 1980, the French nuclear expansion program included twelve
900 MW pressurized water reactors (PWR) in operation, four
under commissioning, and eighteen under construction. Thirty-six
1300 MW PWRs were under construction or in planning phases. In
addition, a 1200 MW liquid metal fast breeder reactor is being
built in cooperation with Italy and Germany.
The entire nuclear fuel cycle is considered within the
French nuclear program, including the mining and enrichment of
uranium, manufacturing of fuel elements, and, above all, the
reprocessing of nuclear waste at La Hague. In keeping with the
consolidated nuclear program, all those working in the nuclear
field--regulators, operators, and suppliers--are fUlly informed
about procedures for the management of nuclear accidents.
Since 1958 a special attachment to each government depart-
ment's emergency organization plan for nonnuclear accidents has
specified protective measures to be taken in case of civil or
military nuclear accidents in France. More recently the Ministry
of the Interior called for the preparation of another set of
documents--specific plans for emergency intervention (plans
particuliers d'intervention et de secours (PPIS)) for each plant.
These plans are more complete and more accessible to the public
than the special attachments discussed above. Also, the utilities
have to prepare on-site emergency guides (plans d'urgence interne
(PUI)), which define all the procedures for reducing the conse-
quences of any nonnuclear or nuclear accident. These documents
are prepared case by case, plant by plant; they depend on the
local conditions, population, geology, industry, and so forth.
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Available emergency guides provide only a list of communica-
tions lines and addresses of hospitals and shelters. So far,
regulatory agencies have chosen not to decide in advance, on
the basis of hypothetical accidents, which countermeasures are
to be used. In their opinion the initial major problem is
preventing an accident instead of planning how to deal with one.
As was said in the Kemeny Commission report, it is more useful
to work on "what is" than on "what if" questions.
The TMI experience has called our attention to the need for
improvements in the construction and operation of a plant. Some
projects are underway in France that aim at improving operating
conditions in nuclear plants; these include a new display for
control rooms, training and evaluation of performance on simula-
tors, and research on human behavior in normal and abnormal
situations.
From a personal and philosophical point of view, insofar as
I am in charge of the operation of nuclear facilities, I think
it is better to plan for decisions about off-site countermeasures
to be made in the course of an accident, rather than to try to
make those decisions a priori. I also think that it is funda-
mental to have a certain level of public acceptance (which is
sooner said than done). This is the first requirement for good
preparedness for an emergency situation, and also for limited
or general training of the public. An emergency guide for the
public has been approved by local authorities, and some parts
have been discussed with working groups, including ecologists
and environmentalists. In spite of difficulties, "relentless
truth-telling," as Mr. Green has said (see Chapter 16) is im-
portant for a comprehensive approach to accident management.
A public who has agreed to the nuclear alternative and assumed
all associated risks will be more cooperative and understanding
if an accident should occur.
IV. BROADER ISSUES
Nuclear accident preparedness and management means much
more than preparing plans and carrying out exercises. This
section brings together three papers that address some broader
considerations, which touch on the implications of the rarity
of nuclear accidents.
The first paper looks at nuclear safety in the context of
the political process that has led to the development of nuclear
power. The rarity of nuclear accidents creates special problems
for the political process, for it requires the management of a
societal risk in the absence of substantial, concrete accident
experience. The second paper looks at the role of the operator
in nuclear accident management. Again, the rarity of such acci-
dents creates special problems, as each operator must maintain
preparedness for an event that is extremely unlikely to occur
while he is on duty. The third paper focuses on legal liability
and compensation in the case of nuclear accidents in the US, a
problem compounded by the lack of precedents and accurate esti-
mates of the effects of the accidents.
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IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT PREPAREDNESS FOR BROADER
NUCLEAR POLICY
Harold P. Green
Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, and Kampelman,
Washington, D.C., USA
George Washington University National Law Center,* USA
The fact that there was a Three Mile Island (TMI) accident
has in itself significant implications for broader nuclear policy,
because of the connotation that nuclear power is less safe than
previously believed. To the extent that TMI is perceived as
requiring new, additional, and more realistic measures to prepare
for nuclear accidents, these implications are amplified because
preparedness stands as a strong, continuing reminder of the
accident potential. The implications for broader nuclear policy
will, of course, vary, depending upon the particular conditions in
each country. The range of such conditions is too broad to permit
generalization, so my discussion will relate primarily to the
situation in the United States.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
The history of preparedness for catastrophic accidents in
nuclear power plants in the United States should be considered
in light of the larger history of the nuclear regulatory authori-
ties' efforts to nurture and protect the nuclear power industry.
A brief recounting of this larger history is appropriate.
As is well known, the central yiece of legislation in this
history was the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It abolished the
early government monopoly over nuclear power technology and
opened the door to private development of nuclear power in the
United States. Despite the monunlental sig~ificance of this
leqislation in thrusting the country onto a course of primary
*Professor Emeritus
157
158
reliance on nuclear power to meet long-term electricity needs,
there was no public discussion of or debate on the risks inherent
in the technology. Although there were no less than thirty ex-
plicit references in the 1954 Act to "health and safety of the
public," the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of
the nature and magnitude of the potential threats to health and
safety. In the mid-1950s there seemed to be broad public accept-
ance of the potential benefits of the atom, with no apparent
apprehension of its risks. Indeed, the tranquility of the pUblic
was so great that the Atomic Energy Commission did not hesitate
to publish the Brookhaven Report (USAEC 1957), with its box-car
estimates of fatalities (as many as 3400 within 15 miles) ,
injuries (as many as 43,000 within 45 miles) and property damage
(as much as 7 billion dollars), to justify enactment of the
Price-Anderson Indemnity Act.
Within the next few years, however, mounting concern about
nuclear safety--at least in certain sectors of the population--
led the atomic energy establishment to erect a defensive shell.
The belief that the public was too unsophisticated to make a
realistic appraisal of the risks of nuclear power, and that
candid discussion of the risks would produce an irrational response
that would slow the growth of nuclear power, led to a new tacit
policy of trying to convince the public that the risks of a
catastrophic accident were essentially hypothetical and, in any
event, virtually zero.
Thus, when the extension of Price-Anderson was under con-
sideration in 1965, and an updating of the 1957 Brookhaven
Report was commissioned, the new report was suppressed to avoid
stlmula ting the fears of the public'- and providing new ammunition
for the antinuclear movement. By this time, it had become
fashionable, if not imperative, to refer to the possibility of
an accident only with qualifying adjectives and adverbs that
would emphasize the remoteness of the possibility. For example,
in the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (1966) on
legislation providing for waiver of certain legal defenses in
litigation arising out of nuclear accidents, a major accident was
variously characterized in this single document as "extremely
remote," an "exceedingly remote contingency," "low probabiliiy,"
an "extremely unlikely event," a "remote possibility," a "highly
remote contingency," a "highly improbable event," and "exceedingly
remote."
Consistently with this approach, it was Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC)/Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) policy to
spare the public in the vicinity of nuclear power plants know-
ledge of the potential destructive impact of a nuclear power
plant catastrophe. Although licensing regulations required
discussion of various accident scenarios, the consequences
of a catastrophic accident did not have to be discussed because
of the asserted extremely low probability that such an event
would occur.
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THE HISTORY OF PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
In the context of this general history, I can now turn
specifically to a discussion of the background of preparedness
for nuclear accidents. Since the early years following enactment
of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the regulatory scheme for dealing
with possible major accidents has rested on two separate approaches:
site geography and emergency planning.
with respect to siting considerations, Part 100 of Title
10 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations--promulgated
by the AEC in 1962 and continued in effect by the NRC--establishes
Reactor Site Criteria. These require each reactor site to be
within an exclusion area, which in turn must be within a Low
Population Zone (LPZ). The size of both areas is defined in terms
of the radiation dose that an individual would receive at the
boundaries as a consequence of a postulated release of fission
products resulting from a design basis accident. The LPZ is
further defined as:
"the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which
contains residents, the total number and density of which
are such that there is a reasonable probability that appro-
priate protective measures could be taken in their behalf
in the event of a serious accident." (United States Code
of Federal Regulations, 1962b).
Such "appropriate protective measures" would, of course, include
evacuation and provision of shelter.
Thus, the first line of preparedness for major accidents
has been the principle of siting a nuclear power plant at a
site where the size and population characteristics of the LPZ
would permit evacuation or sheltering of the population in the
event of an accident that threatens public health or safety.
It should be observed, however, that this approach involves some
inherent limitations; Part 100 is relevant only to the siting
determination and does not involve mechanisms which would be
applicable after issuance of the license. Thus it does not have
mechanisms for preserving the population and other characteristics
of the LPZ required for the siting determination in the first
place. It is entirely possible that during the license term the
population in the LPZ could double or triple, and land use
patterns could change so much that evacuation or sheltering of
the population becomes infeasible.
Under Part 100 the minimum size of the LPZ is dependent upon
radiation doses at its outer boundary. Thus the size of the
LPZ can be reduced if engineered safeguards are incorporated to
reduce the quantities of fission products that will be released
from the containment under credible accident circumstances. The
manipulation of the size of the LPZ through use of engineered
safety features has been translated into judgments about the
number of people who would have to be evacuated in the event of
an accident. For example, in a 1974 decision the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Appeal Board noted, remarkably, that a reduction
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in the size of the LPZ "will make it unnecessary to evacuate per-
sons formerly within (before the reduction of the size of the
LPZ), but now outside that zone." (USAEC 1974). One can inter-
pret this attitude towards potential evacuation more as resembling
a mathematical game than as reflecting a real concern with the
protection of people. This is particularly the case when it is
recognized that the engineered safety features may not work as
advertised.
With respect to the second approach, i.e., actual emergency
planning, the AEC and then the NRC have always at least nominally
required consideration of measures for protecting the public
in the event of a radiological emergency. This requirement is
spelled out in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, which was originally
adopted in December 1970. Appendix E distinguishes between
consideration of emergency planning at the construction permit
stage and the operating license stage. At the construction per-
mit stage, there is no need to present detailed plans, rather
only enough information "to show that (appropriate protective)
measures (e.g., evacuation) are feasible" (USNRC 1977a). At the
operating license stage, the actual plans for coping with emergen-
cies (although not the details of the plans or the details for
their implementation) must be presented to an extent sufficient
to demonstrate "reasonable assurance that appropriate measures
can and will be taken in the event of an emergency .... " (United
States Code of Federal Regulations 1962a).
In reality, however, AEC/NRC took a lackadaisical approach
to implementation of emergency planning requirements. It is not
necessary for present purposes to elaborate on the manifestations
of this approach; it suffices to note that both the General
Accounting Office and Congressional committees have found emer-
gency planning to be woefully inept and inadequate (Comptroller
General of the United States 1979; House Committee on Government
Operations 1979).
The major factor underlying the NRC's approach was the premise
that careful siting plus appropriate design-engineered safeguards
constitute primary and adequate protection--emergency planning
being only a secondary, contingency add-on for the case of the
highly unlikely accident situation (Federal Regulation 75169,
1979). This premise was in turn conditioned and driven by the
concern that increasing emphasis on emergency planning would
unduly alarm the public and contribute to the antinuclear move-
ment. This concern was not ill-founded. AEC/NRC, having boxed
itself into the myth that the probability of a serious accident
was so vanishingly low that it need not trouble any rational
person, could not easily treat such an accident as sufficiently
credible to warrant highly visible emergency plans without loss
of face and credibility.
Moreover, although the applicant had the burden of meeting
AEC/NRC requirements for emergency planning as a condition for
obtaining the construction permit or operating license, the
efficacy of emergency plans was obviously dependent upon the
planning and cooperation of State and local agencies, which
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were not subject to Federal jurisdiction. Since any effort by
AEC/NRC to work with State and local agencies to develop more
adequate emergency plans would heighten public awareness of the
possibility of an accident, AEC/NRC were generally quite willing
to issue licenses with no real inquiry into the adequacy of
such plans. A related factor, of course, was the AEC/NRC
concern that State and local governments might exercise a de
facto veto over nuclear power plants through refusal to develop
adequate emergency plans.
As a consequence, only pro forma consideration was given
to emergency planning in the licensing process. Consideration
was perfunctory at best at the construction permit stage, so
that any real consideration of the adequacy of the plans would
take place only after hundreds of millions of dollars had already
been invested in construction at a given site. Moreover, through
a strange process of reading Part 100 and Appendix E of Part 50
together, the scope of consideration of emergency planning in
licensing proceedings was narrowed by the interpretation that the
applicant had no responsibilitv for emergency planning beyond the
perimeter of the LPZ (USNRC 1977b).
These approaches to preparedness for major accidents reflected
the essentially probabilistic approach to analysis of potential
accidents that has pervaded nuclear power licensing for 25 years.
The mythology has been that a technological system designed to
accomplish something will accomplish it. The compounding of such
optimistic assumptions leads to estimates of an extremely low
probability of a significant accident occurrence. When the
potential consequences (even if a very large number) of such an
accident are discounted by the vanishingly small probability of
the occurrence that is produced by optimistic assumptions, the
laws of mathematics yield a very low product representing total
risk. This mythology has produced the proposition that a Class 9
accident (in which the engineered safeguards are assumed to be
ineffective) need not be considered in licensing actions because,
although the consequences could be "severe," the probabilities
of such an occurrence are so low.
THE IMPACT OF THREE MILE ISLAND
Three Mile Island dealt a massive blow to this way of think-
ing. It became quite clear that human beings are not sufficiently
omniscient and infallible to foresee all adverse events that
might occur and to establish design features that would reliably
forestall and contain such events. What previously had been
regarded as incredible suddenly became stark reality. Indeed,
in the eyes of the NRC staff the TMI event was a Class 9 accident,
an accident previously thought to have such a remote probability
that it did not warrant consideration. Despite the NRC's long-
standing insistence that an applicant's obligations for emergency
planning stopped at the boundary of the LPZ, at the height of the
TMI crisis the agency considered measures for protecting the
public at distances ten times greater. As the NRC itself has
recently stated in the bland prose of a self-orotective bureaucracy
162
that only three months earlier had expressed essential satisfac-
tion with the status quo:
The Commission's perspective was severely altered by the
unexpected sequence of events that occurred at Three Mile
Island. The accident showed clearly that the protection
provided by siting and engineered safety features must be
bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during
the course of an accident. The accident also showed clearly
that on-site conditions and actions, even if they do not
cause significant off-site radiological consequences, will
affect the way state and local entities react to protect
the public from dangers, real or imagined, associated with
the accident" (Federal Regulation 75169, 1979).
In accordance with these realizations, the NRC is now proposing
new rules (Federal Regulation 75167-174, 1979) that require NRC
concurrence in State and local emergency plans as a condition of
operating licenses; as well, the new rules require an extension
of emergency planning considerations far beyond the perimeter of
the LPZ.
Although the NRC had previously defended its policy of not
providing emergency planning information to the general public
(Gossick 1978), the proposed new rules would require dissemina-
tion to the public of basic emergency planning information,
including the possibility of accidents, potential human health
effects, and contemplated protective actions. On one hand, if
the requirement is to be meaningfully implemented, dissemination
of such information will hardly allay the apprehensions of those
who already fear nuclear power and may, indeed, win new converts to
the antinuclear camo. On the other hand, it is self-evident
that there cannot be effective preparedness for a serious accident
unless the planners and those who will be affected by implementa-
tion of the plans have the essential facts and are encouraged
to view the possibility of a catastrophic accident seriously
rather than as a light-hearted hypothetical exercise.
Meaningful preparation for catastrophe can be undertaken
without frightening people who may be affected. We are all famil-
iar with life-boat drills on ocean liners and flight attendants'
routine emergency instructions at the beginning of commercial air
flights. Most recipients of such instructions seem to welcome
these briefings; they listen attentively and do not appear to
become apprehensive. Similarly, telephone directories in Hawaii
offer prominent instructions on actions to take in the event of a
tsunami, and San Francisco phone books offer similar advice with
respect to earthquakes. These instructions do not seem to generate
any perceptible panic on the part of either residents or visitors.
However, a significant distinction can be drawn between the
case of aircraft and ocean liners on the one hand, and nuclear
power plants on the other. It is self-evident that serious
accidents involving aircraft and ships (and darns, bridges, etc.)
will occur and can have catastrophic consequences (at least for
the persons immediately affected). Everyone knows, as a matter
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of common wisdom and experience, that human or technological fail-
ings, and Acts of God, can produce highly destructive events in
these cases. In contrast, the circumstances that could lead to a
catastrophic nuclear power plant accident are much more complex and
the nature of the catastrophe cannot be well understood by the gen-
eral public. No one would believe assurances that an aircraft can-
not crash, that a ship cannot sink or catch fire, or that a dam or
bridge cannot collapse; but the public has been willing to accept
comparable assurances that a nuclear power catastrophe will not
occur because technological systems have been installed that
will override human error, mechanical "bugs," and Acts of God.
Perhaps the most important long-term consequence of TMI is the
destruction of the credibility of nuclear experts who have been
offering such assurances for 25 years.
In order for emergency planning to be meaningful, it is
necessary to engage the attention of the public that would be
affected in an emergency situation. The full potential dimen-
sions of the catastrophe for which the emergency plans are
developed must be disclosed with sufficient candor and vigor
that the public will not regard it as an idle hypothetical
exercise. To do this, however, is to vividly remind the pUblic
that nuclear power is an extraordinarily hazardous technology--
a confession that may lead many members of the public to oppose
and reject its further use. But the fact that a technology is
extraordinarily hazardous does not mean that the risks cannot
be drastically reduced through appropriate design, operation,
and maintenance or that the risks are unacceptable. The crucial
question is the extent of public confidence in the officials
who determine how safe is safe enough.
A recent study (Slovic et aZ. 1980) has shown that when
the general public assesses risk, much more weight is given to
the quantum of potential adverse consequences than to the extremely
low probability of an occurrence that will produce those conse-
quences. In my opinion, the nuclear establishment has low credi-
bility among members of the public because it has used the un-
natural strategy of attempting to persuade the public that the
low probability of an accident makes nuclear power acceptable;
the potential catastrophic consequences associated with the
occurrence of an accident have been downplayed. This creates
the impression that there is something to hide, and nothing
contributes more to a credibility gap than the perception that a
public agency is concealing something--particularly when there
are so many other overt manifestations of extraordinary risk,
such as the Price-Anderson Act. A major Achilles' heel of the
nuclear power establishment in the united States has been the
effort to persuade the public that it need not fear a nuclear
power plant catastrophe, while at the same time catering to
industry's fear of such catastrophe through continuing extension
and refinement of the Price-Anderson Act.
If nuclear power in the United states is to survive TMI, it
is essential that emergency planning be linked with a broad
program of candor designed to increase the credibility of the
nuclear regulatory institutions. TMI provides the opportunity
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for appropriate mea culpas, in the form of a confession that
for the most laudible of motives (i.e., to protect against emo-
tional and irrational responses that might cause the vitally
necessary technology to be rejected), we have attempted to
persuade the public that a catastrophic accident would never
occur. TMI has demonstrated that scientists and engineers cannot
ensure this promised degree of safety. \fhen all is said and done,
however, the case can still be made that nuclear power represents
the optimum presently available technology for generating elec-
tricity, given the realities of the world energy situation; the
risks involved, including the credible risks of nuclear accidents,
are quite acceptable when compared with the risks of alternative
courses of action for meeting our energy needs. But this case
can be made credibly only if assurances about the extremely low
probability of an accident are linked--in a spirit of full and
candid disclosure--to the recognition that such an improbable
accident can have enormously catastrophic consequences.
Three Mile Island has made it clear that preparedness for
a serious nuclear power plant accident is critical to ensuring
that operations of nuclear power plants will not endanger the
health and safety of the pUblic; it has also become clear that
preparedness is essential for the acceptability of nuclear power.
At the same time, meaningful levels of preparedness may paradoxi-
cally heighten the impression that nuclear power is too dangerous
to be acceptable. An escape from this paradox lies in the old
legal tactic of "confession and avoidance." My own conviction
is that relentless truth-telling about the risks of nuclear power
is the only way to put these risks in true perspective, so as
to defuse the present nuclear power controversy. Once this is
done, preparedness for nuclear power accidents can be discussed,
undertaken, and implemented without exacerbating prevailing
antinuclear attitudes.
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INTRODUCTION
The events at Three Mile Island (TMI) have called attention
to the importance of the human element in the overall safety of
large-scale technological facilities such as nuclear power plants.
The findings of post-accident investigations in the USA (e.g.,
The President's Commission 1979, USNRC 1979) have supported the
idea that improvements in operator preparedness are required in
that country. Although the status of operator preparedness
clearly varies form one country to the next (as, indeed, does
physical plant) the general post-TMI response of the nuclear
energy fraternity has been that this is an opportune time to
at least review the situation and to look for areas where improve-
ments might readily be made.
One result of these reviews has been the emergence of a
number of informal and formal suggestions for creating conditions
conducive to improved operator performance (e.g., Bethe 1979,
Holden 1979, Pitzer 1979, The President's Commission 1979, Teller
1979, USNRC 1979, Weinberg 1979). The schemes put forward by
these analysts each imply a different mental model of human
performance that relates changes in particular human- or job-
related variables to corresponding (and positive) changes in
operator performance. The topics addressed include the selection
of 'better qualified' operators; increasing the operators'
motivation (willingness) to perform better (e.g., by enhanced
social status through higher pay and uniforms); and improving
their ability to respond to emergencies (e.g., by rigorous training
*An article based on this paper has appeared in Futures (IPC
Business Press), Vol. 12, No.5, pp. 340-357.
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programs, improved control room design). It has also been
suggested that the nuclear industry might adopt, intact,
personnel management practices from other industries (e.g.,
civil aviation) where the job characteristics appear, at least
at first glance, to be similar to those required for nuclear
operations.
The diversity of these proposals, and their many dnd some-
times conflicting implicit assumptions, encouraged us to explore
the relationships among the many variables that, together, shape
the performance of the "typical" operator. In this paper we
will propose a schematic "model" of operator performance that
considers the underlying determinants of both motivation and
ability to perform, with special emphasis on the response to
emergencies. As there is a tremendous volume of literature
bearing on this problem, we shall only try to summarize the
perspectives of various research areas. The intention is to
provide a starting point for a qualitative understanding of
which variables can be viewed as having a significant influence
on operator performance and, therefore, what sort of job changes,
or additional research, would seem to be effective.
THE OPERATORS' JOB
The operating crew of a nuclear power plant might typically
consist of a shift supervisor, two control room operators, and
several auxiliary operators. However, the key members of the
team are the shift supervisor, who has the overall operating
responsibility, and the control room operators who report to
him. For reasons of brevity, in the following discussion we
shall often use the term 'the operator' rather loosely to mean
the shift supervisor and the control room team that he directs.
Because the qualifications and training of operators vary from
country to country, and sometimes even from one utility to the
next within a country, we shall not attempt to review them here.
They are, in any case, not central to the aims of this paper.
Normal Operations
The tasks of the operator are basically determined by the
fact that nuclear power plants are used as base-load producers.
That is, the plants are operated at a constant power level for
extended periods of time: thus the crew may be required to
execute load changes only six to twelve times per year--these
(typically) divided among five shifts. Additional activities
during normal operations consist of taking over the plant from
the previous shift--usually through a jointly executed check
of plant status--and then, in turn, passing the plant on to the
next shift. In short, when things are normal the tasks of the
operator tend to be monotonous rather than stimulating and
challenging (see Bohr et aZ. 1977, for a detailed discussion).
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Off-Normal Situations
The most important task of the operator in the event of
an off-normal condition is to prevent it from becoming an
emergency potentially damaging to the physical plant and
perhaps to public health through the release of radioactive
material. In other words, the goal is to return to normal
operations, if possible, or, if not, to place the plant in a
shut-down condition where decay heat can be removed. In the
best of situations automatic safety systems will act to shut
down the reactor and initiate removal of decay heat. However,
these automatic systems might be inadequate to handle situations
not anticipated by their designers. This means that the operating
crew must continuously 'track' the situation so that they under-
stand the status of the plant, with the help of instrumentation
displays and diagnostic aids, and accurately diagnose the reasons
for the off-normal occurrence should manual intervention be
required. The typical operating crew encounters an 'off-normal'
operating condition only about once a year.
Thus the requirements placed on the operator in an off-normal
situation are the opposite of those faced in normal operations:
he is expected to make correct inferences and decisions about
complex phenomena very rapidly, i.e., under conditions which tend
to evoke high levels of experienced stress. Even extensive simula-
tor training may not have directly prepared the operator to
handle such situations because the simulator cannot simulate what
it has not been programmed for, i.e., situations that the designers
have not anticipated. (For example, prior to TMI the Babcock and
Wilcox simulator "was not .... programmed to reproduce the condi-
tions that confronted the operators during the (TMI) accident"
(The President's Commission 1979)). Another difference between
simulator experience and actual off-normal events is that the
operator may not experience the same level of stress during
simulator practice. Thus his performance when handling a real
emergency may be reduced, even though he has seen the same situa-
tion in simulator training. (The causes of stress and its effects
on performance will be discussed below in more depth.)
In summary, there is a dramatic contrast between the demands
placed upon the operator in normal operations compared to off-
normal situations or emergency conditions.
A "MODEL" OF OPERATOR PERFORMANCE
Figure 1 illustrates how various characteristics of the job,
the individual, and the work and social environment come together
to shape performance. Performance, as expressed by overt behav-
ior, is represented by the box on the extreme right-hand side
of the figure; a large number of behaviors is portrayed because
"performance" can seldom be easily defined in the real world.
For an assembly line task it might be roughly measured in terms
of units produced per hour, but, in reality, job performance
consists of a complex package of separate (specific) behaviors.
The immediate determinants of these specific behaviors are seen
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Figure 1. Scheme showing determinants of operator performance.
to be both the individual's motivation (behavioral intentions)
and ability (perhaps reduced or enhanced by the stress he is
experiencing). The determinants of motivation and ability to
perform will be discussed separately.
Motivation to Perform
Our analysis of willingness-to-perform resembles the con-
ceptual framework for attitude studies used by Fishbein and
his colleagues to summarize the relations among beliefs, atti-
tudes, intentions, and behaviors (see, for example, Fishbein
and Ajzen 1975, Otway and Fishbein 1976, 1977). with respect
to our specific interests here, the analogous variables are,
respectively, the perceived characteristics of job and social
environment, job satisfaction (an attitude)*, and the individual's
*This is a simplified presentation for purposes of discussion.
Actually there are a number of attitudes relevant to 'job satis-
faction', e.g., attitude toward the work, toward one's own per-
formance, toward the supervisor, co-workers, etc. (see for example,
Hackman and Oldham 1976). The relevant attitude depends upon
which behavior is of interest.
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motivation (intention) to do the job as it is defined by some
set of specific behaviors. These variables are shown in the
boxes in the lower half of Figure 1.
The perceived characteristics of the job coupled with the
perceived organizational and external social environments are
the immediate underlying determinants of job satisfaction. In
Figure 1, the line going from the "job satisfaction" box to
the edge of the 'motivation to perform' box is meant to show
that, once job attitudes have been formed, the individual is
predisposed to perform some pattern of job-related behaviors,
which, taken together, are consistent with his attitudes. But
he is not necessarily disposed to engage in anyone specific
behavior, Le., "satisfaction" cannot be inferred from the
observation of one specific behavior.
The dashed line originating from the 'individual differences'
box in Figure 1 illustrates that people express their attitudes
in different ways. For example, two workers could express the
same favorable attitude toward their jobs in quite different
ways: one by regular and prompt attendance coupled with low
job output, the other by an erratic attendance pattern coupled
with high productivity when on the job.
The 'building blocks' of the individual's willingness to
perform his job, i.e., the perceived characteristics of the job
and its social environment, will be discussed next.
Pepceived Job Chapactepistics
What matters most is how the operator perceives his job,
not the 'objective' reality. We can expect that job perceptions
are largely based upon reality, but that these realities may
appear somewhat different to different people--management and
labor, for instance. Thus it is not possible to say precisely
which job characteristics will, in fact, be related to job
satisfaction, but we can look at the sorts of attributes that
empirical research has found people typically use to describe
their jobs--keeping in mind that there could be an essentially
infinite list and that the relevant characteristics will vary
from job to job and person to person. They are what the worker
believes to be the characteristics of his job.
The usual empirical approach to identify job dimensions
is to ask employees to respond to a questionnaire containing
a number of job-related items~ factor analysis is then used to
group the items which correlate highest with each other (a
"factor"). The basic job characteristics are then inferred from
the content of the items loading on each factor. Of course,
each study is likely to find a different factor structure,
depending upon the nature of the respondent group, the items
scaled, and the interpretation of the factor analysis. However,
in general, job dimensions tend to fall into two broad categories:
characteristics of job events and conditions (Locke 1976)~ and
the social environment in which the work is performed, both
within the organization and outside.
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Typical of items in the first category are characteristics
of the work itself (autonomy, variety, significance, feedback,
etc.; see Hackman and Oldham 1976), pay (amount, fairness, method
of payment, etc.), promotion (opportunity, fairness, bases, etc.),
benefits (medical, pension, vacation, etc.), and working condi-
tions (hours, rest breaks, physical environment, etc.). The
category of social environment would typically include items
related to the people within the organization (e.g., co-workers,
supervisors, management) who determine the nature of job events
and conditions. The social environment outside the organization
can also influence a person's feelings about his job; this in-
cludes normative influences due to his awareness of how others
important to him (e.g., family, friends, community) feel about
his job. (Along these lines, one can imagine that the public
controversy surrounding nuclear energy may well have had effects
upon operators' attitudes toward their jobs.)
With respect to the nuclear power plant operator, job
satisfaction and motivation are not likely to be as important
to performance as are his skills and abilities. The main reason
is that his job is not one of production where, for example,
his own desires can largely determine how fast he will work.
The particular aspect of performance that is of most interest
is his response to infrequent, off-normal situations. It seems
rather unlikely that an operator will lack motivation to respond
when the alarms go off. The real question when this happens is
if the right person holds the job and is able to supply the
correct response.
The primary relevance of the "willingness-to-perform"
variables to nuclear operations may be in the longer term. For
example, because of boredom an operator may gradually lose interest
in his job. As he begins to place the job lower in his priorities,
it is possible that his ability to respond to emergencies will
be subtly reduced, possibly in ways not readily noticeable to
his co-workers or supervisors. The US Air Force has sponsored
research (see Mudrick et aI. 1978) to identify 'indicator
behaviors' to help diagnose longer-term loss of motivation in
fighter pilots; e.g., does he spend his off-duty hours reading
material related to his job, does he take advantage of oppor-
tunities to 'pick the brains' of more experienced pilots? Loss
of motivation can also be shown by leaving the job. High turn-
over of people with extensive training is expensive and likely
to be detrimental to safety.
Pay and Performance
A few words should be said about the effects of pay on job
satisfaction and performance. One of the 'intuitively obvious'
ways that has been suggested to improve operator performance
is to increase pay. Implicit in this idea is the assumption
of a direct and positive relationship between pay and performance
--which is not supported by the literature.
For example, Deci (1975) found that people involved in a
task with high intrinsic interest displayed a decrease in
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motivation when external financial rewards were offered. In a
military setting Frey et al. (1974, 1974a) found that performance
did not necessarily increase with increased financial incentives
and, in fact, it sometimes got worse. Hulin (1969) found that
workers from communities with better economic conditions, standards
of living, and so forth were less satisfied with their financial
rewards than were less well-off workers. He suggested that
higher rewards raise the frame of reference used to evaluate
incomes, thus leading to a devaluation in the level of pay
actually being received. Laboratory research (Pritchard et aZ.
1972) suggests that people who are overpaid are equally, but
not more, satisfied with their pay than are those who are
equitably paid.
Equity theory (see Lawler 1971) posits that pay satisfac-
tion is a function of pay received in relation to an individual's
perception of his contributions as compared to those of others
holding similar jobs. Equity theory predicts that overpayment
will lead to as much dissatisfaction as underpayment.
These studies suggest that large increases in operator
pay would not necessarily make operators more satisfied with
their jobs. In view of the uncertain relations between satis-
faction and specific items of performance (especially in emer-
gencies), it seems even less likely that an increase in nuclear
safety would result. There might even be negative effects, if
high pay kept operators in jobs that no longer interested them.
It has sometimes been suggested that higher pay would allow
operators to be selected from a larger pool of applicants, thus
making it possible to hire more intelligent operators with
better educational backgrounds. However, it must be remembered
that an operator spends more than 99.9% of his time in rather
routine operations, and the ability of people selected must
correspond to the total job, not just the requirements of
infrequent episodes. The reasons for this will be discussed
under the topics of stress and selection.
Ability to Perform
In this section, we will explore the factors which shape
the operator's ability to perform under the stress of emergencies.
We will begin by explaining what is meant by 'stress' and dis-
cussing its effects upon performance.
stress and Performance
Stress is a rather imprecisely defined term. McGrath (1976)
has suggested the following working definition: "there is a
potential for stress when an environmental situation is perceived
as presenting a demand which ttreatens to exceed the person's
capabilities and resources for meeting it, under conditions where
he expects a substantial differential in the rewards and costs
from meeting the demand versus not meeting it." Stress results
then from an interaction between the person and his environment.
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In lay terminology we could say that stress is simply mental or
physical tension resulting from any external or internal source
(event, condition, etc.).
It is important to note that it is the subjective experience
of stress that affects performance, i.e., the person's perception
(cognitive appraisal) of the 'objective' stress-inducing situa-
tion. Some typical causes of stress will be discussed below.
The generally accepted relationship between experienced
stress and performance is shown in Figure 2. This inverted-U
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Figure 2. Plot of hypothetical stress-performance relationship.
relationship suggests that performance is poor at very low stress
levels (for an explanation see Scott 1966), increasing as stress
rises to an 'alertive' level. However, as experienced stress
continues to increase, 'disruptive' levels are reached and per-
formance begins to deteriorate.*
One goal of job design is to achieve a level of arousal
that allows near optimal performance. This, in turn, requires
an understanding of the typical causes of stress. First, some
rather general statements can be made about stress and perfor-
mance. For example, it has been found that past experience with
a stressful situation or stressor condition, as well as practice
or training, can act to influence the level of stress experienced.
There is also a reinforcement effect, for past successes or fail-
ures in these experiences also have a bearing on stress. Finally,
interpersonal relations, due to the presence (and activities) or
absence of others can influence experienced stress and performance
*For example, Appley and Trumbull (1967) estimated that the error
rate for very low stress, passive inspection tasks may be as high
as 0.5. Studies of military personnel exposed to extremely stress-
ful conditions (flight crew response to in-flight emergencies,
behavior under realistically simulated combat conditions) have
recorded error rates in the range of 0.16 to 0.33 (Ronan 1953,
Berkun 1964).
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by increasing arousal, causing irritation or antagonism, pro-
viding sources of self-esteem and affiliative feelings, and so
forth. Zajonc (1965) has suggested that the presence of others
leads to increased arousal and thus to an increased probability
of selecting the dominant (i.e., 'best-learned') response, with
a corresponding decrease in the probability of a 'new' response
should the best-learned response be inappropriate. This finding
may be relevant to operator actions in the early stages of the
TMI accident.
In the following sections, specific determinants of stress
will be discussed in more detail. Note that stress is treated
as a social-psychological state that can be affected by the
physical environment in which the job is performed.
Physiological st~essors
Returning to Figure 1, a group of physiological stressors
is shown above the box labeled "social-psychological stressors."
These physiological stressors can include aspects of the working
environment such as temperature extremes, lighting, noise*,
fatigue brought on by long working hours, shift work, or insuf-
ficient rest periods. The variable in this category most likely
to affect the stress experienced by the nuclear power plant
operator is the design of the control room itself (as was seen
in the case of the TMI accident). It has been observed (e.g.,
Weinberg 1979) that nuclear power plants in the USA were treated
by utilities as just another type of generating station. Con-
sequently, the state-of-the-art of human-factors engineering
(developed, for example, in aerospace programs) was not reflected
in nuclear plant control room design (see also Skans et al. 1974,
Bohr et al. 1977). This is an area in which the work undertaken
in research centers like Halden and Ris¢ can make an important
contribution to easing the demands placed on operators confronted
with emergency situations.
Social-Psychological Stressors
The most obvious sources of stress in the category of
social-psychological stressors are the perceived characteristics
of the task itself. For example, tasks which must be performed
at high speed and load tend to increase stress. But it should
be noted that exact opposites can be sources of stress, e.g.,
overload and underload, monotony as well as time pressures (see
Marshall and Cooper 1979).
Stress is also increased in the following situations: when
the individual believes that the consequences of poor performance
*Although the physical working conditions in a nuclear plant are
certainly adequate, a paradox of the TMI accident was that the
distraction caused by excessive emergency alarms seems to have
been a stress factor (The President's Commission 1979).
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could be disastrous (the case of nuclear operators and airline
pilots); if the individual himself is also personally at risk
(clearly so for the airline pilot, not likely for the nuclear
operator); and if poor performance will be penalized (retraining
assignment, demotion, loss of job, financial or criminal liabil-
ity). In addition, stress may originate from role-based fac-
tors, i.e., ambiguity and confusion about exactly which opera-
tional role the individual is expected to fill. Stress may
also be affected by the behavioral setting, through undermanning
or overcrowding; further sources of stress might be found in
the social environment--reflected by interpersonal disagreements
caused, perhaps, by isolation or lack of privacy.
The primary relevance of this category of stressors to
nuclear operations is that job designers should try to ensure
that normal operations are not excessively boring or monotonous.
This means that the job design should strive for an alertive
level of stress in order to prevent errors by under stressed
operators that could cause off-normal events. More importantly,
job designers should not allow stress in off-normal situations
to reach dangerous levels by expecting the operator to handle
a large number of tasks under the pressure of time. This will
be discussed in more detail below.
Individual Differences
Of course each individual will respond differently to stress-
ful conditions--hence the box marked "individual differences"
in Figure 1. For purposes of discussion, we may think of each
individual as being characterized by the abilities and skills
that he brings to the job. We will treat abilities as being
rather basic and fixed aspects of the individual, e.g., intel-
ligence and visual acuity, although, in fact, these can be
changed somewhat by education, training, and practice. Skills,
in contrast, are more task-specific and may be conceptualized
in terms of three broad classes (Hinrichs 1976): motor skills
(manipulation of the physical environment); cognitive skills
(ways of thought and systems of belief); and interpersonal
skills (self-awareness and effective functioning in social
interactions). In addition, individuals differ in terms of
personality*, physical and mental health, their susceptibility
to group influences--all of which will affect the level of
stress experienced. There is also a certain amount of stress
that the individual brings to the job in terms of his own
anxieties and perceptual styles.
The intent of training is skill enhancement. Because of
its importance to nuclear operations, training will be saved for
a later discussion. The other variables in the "individual
*Personality will not be discussed further in view of the findings
(Mischel 1973, Sarason et al. 1975) that personalities do not seem
to be deep-seated, permanent variables, and in any case are rela-
tively insignificant compa~ed to situational variables.
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differences" category, being more enduring in nature, are best
treated under the heading of personnel selection.
Selection
Selection is an attempt to match the needs of people and
organizations. The basic idea is to determine characteristics
of people that will relate to subsequent performance on the job.
This is a big order on two counts: first, people can differ
from each other in so many ways (on more than one million
measurable and relatively independent dimensions (Rigby 1970)),
and second, it is difficult to describe job performance in terms
of the particular package of human characteristics that such
performance requires.
In his review of the personnel selection literature, Guion
(1976) noted that the principles and practices of selection
published by Freyd in 1923 are still relevant today; Guion showed
that relatively few employee selection procedures have been
validated by demonstrations that they describe the skills and
knowledge necessary for successful on-the-job performance. An
example may be seen in the discrepancy between typical testing
procedures for secretarial applicants (15-minute typing test,
dictation test) and the requirements for the effective perfor-
mance of the actual job, which may require skills in organiza-
tion, travel planning, drafting correspondence, etc. Ghiselli
(1966) has suggested that it is easier to predict trainability
for a job than to predict job performance itself.
Thus it is doubtful that complicated selection tests can
uniquely identify the best candidates for the position of
nuclear power plant operator. Formal selection procedures are
perhaps best for rough screening, to eliminate those who are
uneducable, intellectually unsuitable, or excessively responsive
to stressful situations. It is important to observe that it is
just as necessary to screen out candidates who are overqualified
for the job because they may be insufficiently challenged and
thus perform poorly. This is of special relevance to the selec-
tion of nuclear power plant operators where there is a marked
contrast between the requirements of normal versus emergency
conditions. A highly intelligent, well-educated operator
stressed by the boredom of normal operations might even become
the cause of an emergency.
Training
Training is any organizationally-initiated procedure designed
for the education of employees or the acquisition or enhancement
of skills--cognitive, motor, or interpersonal. Despite the vol-
ume of training activity in public and private sectors, Hinrichs'
1976 review of the personnel training literature concluded that
"little psychological knowledge about the field has been developed."
By this he meant that the field has been dominated by practi-
tioners who have either assembled a "training program" as an end
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in itself without first establishing what its goals should be,
or that the things that seem to work have been determined through
iteration (as reflected by 'acceptable' performance) without
finding out why. This makes it difficult to generalize experi-
ence gained in, say, pilot training to another area such as the
training of nuclear plant operators.
In Figure 1 training is shown to provide an input, i.e,
skill enhancement, to the "individual differences" box. Training
efforts can be thought of as falling into three broad categories
(Hinrichs 1976): content techniques designed to impart knowledge
or information; process techniques concerned with the develop-
ment of interpersonal skills, self-awareness, etc.; and mixed
techniques used to impart substantive knowledge for activities
where group processes are also important.
Content-oriented approaches include lectures, the use of
audio-visual devices such as films and slides, and techniques
for self-instruction, e.g., programmed instruction (PI) and
computer-assisted instruction (CAl). Content techniques alone
are clearly not adequate for the training of nuclear operators,
but can be a useful tool for teaching conceptual principles and
providing technical knowledge prior to skills training. The
lecture technique, despite its widespread use in formal education
programs, has been quite generally criticized (Korman 1971).
The 'teaching machine' approach (PI and CAl) is promising, and
is being increasingly used, although there is evidence (Goldstein
1978) that it is not always superior to traditional methods of
instruction. The success of these new methods is completely
dependent upon the careful design of the instructional program.
These methods can be relatively expensive compared to conventional
instruction.
Process-oriented techniques are of less relevance to the
training of nuclear plant personnel. The following are examples
of these techniques: role-playing, to increase sensitivity to
the position of others in the organization, thus bringing about
change in attitudes; sensitivity training, which deals with the
feelings and perceptions of the group members and the behavioral
processes operating in the group; and the modeling of behaviors
to be learned by demonstrating the desired behaviors (e.g., by
using filmed examples) and then reinforcing these behaviors in
role-play practice.
Of most interest for the training of nuclear power plant
operators are the mixed techniques that endeavor to impart
knowledge as well as to enhance the skills needed by trainees
to function as members of a team. The methods used include
conference discussion and case study analysis, which are superior
to lectures because they involve the participants to a greater
extent and provide feedback; on-the-job training programs; and,
perhaps most attractive for nuclear operator training, the use of
simulators. Simulators have gained widespread acceptance in areas
where the acquisition of motor skills islmportant, such as
military and aerospace programs, and have assumed particular
importance in the training and requalification of commercial air
transport pilots.
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Simulators have the great advantage of not penalizing
poor performance. That is, there is no loss of life if faulty
performance in an airplane simulator leads to a "crash."
Further, simulators can be used to practice emergency situations
that could hardly be duplicated at will in the real system,
e.g., an airplane engine fire. Also, the cost of simulator
training may be only a fraction of the operating cost of the
real system.
Simulators also have disadvantages. One of the more obvious
is that they can only be programmed to simulate conditions that
have been anticipated by their designers and deemed 'credible'
enough to be included in the simulator repertoire. Another
drawback is that trainees may tend to focus on the responses
they have learned to cope with simulator behavior, thus lessen-
ing their ability to improvise should an unanticipated situation
arise. Finally, there is the question of realism. In the end,
the trainee knows that he is in a simulator and thus may experi-
ence considerably less stress than he would in operating the
real system; thus simulator performance (training validity) might
be significantly better than that in the real situation (per-
formance validity).
Intuitively, simulators often seem to be an obvious solution
to the training problem. However, and perhaps because of this,
there is little information available on just how effective they
are as a training tool. Hinrichs (1976) wrote that " ... there
is a surprising absence of conclusively controlled research to
test their effectiveness or to identify general principles for
their design." In fact, this statement is equally true of
virtually all training methods, including on-the-job training.
Goldstein (1978) proposed four stages to establish the
validity of a training program. The first is training validity,
which refers to the ability to master the instructional program
itself. The second is performance validity, an indication of
skill transfer from the training environment to the actual job
setting. The third and fourth stages, intra- and inter-organiza-
tional validity, concern, respectively, generalization to other
groups of trainees within the organization, and generalization
to trainees in other organizations. Performance is obviously
affected by a larger number of variables at each successive
stage. For example, although the required motor and cognitive
skills may have been mastered in training, organizational con-
straints may interfere with their performance in the work envi-
ronment. Most training programs, if they are evaluated at all,
are concerned primarily with establishing training validity,
which itself is not a trivial task.
In the case of the nuclear power plant operator, we are
primarily concerned with performance validity. This requires,
first of all, a careful assessment of the needs of on-the-job
performance, including consideration of organizational goals,
resources, and constraints. It is tempting to accept the high-
fidelity simulator as a valuable and necessary part of operator
training--and, indeed, it may be valuable. But, remembering
the warning about the dangers of developing a training program
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to fit the training devices at hand (Gilbert 1960), we would be
well advised to 'start from scratch', keeping an open mind
with respect to reactor simulators, and to base the mix of train-
ing techniques on a sound assessment of performance needs and
objectives.
DISCUSSION
A large number of factors can, in principle, be instrumental
in shaping performance, although their relative importance varies
from situation to situation. In the particular case of the nucle-
ar operator we have tried to show that some of the 'intuitively'
obvious' ways to improve performance by the manipulation of spe-
cific factors might not produce the expected results. For example,
selecting operators with especially high intelligence (and there
is some question about exactly what it is that IQ tests measure)
would not necessarily result in improved emergency response and,
in fact, might even lead to a performance decrement in view of
the long, relatively monotonous, periods of normal operations.
Likewise, there is no evidence that large pay rises would result
in better performance or, indeed, even more job satisfaction.
Again, the effect could even be negative. Even the notion that
true-to-life simulators are the best way to train operators is
a largely unproven assumption--although the contrary has also
not been established.
Another idea that does not bear closer scrutiny is that
personnel management practices (e.g., selection procedures,
compensation levels, training programs) from some other, appar-
ently similar area of activity could be adopted as a package
for use in nuclear operations--the job of the commercial airline
pilot often being suggested as an analogy. The validity of this
analogy can be explored in light of the model presented earlier.
To begin with, the jobs themselves are very different. Even
in normal flight conditions the cockpit crew must respond to a
continuing series of routine demands, e.g., resetting naviga-
tional aids, position cross-checking, radio communications,
which (under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), with autopilot) are
superimposed upon a job somewhat similar to the nuclear operator's.
Under Instrument Flight Rules at least one of the pilots is
required to perform a rather typical vigilan8e task involving
rapid cross-checking of basic flight instruments. In addition,
the pilot's physical well-being (in contrast to that of the
nuclear operator) is intimately linked to the safe operation of
the aircraft. Thus, during normal operations, the pilot would
be expected to experience a level of arousal closer to the
optimum of the stress-performance curve (Figure 2). The typical
airline cockpit crew also encounters 'off-normal' conditions
more frequently than the nuclear plant operator*. Having had
*'Hard' numbers are not readily available but one of the author's
(HJO) experience as a professional pilot suggests that some tens
of unexpected (i.e., off-normal but not necessarily emergency)
occurrences requiring action might be experienced each year.
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the positive reinforcement of satisfactorily coping with these
situations (as well as the stress of frequent recertification
tests in simulators), the pilot should experience less stress
in an emergency.
The jobs are also quite different in terms of motivating
factors. The intrinsic interest of the pilot's job is certainly
greater, especially when we remember that man has always been
fascinated by flight, a recurring mythological theme. We could
stretch the point a bit and say that the pilot's job was desired
even before the airplane existed--the same could hardly be said
of the nuclear plant operator. Another difference is that the
pilot provides an obvious social benefit--it is clear to the
passengers, for example, that they have been rapidly transported
from one place to another and who has piloted the plane. The
pilot also enjoys virtually complete autonomy when airborne,
and gets positive performance feedback from each flight.
One of the justifications given for proposing increases in
operators' pay is that it should be commensurate with their
responsibilities as measured by potential public hazard; often
pilots' pay and responsibility have been offered as a model.
However, pay is seldom related to only one variable--such as
potential for loss of public life. For example, using this
criterion, it is not obvious that the responsibility of the
pilot is greater than that of the air traffic controller, although
the pilot's pay is several times greater. Pay scales may be
more influenced by the nature of collective bargaining arrange-
ments than by the objective characteristics of the jobs them-
selves*; pilots have had a very effective bargaining position
in comparison to the air traffic controllers who, in most coun-
tries, are civil servants.
There are very few civilian jobs closely resembling that
of the nuclear power plant operator; the most similar is perhaps
the operation of chemical process plants. But indications are
that little attention has been given to preparing chemical plant
operators to handle emergencies (Albracht 1979). The practices
of other industries are best viewed as sources of ideas that
may, or may not, be relevant to the case of nuclear operations.
CONCLUSION
The intention of this paper was to approach the question
of operator preparedness for emergencies from the scientific
perspective provided by research on human performance. Our
findings can be grouped under three headings: the identification
of existing practices that have a sound scientific basis (although
unsound proposals to change some of these practices have been
made since the TllI accident); a discussion of some aspects that
*An additional factor is that, in VFR weather, the air crew
could in principle transport passengers without air traffic
control personnel. The reverse is never true.
P8E ~4 _ M
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might be considered in redesigning the operator's job; and
mention of research needs related to operator performance.
Present Practice
In view of the high level of stress an operator is likely
to experience in an off-normal or emergency situation, it is
especially important that he should not be expected to take
decisions in the early stages of a crisis. The worst time to
think is when under pressure. For example, Swain (1975) estimated
that operator error rates following a large loss-of-coolant
accident would decrease to steady-state levels (the specific
numerical level depending upon the situation) only after 25-30
minutes. Siegel and Wolf (1969) theorized that, under severe
time stress, the normal error rate for a corrective action would
double if the previous corrective attempt was erroneous or
ineffective. If the initial error rate is relatively high, say
0.2, it takes only a few attempts to reach a rate of 1.0, cor-
responding to complete disorganization (Appley and Trumbull
1967). The symptoms of all emergencies that can be anticipated
must be related to emergency checklists so that no actions,
however elementary, have to be improvised by decision of the
operator. (This is also standard airline practice.) The ques-
tion of unanticipated situations will be discussed below.
Although detailed practices differ among countries, the
policy generally is both to design safety system response so
that no operator actions are (typically) required in the first
30 minutes of an anticipated emergency, and to provide detailed
contingency checklists. These policies have a sound scientific
basis.
Because of the difficulties involved in relating subsequent
on-the-job performance to formal preemployment testing, existing
selection procedures must not necessarily be changed if they
seem to be working satisfactorily. Formal testing is best suited
to screen out those candidates who are clearly underqualified
or overqualified.
There seems to be no obvious reason to contemplate drastic
increases in operator pay. The key word here is 'equity':
operators must receive compensation that is 'fair', in terms
of their qualifications, the demands placed upon them, and the
salaries available for similar jobs elsewhere. However, in
view of the public opposition to nuclear energy, it might some-
times be necessary to pay a premium if the job is perceived by
the community to be of low status.
Considerations for Job Redesign
A paradoxical situation exists between the demands placed
on the operator in normal and emergency conditions. During
periods of routine operation he may be experiencing so little
stress that his performance is suboptimal (see Figure 2); then,
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when an emergency arises, arousal may rapidly increase to such
a high level that performance remains suboptimal. This para-
dox could be resolved by changing the job so as to increase
arousal during normal operations and to decrease the stress
experienced in emergencies. Aside from changes in the physical
environment (e.g., improved design of control panels and alarms),
we can speculate as to how the job or its organizational aspects
might be modified to help achieve stress levels nearer the per-
formance optimum in both conditions. Approaches that have been
successfully used in military settings to address this problem
include the ideas of 'non-lethal defects' and 'realistic drills'
(Hulin and Triandis 1981). In order to stimulate discussion we
will explore below how such concepts might be used in the con-
text of nuclear operations.
The reason for suboptimal stress levels during normal
operations is simply that not much is happening and, indeed,
the operator is not expecting much to happen--i.e., he holds a
low subjective probability for the occurrence of an off-normal
situation. 'Non-lethal defects' means the intentional creation
of nonhazardous system irregularities that must be discovered
and corrected by members of the operating team. For example,
a valve that should be found in the closed position on a check-
list might be intentionally (and surreptitiously) opened by
management prior to checklist execution (if this poses no hazard
to people or equipment). These apparent defects must occur often
enough (say several times per week) that operators expect to find
unusual conditions, even during routine operations, thus increas-
ing arousal. Needless to say, for such an exercise to have
meaning there must be a direct relationship between performance
of these tasks and job evaluation for promotions, pay rises, etc.
'Realistic drills' extend this principle to the high-stress
side of the performance curve. The nuclear power plant equivalent
of military practice could involve a second control room; un-
beknown to the operating team, actual control would be switched
to the second control room (manned, for example, by qualified
management personnel), while the operator's controls would be
switched to a simulator. Emergencies would be simulated at
least once a week in this way without the operating crew knowing
for sure if it is a simulation or a real emergency.* Again it
is essential that performance on these drills be treated as if
the drills were 'real' in evaluating operating crews for promotion,
etc.; in addition there must be the possibility of penalties,
e.g., dismissal, for poor performance.
If performance on drills is rigorously evaluated, they
become stressful events--even though the operators know they are
most likely simulated--and thus allow the operators to acquire
an increased tolerance for stress. (As mentioned earlier, experi-
ence, practice, and positive reinforcement have been found to
lower experienced stress, resulting in better performance in real
emergencies.)
*A military equivalent, drills of a missile-firing crew, could
go as far as the actual firing of a (secretly) redirected and
disarmed missile.
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Some qualifications must be made here. It is not seriously
proposed that plants should be built with duplicate control
rooms (or that they should not), or that the ideas presented
above would necessarily be successful in the nuclear field.
We want to suggest only that schemes successfully used in military,
aviation, and other contexts to enhance performance should be
examined to detect principles that hold promise for helping to
resolve the normal vs emergency paradox of nuclear operations.
To some extent the notions of 'realistic drills' and 'non-
lethal' defects just provide operational details for the 'nuclear
priesthood' (Weinberg 1972), an elite, highly disciplined cadre
of nuclear experts. But we should remember that these organiza-
tional 'fixes' are basically of military origin and, indeed, it
might be difficult to enforce penalties for poor performance in
a nonauthoritarian atmosphere. There is an implication here
that nuclear operations might have to assume a quasi-military
character, something that some nuclear critics (e.g., Jungk
1978) have cited in opposition, asserting that the social
institutions required by the technology are inconsistent with
the ideals and traditions of democratic societies. This raises
the possibility of another potential paradox: that organizational
measures taken to reduce risk (in the physical sense) could en-
hance perceptions of social risk and thus have the net effect of
increasing public opposition (Otway et al. 1978).
A problem that might be encountered in making performance
on drills a strong determinant of the operator's career pros-
pects is that it obviously requires the existence of a career
structure. This, of course, implies a growing nuclear program;
but, because of public opposition, this is not the case in many
countries. Thus fundamental organizational changes might be
necessary to provide sufficiently attractive career advancement
possibilities, e.g., by combining the operational side of all
energy sources on a national basis--although this might be
inconsistent with maintaining a high level of expertise in the
nuclear field.
Research Needs
Our review suggests that there are several areas where
additional information could improve our understanding of
operator performance and its role in nuclear safety. Some work
must be done to improve the design of nuclear control rooms,
(e.g., in terms of optimizing the layout of control panels, the
amount and type of information available, the provision of
diagnostic aids, and the optimization of alarm hierarchies) .
Analyses should be performed to determine the needs and objectives
of nuclear operator training prior to the design of new training
initiatives, and attention should be given to the evaluation of
these programs. It is easy to say that training should be
improved, but it is quite another thing to show which particular
combination of, for example, classroom instruction and simulator
training are optimal, and at what level of simulator fidelity.
It would be useful to investigate the stress levels experienced
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by operators in normal operations and simulated emergencies and
to learn more about the sources of these stresses. Implicit in
all of the foregoing is a theoretical task analysis to better
define what is expected of each operating team member in various
emergencies.
Finally, thought should be given to ways in which the opera-
tor's job itself, and the organizational environment in which it
is performed, might be modified to enhance the overall safety
of nuclear operations. But careful, scientific analyses are
required; many of the intuitively appealing suggestions made
in the aftermath of the TMI accident, upon closer examination,
may be ineffective or even deleterious. This cautionary note
can be taken in a more general way to apply to all changes
initiated in response to TMI. It is entirely possible that a
modification, too narrowly specific to TMI, or poorly conceived
or executed, could become the cause of the next accident.
A principle of current plant design is that control and
safety systems are designed to respond automatically to all of
the significant accident sequences that can be anticipated.
These automatic responses will have been carefully thought out
and discussed by the designers without the pressure of time.
Should one of the anticipated accident sequences actually occur
there should not be much need for the operator, or at least no
creative role for him. The paradoxical implication of this is
that the operator is most needed when a completely unanticipated
situation arises--when he must rapidly diagnose and respond to
a situation not included in his training. However, the research
we have reviewed suggests that these are precisely the conditions
to which he would be least able to respond in a constructively
creative way.
Here we should explore the implications of the argument
that the operator is not really required for anticipated events
and that he might be of little use for unanticipated events.
This requires us to evaluate a trade-off between two possibilities:
that an unnecessary operator action, made under stress, aggravates
otherwise 'routine' recovery from an anticipated event that could
have been handled by automatic systems (apparently the case at
TMI); and that a correct diagnosis and intervention (under
extremely stressful conditions) would actually effect recovery
from an unanticipated accident sequence. It is possible that
the human element will remain the weak point in the overall
safety of nuclear power plants. In any speculation about the
redesign of the operator's job, thought should at least be given
to the possibility of its elimination, or at least to its redefi-
nition as a more routine monitoring task with extremely limited
possibility for intervention in emergencies.
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LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS:
POS~-ACCIDENT RECOVERY
Gary W. Hamilton*
INTRODUCTION
IMPLICATIONS FOR
The ability to provide adequate compensation for financial
losses resulting from a nuclear accident may be one of the
primary factors in determining the recovery rate of the affected
community. Some costs, such as the expense of evacuating nearby
residents, must be met while the crisis is still in progress.
Others, such as the costs of restoring facilities and purchasing
replacement power during the interim period, may be of concern
for months or even years after the crisis has subsided.
This paper examines the various types of liability for
damages resulting from an accident at a nuclear power facility
and the mechanisms for compensating these losses in the post-
accident recovery phase. Attention is first given to the Price-
Anderson Act, which has been a source of controversy because of
the limits it places on liability for nuclear accidents in the
United States. The insurance industry is then considered in
terms of its role under the Price-Anderson Act. Finally the
successes and failures of the existing compensatory systems are
considered in terms of their effect on post-accident recovery
and on the future of nuclear power in general. Examples from
the accident at Three Mile Island will be used wherever possible
to illustrate the different categories of losses and compensatory
mechanisms.
THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
Background
With the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, private
industry was given the opportunity to participate in the peaceful
*Student in a joint program of the School of Law and Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.
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applications of nuclear energy. Although private industrial and
business interests appeared eager to invest in the then infant
industry, it soon became obvious that the potential liability
for a nuclear accident might prove to be an insurmountable barrier
to the development of commercial nuclear power.
Recognizing that special measures might be required, the
Atomic Energy Commission created a study group of insurance in-
dustry representatives to study the insurance problems associated
with the peaceful applications of nuclear energy (Lowenstein
1977, p. 597). In its preliminary report to the Commission in
June 1955, the group concluded that the primary difficulties
would involve liability to third parties (the general public in
this instance). The group found that there would be little
difficulty in providing property (first party) coverage for
nuclear facilities and concluded that employees (second parties)
injured in an accident would be covered under workmen's compensa-
tion programs in existing insurance plans.
A basic problem for the insurance industry was the question
of how to calculate the probability of an accident. The limited
number of nuclear plants operating in the 1950s provided few
data for developing an actuarial base to calculate insurance
premiums on the basis of risk. Thus while the industry was
eager to participate in a potentially lucrative venture, it was
operating without the most fundamental tools of the insurance
profession. As one commentator (Marrone 1977, p. 609) stated:
In 1957 the underwriters were frank to say that they
did not know what the proper premium charge would be
for nuclear insurance. As a result of this, a unique
industry-wide credit rating plan was developed. The
premium to be charged for each risk would be affected
by the loss experience of the entire nuclear industry.
The private insurance industry eventually agreed to provide
liability coverage ranging from 50 million to 60 million dollars,
a sum which was four times greater than any public liability
policy previously available to any single us industrial plant
(Green 1973, p. 484). Yet the atomic energy industry regarded
even this unprecedented amount of coverage to be inadequate and
the insurance problem continued to roadblock the private develop-
ment of nuclear technoloqy (Green 1973, p. 484).
Congress considered the nuclear liability question through
a series of extensive studies and congressional hearings in 1956
and 1957. In 1957, an indemnity statute was enacted as an
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This amendment is
generally referred to as the Price-Anderson Act (Price-Anderson
Act of September 2, 1957).
Purposes and Scope of the Price-Anderson Act
The two central objectives of the Price-Anderson Act were
to insure that the public would be compensated if an accident
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did occur and to set a limit on the liability of private industry
in order to remove the roadblock to large-scale private partici-
pation in the development of nuclear energy (Lowenstein 1977,
p. 597). The original Act was not intended to establish any
new rules of liability. Rather, it was indemnity legislation
designed to guarantee the availability of funds to satisfy
claims up to the established limits.
The Price-Anderson provisions for limited liability have
been criticized by some on the grounds that the public could be
deprived of the opportunity to collect for losses in excess of
the insurance and indemnity (presently 560 million dollars, as
discussed below). However, in a report to Congress, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy (1965) stated an alternative view:
It is the committee's view that this limitation does
not, as a practical matter, detract from the public
protection afforded by this legislation . ... [In] the
event of a national disaster of this magnitude, it is
obvious that Congress would have to review the prob-
lem and take appropriate action. The history of other
natural and man-made disasters, such as the Texas City
incident, bears this out. The limitation of liability
serves primarily as a device for facilitating further
congressional review of such a situation, rather than
as an ultimate bar to further relief of the public.
Nevertheless, the Act has been the subject of intense controversy
because of the claim that its twofold purpose of promotion and
protection has evolved to the point where promotion greatly
outweighs any public protection afforded by the measure (New
England Law Review 1975; Stanford Law Review 1978).
Basic Provisions of the 1957 Act
The 1957 Price-Anderson Act required, as a condition of each
operating license and construction permit issued by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), that the licensee maintain third party
liability insurance up to the maximum amount available from
private sources (Green 1973, p. 487; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210 (b) (1976)).
In 1957 the private insurance industry was offering 60 million
dollars in liability coverage. Therefore, each licensee was
required to maintain at least this amount of financial protection.
However, the licensee was not required to maintain this protec-
tion in the form of insurance, but could seek "private contractual
indemnities, self insurance, other proof of financial responsibil-
ity or a combination of such measures." (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(b)
(1976)) .
One of the central provisions of the Act was the requirement
that each licensee enter into a 500 million' dollar indemnity
contract with the AEC (Price-Anderson Act 1957, codified at 42
U.S.C. 2210(c) (1976)). This agreement operated to indemnify
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any ~arties which might be in contractual privity* with the
utility, i.e., subcontractors, designers, manufacturers, etc.
(Green 1973, ~. 488; Joint Committee on Atomic Energv 1957).
However, the insurance and indemnity coverage also extends to
any party, even strangers**, who might be subject to liability
as a result of a "nuclear incident," which is defined in 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2014 (q) (1976) as "any occurrence ... causing ... bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to
property or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting
from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous
properties of source, special nuclear, or by-product material."
The protection offered under the indemnity agreement was
intended to ensure that the public would be protected from any
nuclear incident regardless of the identity of the causal party.
However, in its original form, the Act required that a party be
found liable under applicable state law before any claims could
be satisfied. This provision prompted considerable discussion
among legal scholars over which elements of fault or negligence
might be required or whether principles of res ipsa loquitur***
or absolute liability**** might ap~ly in the case of a nuclear
incident (Seavey 1958). Concern was also expressed over the
possibility that burdensome requirements of proof might ~revent
genuine claims from being compensated (New England Law Review 1975;
Stanford Law Review 1978). Although this possibility may never
be eliminated entirely, the mechanisms for establishlng liability
have been modified by amendments to the Act. These amendments
will be discussed below.
The AEC indemnity of 500 million dollars combined with the
60 million available from private sources gives an aggregate
liability coverage of 560 million dollars. If it is apparent that
the total damages will exceed this statutory limit, a US District
Court with bankruptcy venue t over the location of the accident
*The concept of privity pertains to the relationship between a
party to a suit and a person who was not a party, but whose interest
in the action was such that he will be bound by the final action
as if he were a Darty (Black's Law Dictionary) .
**Note also that the indemnity applies to "the licensee and other
persons indemnified" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(c) (1976)). Furthermore,
the "person indemnified" is defined to mean "the Derson with whom
an indemnity agreement is executed, or who is required to maintain
financial protection, and any other person who may be liable for
public liability" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014 (t) (1976)).
***Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby the negligence
of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened, provided that the character of the accident and
the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that
in the absence of n~gligence it would not have occurred (Black's
Law Dictionary) .
****Absolute liability is responsibility for damages without the
showing of fault or negligence.
tvenue deals with the question of whether the court has juris-
diction to hear the suit in question.
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is required to serve as a clearinghouse to review claims and
apportion the available funds among the various claimants.*
Hence the Price-Anderson Act does not guarantee that the public
will be fully compensated for all losses resulting from a nuclear
incident if the aggregate liability exceeds 560 million dollars.
However, a subsection of the Act promises that Congress will
"review" the situation and take "appropriate" action if an
accident causes damages in excess of the 560 million dollar
ceiling (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(e) (1976); Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy 1965).
The original Price-Anderson Act was regarded as a temporary
measure, with indemnity provisions applicable only to licenses
issued between August 30, 1954 and August 1, 1967 (Green 1973,
p. 491). The termination of the indemnity provisions was based
on the hope that the insurance industry would eventually develop
an independent program to insure nuclear facilities. As the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated: "during the ten year
period it is hoped that there will be enough experience gained
so that the problems of reactor safety will be to a great extent
solved and the insurance people will have had experience on which
to base a sound program of their own" (Lowenstein 1977, p. 597;
H.R. Rep. 435, 1957, p. 9).
Modifications in Provisions 1957-1975.
In June 1965 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy began
hearings on the possibility of extending the Price-Anderson Act
for a second ten-year term to August 1, 1977. During the first
eight years there had been a substantial increase in private
investment in nuclear power plants and there had been no accidents
causing injury to the public. Yet, in the view of the Committee,
the "theoretical possibility" of a catastrophic accident and the
potential liability remained as great a deterrent to "necessary
industrial participation" in nuclear technology as it had been
in 1957 (Green 1973, p. 493; H.R. Rep. No. 435, 1957, p. 9).
In September 1965 Congress passed legislation to extend the
Act for a second ten-year term (Act of September 29, 1965).
Under the terms of the extension, the private insurance industry
agreed that it would, from January 1, 1966, increase its liability
coverage to 74 million dollars. However, the aggregate coverage
under the insurance and indemnity plan was to remain at 560
million dollars. Under an amendment to the Act, the government's
indemnity contribution was reduced "by the amount that the finan-
cial protection required shall exceed $60,000,000 (42 U.S.C. Sec.
2210 (c) (1976)). Thus the net effect was to reduce the amount
of government indemnity from 500 million dollars to 486 million
dollars, while preserving the aggregate liability ceiling at
560 million dollars.
*Venue provisions are found in L~2 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(n) (1) (1976).
The apportionment provision was originally part of 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2210(e), which was deleted and replaced by similar provisions in
a 1966 amendment. These provisions may be found in 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2210(0) (1976).
196
In a modification adopted in 1966, Congress provided simpli-
fied measures for handling claims in the event of an emergency
(Public Law 89-645). The new provisions allow a claimant to
receive immediate partial compensation. However, if the court
with venue over the accident determines that total liability
might exceed the 560 million dollar limit, emergency payments
must be limited to no more than fifteen percent of the total
fund. The amendment also contains a provision to reserve a por-
tion of the fund for latent injury claims.
A more fundamental amendment adopted by Congress in 1966
dealt with' the issue of establishing liability for damages result-
ing from a nuclear accident. Under traditional tort law most
states required that, in the absence of provisions for liability
without fault*, a claimant must establish negligence in order to
recover damages. This burden of proof could become a barrier
to recovery, since the relevant evidence might be destroyed by
the accident or rendered unavailable for a period of time exceed-
ing the statute of limitations. Furthermore, proving actual
damages would be especially difficult because it often takes
many years for the damaging effects of radiation exposure to
become manifest.
Faced with the concern that the protection offered by Price-
Anderson might prove to be illusory in light of the substantive
and procedural obstacles which could prevent compensation for
legitimate claims, Congress was under pressure to enact a federal
law to establish strict liability with respect to nuclear inci-
dents. A bill enacted in 1966 established, in effect, the prin-
ciple of absolute liability for nuclear accidents (Green 1973,
p. 496; P.L.89-645). However, rather than explicitly establishing
such a rule, the legislation provided for the waiver of certain
defenses, thus giving the net effect of absolute liability.
Licensees are required to waive "any issue or defense as to the
conduct of the claimant or fault of the person indemnified."
In addition, there is a provision for the waiver of "any issue
or defense based on any statute of limitations if the suit is
instituted within three years from the date on which the claimant
knew, or reasonably could have known, of his injury and the cause
thereof, but in no event more than ten years after the date of
the nuclear incident." (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(n) (1) (1976)).
In order to prevent nuisance suits and spurious claims, the
waivers are restricted by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(j) (1976) to suits
involving an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," an event causing
substantial damage to persons or property as a result of the
release of radioactive materials from a nuclear facility. Final
authority for determining extraordinary nuclear occurrences
belonged to the AEC** (this power is now vested in the Nuclear
*The principle of liability without fault and its variants relies
on the rule established in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
See Seavey (1958), p. 7.
**The Atomic Energy Commission was charged with the responsibility
for establishing written criteria upon which to base a determination
of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." These criteria are found
in 10 C.F.R. Sec. 140.81-85 (1979).
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Regulatory Commission (NRC). If the Commission determines an
event to be "non-extraordinary," liability is determined under
traditional tort law.
The Price-Anderson Act was amended in 1968, to increase the
amount of liability insurance available to 82 million dollars,
and again in 1972 to raise the private coverage to 95 million
dollars. In both amendments, the government's indemnity exposure
was decreased by an amount equal to the increase in private
liability coverage, and aggregate coverage was maintained at a
ceiling of 560 million dollars.
Amendments Enacted in 1975
In 1975 Congress passed a bill which extended the Price-
Anderson Act for an additional ten-year period to August 1, 1987
(Act of December 31, 1975). The bill provides for two basic
changes in the Act. First, there is a provision for the gradual
substitution of industry-financed indemnity to replace government
indemnity over and above the amount of private coverage available.
The second change provides for an eventual increase in the amount
of total liability.
These two goals are to be accomplished through a system of
"deferred premiums." In the event of an accident causing damages
in excess of the amount of private coverage (currently 160 million
dollars, as discussed below), each licensee is assessed a deferred
premium of between 2 million and 5 million dollars to cover a
share of the excess damages (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210 (b) (1976)).
Losses exceeding the combined insurance (primary) and deferred
premium (secondary) layers of coverage will continue to be covered
under NRC indemnity assurances. As new reactors come on-line,
the secondary layer of coverage will increase and gradually
replace the federal indemnity provisions. Eventually, the federal
indemnity exposure will be eliminated entirely, while the liability
ceiling will continue to rise in proportion to the number of new
reactors.
Current Status of the Price-Anderson Act
The current provisions of the Price-Anderson Act may be
summarized as follows:
(1) Each nuclear power plant licensee is required to maintain
third party liability coverage up to the maximum amount
available from private sources. On May 1, 1979, this
amount was increased to 160 million dollars.
(2) The NRC provides indemnity coverage in the amount of
400 million dollars over and above the amount of private
insurance available.
(3) Under the deferred premium plan, the government indemnity
exposure will eventually be eliminated and the ceiling
on liability will be increased.
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(4) The Act limits the liability of all parties to the
accident to a total of 560 million dollars.
(5) If an accident is determined by the NRC to be an "extra-
ordinary nuclear occurrence," all legal defenses to
liability are waived. This, in effect, establishes
strict liability for nuclear catastrophes.
(6) The Act provides for the prompt settlement of claims
and immediate partial payment.
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S VIEW
Managing Nuclear Liability Risks
As mentioned above, in 1957 the insurance industry was unsure
of the proper premium charge for nuclear liability insurance.
Therefore, the underwriters developed a plan which would base
the premium on the loss experience of the industry as a whole.
Under this plan, called the credit rating plan, approximately 73
cents of every dollar of premium received is held by the insurance
pools in a special fund. If this money is not used to pay losses,
it is returned to the insured party in the eleventh year after it
is received (Marrone 1977, p. 609). Under this arrangement, the
insurance pools refunded approximately 13 million dollars from
the fund between 1967 and 1978 (National Underwriter, April 13,
1979) . .
The insurance offered to the nuclear industry is especially
remarkable in view of the premium for coverage offered. For
example, in 1976 the insurance pools collected a total of 32
million dollars in premiums for 300 million dollars in caDacity
offered, giving a ratio of roughly 1:10. In comparison, the
airline industry was offered similar capacity, but the total
annual premium collected was in excess of 300 million dollars,
giving a ratio of about 1:1 (Marrone 1977, p. 608). One reason
for the low rates offered to the nuclear industry was the excel-
lent safety record of nuclear facilities prior to the accident
at Three Mile Island. Between 1957 and 1978, a total of only
$623,000 was paid out in claims and claim expenses (National
Underwriter, April 13, 1979).
Coverage Offered
At present there are three irsurance pools offering protec-
tion for nuclear facilities. They are Mutual Atomic Energy
Liability Underwriters (MAELU), American Nuclear Insurers (ANI),
and the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pools. Two types of
coverage are offered. The first type is third party liability
insurance which covers the operator of the nuclear facility, the
suppliers and contractors, and any other Darty which might be
held liable for a nuclear accident. The second type of insurance
covers damages to facilities on an "all-risk" basis.
Insurance coverage for the Three Mile Island facility was
provided by ANI and MAELU. The maximum liability of these two
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pools in connection with the accident at TMI is 140 million
dollars (since the 160 million dollar liability limit did not
go into effect until May 1, 1979). Of this amount, ANI is respon-
sible for 108.5 million dollars; MAELU's share is 31.5 million
dollars. After reinsurance with foreign firms, such as Lloyd's
of London, the net liability of the two pools is 57.8 million
dollars for ANI and 16.8 million dollars for MAELU (Bardes 1979)
Under the credit rating plan, the two pools had placed ap-
proximately 73 percent of the collected premiums into a reserve
fund which could only be used to pay incurred losses or returned
to the insured parties after the ten-year experience period had
expired. If the losses incurred by ANI and MAELU exceed the
74.5 million dollars in the reserve fund, a portion of the excess
loss will be assigned to each member and reinsurer in the pools
(Bardes 1979).
As discussed above, the deferred premium arrangement makes
each reactor operator liable for up to 5 million dollars in the
event of an accident causing damages in excess of the primary
layer of coverage. At the request of Congress, the insurance
pools have created a 30 million dollar contingent liability fund
to cover any defaults in payment by the licensee.
Finally, ANI provides facilities insurance totaling 300
million. Hence, the insurance coverage for an accident at a
nuclear power plant may be summarized as follows: (1) third
party liability coverage--160 million dollars (140 million dollars
at the time of TMI); (2) facilities coverage--300 million dollars;
(3) deferred premium coverage--up to 340 million dollars; (4)
government indemnity coverage--up to 60 million dollars; (5) poten-
tial liability of insurance pools for licensee default on deferred
premium--30 million dollars. Stated alternatively, the insurance
pool is potentially liable for up to 490 million dollars, while
the government's liability has been reduced to 60 million dollars,
a decrease of 440 million dollars since 1957.
LIABILITIES RESULTING FROM THREE MILE ISLAND
Facilities Losses
In August 1980 William G. Kuhns, Chairman of General Public
Utilities, announced that the estimate of repair costs is 760
million dollars. GPU believes that the repair will take up to
7 years to complete (New York Times 1980b). To meet the repair
costs, GPU is relying on the 300 million dollars of facilities
insurance it carried with ANI. Funding for the remaining costs
is still in question. There has been some talk of asking the
federal government for assistance in the form of a research
grant to study the problems associated with decontaminating a
reactor facility following an accident (Business Week, July 30,
1979) .
In other cost-cutting measures taken by GPU to reduce the
financial impact of the accident, the utility has been forced
to stop work on two new plants in which it had invested hundreds
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of millions of dollars. In addition, GPU has been forced to
cut its dividend in half and reduce its staff by 600 positions
(Business Week, July 30, 1979).
Off-Site Losses
Within hours of the accident at Three Mile Island, ANI set
up an emergency claims center to issue payments to residents who
were forced to leave as a result of Governor Thornburgh's request
for a partial evacuation. The emergency payments were available
only to those families with pregnant women or school-age children,
the two groups believed to be most susceptible to the radiation
released from the crippled reactor (Business Insurance, April
16, 1979). The payments, averaging between $50 and $750 per
family, totaled over $600,000 in the first week alone (Business
Insurance, April 16, 1979). By the time the crisis was over,
2800 families within a five-mile radius of the plant had been
compensated with the total payments amounting to approximatelv
1.2 million dollars (National Underwriter, July 27, 1979).
Fortunately, there were few cases of looting and vandalism
in the communities affected bv the evacuation. Most homeowners'
policies have an exclusion clause barring claims based on nuclear
reactor accidents and there was some doubt whether losses suffered
during an evacuation could be compensated. It is now clear that
an exception to the bar would apply in the case of theft and
vandalism occurring after a horne has been evacuated due to
nuclear contamination. In the industry's view, "since the vandal-
ism and theft are not a direct result of the contamination, the
nuclear exclusion clause does not apply" (National Underwriter,
April 20, 1979).
A major category of off-site claims being considered is
losses suffered by businesses that were forced to close during
the crisis. Although there is no assurance that these claims
will be compensated, the insurance pools have told shopowners
and businesses to collect documents to show the amount they
could have reasonably expected to make during the time they
were forced to close (Business Insurance, April 16, 1979).
Farmers in the area who also claim to have suffered financial
losses may eventually be compensated as well (New York Times,
August 23, 1979). However, the industry has emphasized that all
cases involving business losses will have to be considered on an
individual basis.
As one would expect, the accident at Three Mile Island has
generated a considerable number of lawsuits. Within six months
of the incident, twenty-nine class action and specific damage
suits had been filed and consolidated for trial purposes in
middle district courts. In addition to the complaints brought
by individuals, twenty-nine suits have been filed by government
agencies seeking recovery for expenses incurred during the crisis
(National Underwriter, September 28, 1979).
The suits brought by local residents have listed a variety
of charges. One claims that residents of the area now have an
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increased likelihood of developing cancer as a result of the
radiation released into the atmosphere during the accident.
The suit seeks to impose a "Constructive trust" on the "real
and personal property of the defendants 'in a sufficient amount
to pay for the costs of the plaintiffs and the class members
receiving medical and diagnostic treatment services for the next
twenty years'". The complaint further alleges that operation
of the plant "'constitutes a continuing and unabated nuisance'",
which has "'substantially and permanently disturbed plaintiffs'
and class members' peaceful enjoyment of their lands'" (National
Underwriter, May 18, 1979).
other suits have been filed to seek damages for "general
physical and emotional injuries" or "psychic damages". These
suits are based on the claim that the malfunction of the reactor
caused mental anguish resulting from the fear of being injured
by nuclear radiation. Naturally, the plaintiffs in these cases
will bear the same burden of proof required in any case involving
mental anguish injuries.
The outcome of these suits is affected by the fact that the
NRC has determined that the Three Mile Island accident was not
an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO), since the radiation
releases were below established criteria for declaring an ENO.
As a result, the waiver of defense provisions of the Price-
Anderson Act cannot be invoked. Liability for the suits must
then be determined on the basis of traditional tort law.
Replacement Power Costs
In order to restore electrical service to the communities
previously served by the Three Mile Island plant, GPU was forced
to purchase replacement power from neighboring utilities. It
is estimated that GPU is currently spending about $600,000 per
day to replace power previously supplied by the Unit II reactor,
the site of the March 28 accident. An additional $500,000 oer
day is required to replace power from the Unit I reactor, which
has also remained closed since the date of the accident (National
Underwriter, May 4, 1979). Thus GPU is paying a total of approxi-
mately 1.1 million dollars per day for replacement power costs.
While-there is reason to believe that the operational Unit I
reactor will be placed on-line before the end of 1981, replace-
ment power costs for Unit II alone could run as high as 900 million
dollars, depending on the price and availability of oil over the
four years following the accident.
POST-TMI MEASURES TO COMPENSATE LOSSES FROM NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
Replacement Power Costs and First-Party Coverage
To deal with the staggering losses associated with purchasing
replacement power, the nuclear industry has announced plans to
form an insurance pool to provide funds to utilities whose ser-
vice has been interrupted by a nuclear accident (Washington Post,
September 22, 1979).
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The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
recently requested that the nuclear industry supply information
aimed at determining whether accidents involving nuclear reactors
can be covered adequately under first-party property insurance
(National Underwriter, June 24, 1979). The NAIC noted that it
had been unsuccessful in obtaining industry estimates of the
costs of insuring property losses under first-party insurance
programs and that this failure was due to several factors,
including:
(1) The uncertainty surrounding the probability of a
nuclear accident.
(2) The innumerable variables that influence the extent
and nature of personal injuries and property damage arising from
nuclear accidents.
(3) The adverse selection difficulties inherent in the con-
cept of insuring nuclear accident losses under first-party insur-
ance coverage.
(4) The conflict between the Price-Anderson Act's third-
party liability system and the proposal to insure excess nuclear
losses under first-party insurance coverages.
Under the system proposed by the NAIC, an entirely private cata-
strophic risk insurance program would be substituted for the
current nuclear accident compensation program contained in the
Price-Anderson Act.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Price-Anderson Act
The Price-Anderson Act was enacted with the dual purpose
of encouraging nuclear power development and protecting the
public from the substantial losses that could result from a
nuclear catastrophe. There is little doubt that the goal of
promotion has been achieved. Indeed, critics of the Act charge
that the federal indemnity provisions amount to a subsidy of
the nuclear industry. This characterization is vigorously con-
tested by proponents of the legislation on the grounds that the
industry pays fees for the indemnity protection (this fee is
currently $30 per year per thousand kilowatts of thermal energy
capacity) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(f) (1976)). Nevertheless, it is
clear that the net effect is a subsidy, even though it is achieved
by removing a burden, rather than by providing direct revenues.
The need for continuing the role of Price-Anderson as a
promotional mechanism is unclear. Although the legislation was
considered to be essential to tne early development of civilian
nuclear energy, some industry spokesmen have said that they
would continue to build nuclear facilities even if there were
no limitation on liability. Yet, many commentators feel that
this is an overly optimistic assessment. They argue that
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removing the liability limit would effectively deal a death blow
to the nuclear industry.
If nuclear power development were to continue in the absence
of liability limitations, it would undoubtedly take on a different
complexion. Social costs which have been externalized by the
Price-Anderson Act would have to be internalized by the utility
and would, therefore, change the economic bases for many decisions.
One example would be the siting of nuclear facilities. With the
present limitation on liability, utilities are free to site facil-
ities near major population centers, thus taking advantage of
savings resulting from shorter transmission distances. On the
other hand, if there were no liability ceiling, it is doubtful
that the savings realized from shorter transmission distances
could balance the potential liability associated with locating
the plant near a major population center.
A major criticism of the Price-Anderson Act has been the
claim that 560 million dollars is an insufficient amount to
fUlly compensate the public in the event of a serious nuclear
accident. Many critics argue that the limitation on liability
should be lifted entirely. However, it should be noted that
the right to sue for an amount above the present statutory
ceiling would not necessarily guarantee the ability to collect.
The nonspecific nature of many claims for radiation-induced
damages could present insurmountable barriers to recovery.
Furthermore, it might take litigants many years to reach an
adjudication, which could bankrupt the utility and still pro-
vide inadequate relief.
The Price-Anderson waiver of defense provisions is designed
to eliminate many of the difficulties encountered by claimants
who must establish a causal link between exposure to radiation
and their injury. But these waivers must be preceded by an
NRC determination that an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence"
has taken place. The NRC has determined that the accident at
TMI was a "non-extraordinary" occurrence, since the radiation
releases were below the established guidelines. Therefore,
claimants in that case are required to establish liability under
traditional tort law.
TMI Losses
Perhaps the most pressing financial needs during the TMI
crisis were the emergency payments to families who left their
homes in response to Governor Thornburgh's recommendation for a
partial evacuation within a five-mile radius of the plant. It
appears that ANI responded to this need in a prompt and efficient
manner.
Restoration of the TMI plant facilities will be a very costly,
time-consuming process. A portion of the costs will be covered
by insurance. However, the source of the uninsured portion of
the costs remains to be determined. The Public Utilities
Commission in Pennsylvania has ruled that repair costs cannot
be passed to consumers (New York Times, May 10, 1980).
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Finally, the cost of replacement power has surfaced as a
major concern regarding post-accident recovery. It is estimated
that GPU could spend well over 1 billion dollars in replacement
power costs over the four years following the accident. The
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission has allowed the utility
to institute a temporary 111 million dollar-per-year rate hike
to cover some of the costs of buying replacement power. In
addition, the proposed industry-financed plan for dealing with
these costs is intended to lessen the impact of prolonged shut-
downs on the utilities.
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v. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several technical procedures and systems provide vital in-
puts for nuclear accident preparedness and management. The
papers in this Section describe technical bases for setting plan-
ning and reliability requirements, data storage and retrieval
mechanisms to facilitate learning from past accidents, rapid
dosimetry assessments of nuclear accident health effects, and
noise diagnosis in support of early accident management.
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TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
RELIABILITY AND SAFETY
M.Kh. Ibragimov
Ministry of Energy, USSR
INTRODUCTION
The development of nuclear energy has been accompanied by
an increased awareness of the importance of safety in nuclear
power plants. The radioactive material accumulated during the
operation of nuclear reactors presents a potential danger for
the environment. Ensuring the safety of a nuclear power plant,
i.e., preventing the melting of the nuclear reactor core, and
preventing the release of dangerous radioactive material into
the environment, is a complicated problem with no immediate
solution.
A nuclear power plant, with all its components, may be con-
sidered a system whose purpose is to produce electrical energy.
In this paper a systems approach will be used to provide a frame-
work for the comprehensive analysis of the problem of nuclear
power plant safety. The principles of the systems approach may
be conceived as follows: (1) the system is composed of elements;
(2) the elements of the system are interconnected, and (3) the
elements influence one another. On the basis of these principles,
two major goals of one procedure of analysis, which may be called
'systemization,' may be outlined: first, identification of the
system and decomposition of the system into elements; second,
identification of the connections between elements and the char-
acter of these connections.
SYSTEMIZATION
A nuclear power plant should be considered a system encom-
passing specific devices and pieces of machinery that perform
certain functions in a given chronological sequence. Thus it
is useful to systematize such a plant structurally, functionally,
and chronologically.
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A structural systemization identifies the location of every
piece of equipment in the system. This makes it possible to
classify elements of the same type, to develop uniform require-
ments to be imposed on different classes of elements, and to
group all equipment into classes or categories on the basis of
their requirements for reliability. In the case of Category I
equipment, such as pipes, failure can lead to large radioactive
releases in the primary circuit. Category II equipment is less
important for safety, but of great importance for reliable
electricity generation. Primary circuit circulation pumps fall
into this category. Failure of equipment in Category III does
not interrupt the generation of electricity. Auxiliary equip-
ment in the secondary circuit is an example of Category III
equipment. An example of a structural systemization is given
in Figure 1.
Kola
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-----
Water.moderatert ONovovoronezhskaya Plant -()Primary--
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SUBSYSTEM
PLANT DESIGN
BLOCK
CIRCUITS
ELEMENTS
~pr~CO~TOP
-----OReaclor OVessel 0 Shell
----- ~ Slea~ l"tr~connectIOns~ 1m generator machinery
Figure 1. An example of a structural systemization of a
nuclear power plant.
In a functional systemization, another three categories
of equipment, which perform certain functions and provide safety
under unfavorable conditions, are identified. Category I equip-
ment ensures the safety of the power generation process. This
category represents the first level of safety equipment in nuclear
power plants. Category II safety devices operate when equipment
failures or external events, such as earthquakes, occur. These
safety devices make it possible to reverse the initial develop-
ment of an accident and to maintain fuel elements in operational
status. This category represents the second level of safety
equipment for the plant. Category III equipment ensures safety
in the event of an accident. These devices represent the third
level of safety equipment preventing radioactive releases.
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An example of a functional systemization is presented in
Figure 2. Machinery in each category has specific reliability
requirements, and these should be taken into account during
design, production, and installation. Under normal operating
conditions this functional systemization provides a basis for
developing different methods of testing machinery with special
attention to minimizing the time required for testing. The
functional systemization could also be used as a basis for
optimizing atomic power plant safety, taking into account eco-
nomic factors. Generally this systemization could be used to
demonstrate the necessity or sufficiency of proposed safety
measures.
A chronological systemization may be used to describe the
stages of construction and maintenance of a system. These stages
include design, fabrication, installation, start-up and adjust-
ment, operation, and repair, as shown in Figure 3. For each
stage requirements for the safety of equipment and subsystems
may be studied, taking into account a plant's specific features.
At the design stage primary consideration is given to the
radiation-physics, thermohydraulics, and mechanical integrity
of the reactor and its facilities under normal, transitional,
and emergency conditions. It is 'important to ensure high quality,
which in turn ensures plant safety, at the fabrication stage.
Quality control before the installation phase precludes the
delivery of defective machinery.
Under operating conditions some structural changes appear
in materials. These changes, caused by vibration, corrosion,
and radiation, can lead to equipment failure. For this reason
special attention should be paid to operational monitoring
methods, especially remote monitoring (such as ultrasonic, acous-
tic, and emission monitoring). Structural and functional sys-
temization makes it possible to determine the most important
sites for monitoring, for example, where there is a concentration
of stress in equipment in structural categories I and II.
SYSTEMIZATION OF SAFETY AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
General requirements. Every operating condition of a nuclear
reactor has a particular nuclear or thermotechnical character,
each associated with specific safety problems. In the event of
a failure, the parameters describing every process should be
maintained within given safety limits. Safety limits might be
defined in terms of the following factors:
neutralization of the consequences of a failure while main-
taining the operational status of the plant;
prevention of the development of a failure into an accident;
and
prevention of radioactive releases.
In the case of unfavorable changes in operating conditions, all
safety measures that are taken should be consistent with the
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general safety requirements for the power plant as a whole.
Safety measures achieved by varying operating conditions (down-
rating, controlling the values of some parameters, etc.) are
economically advisable. Implementation of technical safety
measures to keep a plant operational in the event of large-
scale failure would be too complicated and expensive. Nontech-
nical safety measures should be used for protecting the population
and environment from radioactive releases. These considerations
should enter into the determination of safety requirements for
nuclear power plants.
As discussed above, at every stage in the development and
operation of a nuclear power plant careful attention should be
paid to the safety of systems and equipment whose failure could
lead to an accident. Because of the small probability of such
failures, safety requirements are not necessarily consistent
with requirements for reliability.
Requirements for safety measures and their cost should be
determined by the scale of failure. In every emergency case a
"limited failure mode"-not unlike a fuse in an electrical cir-
cuit-should be established, with consequences that can definitely
be localized and limited by safety measures. This concept is
related to the notion of a "maximum rated accident" (MRA). The
MRA for a water-moderated reactor, for example, is a failure in
the primary circuit, an event with an estimated annual probability
of 10- 4 • Safety measures for that event are aimed at preventing
melting of the core and metal-water reactions. This would make
it possible to carry out post-accident repair of the core and
intravessel machinery. These measures would prevent radioactive
releases to the environment if fuel elements are damaged (which
would occur if temperatures become higher than 1200-1300 °e).
A possible failure of the reactor vessel is not considered in
the planning of safety requirements because of its small proba-
bility (10- 6 per year). Siting nuclear power plants at distances
of 40-50 km away from densely populated areas is a measure that
limits the consequences that could stem from accidents exceeding
a MRA in scale.
Safety requirements during special operations. Safety prob-
lems associated with charging the core, starting the reactor,
changing fuel elements, and other special operations must be
handled through technical measures and carefully planned proce-
dures.
Requirements for radiological safety. Fission products are
the main sources of radioactivity in a plant. The hermetic clad-
ding of fuel elements represents the first safety barrier for
fission products. Still, the high pressure caused by gaseous
fission products, thermal fatigue, and superheating produces
cracks and even perforations in the fuel cladding. This could
result in inadmissible levels of radioactivity in the primary
circuit coolant. For this reason it is required that no more
than 1% of fuel elements have microfissures and no more than
0.1% have perforations. If these requirements are met, increased
specific radioactivity in the primary circuit coolant due to
leaking should not exceed 0.14 curie/liter.
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The integrity of the primary circuit represents the second
barrier for radioactivity. This barrier could be damaged by
increased coolant pressure and vibration, together with inter-
crystal corrosion. The hermetic safety jacket of the reactor
is the third barrier of radiological protection. It provides
simultaneous protection from both external and internal mechanical
effects.
ReZiabiZity requirements. Economic factors should be taken
into consideration in determining the requirements for reliability.
On the one hand, high reliability leads to a high load factor.
But, on the other hand, expenditures connected with increasing
reliability lead to higher capital cost. It follows that there
is an optimal level of reliability for a plant that is a function
of the economics of increased load factor vs investment in com-
petition with other energy sources. Optimal levels of reliability
can be determined by a complex technical and economic analysis.
Relationships between safety, reliability, and several other fac-
tors discussed in this paper are presented in Figure 4.
The general concept of plant reliability includes operational
reliability, lifetime of the plant, and maintainability. Opera-
tional reliability refers to the probability of operating without
failure throughout a reference period of time. The overall re-
liability of a nuclear power plant is the aggregated reliability
of all systems and equipment, especially those that play a primary
role in the operation of the plant.
Although the general reliability of a plant can only be
estimated on a relative basis, such an estimate yields important
information. This information makes it possible to determine
the optimal structure of the reactor, to identify systems and
equipment with insufficient reliability, to compare power plants
that are still in the design phase with operating plants, and
to identify equipment requiring improved production technology.
Special emphasis should be placed on the thermomechanical reli-
ability of the nuclear reactor core, which is characterized by
particular parameters. In the case of water-moderated reactors
the most important of these parameters relate heat emission
characteristics of the fuel elements to maximum energy releases
under various operating conditions. The reliability of fuel
elements in the core is determined by the ratio of critical
thermal flux to the maximum flux sustainable by the fuel ele-
ments. This value should take into account local irregularities
in core parameters.
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY PROCESSES
An analysis of emergency processes is required to evaluate
the safety of a nuclear power plant. This analysis makes it
possible to determine the necessity and sufficiency of safety
measures and to specify safety requirements. Emergency processes
have a complicated character, because failure in one system might
lead to failure in another, or two failures may coincide by chance.
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Calculations describing various emergency processes can be used
to specify the range of values of important parameters; this
information can be stored in a computer memory and retrieved in
the event of an emergency. Possible emergency processes may be
divided into the following groups:
emergency processes involving variations in reactivity, includ-
ing trouble with the control system, an unexpected change of
the boron concentration in the primary circuit coolant, and
connection of a nonoperational (cold) loop;
emergency processes connected with the loss of primary circuit
coolant flow;
failure in the primary circuit, including a break in the main
circulation pipe;
failure in the secondary circuit, including a break in the
main steam condensor;
loss of power available to the plant.
The characteristics of the emergency process very much depend on
the level of energy flux and the type of reactor. In water-
moderated reactors the energy accumulated in the primary circuit
presents a major danger, on the order of about 10 8 kilojoules.
The above discussion represents an initial attempt to apply
a systems approach to problems of assuring the safety of a nuclear
power plant.
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THE CAUSE--CONSEQUENCE DATA BASE: A RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Hiromitsu Kumamoto
Koichi Inoue
Yoshikazu Sawaragi
Kyoto University, Japan
INTRODUCTION
The events at Three Mile Island-Unit 2 on March 28, 1979
have profoundly affected our thinking about the safety of nuclear
reactors. A question we must now ask is, How can we effectively
learn as many lessons as possible from this mishap?
Since letters were invented several thousand years ago,
human beings have been documenting their experiences. Relevant
documents have been retrieved and examined over and over again
to facilitate creative thinking to cope with new situations.
Since the TMI accident, many investigators, including those
representing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and those
serving on The President's Commission on the Accident at Three
Mile Island, have evaluated the events at TMI. Reports of
several investigations are already available (President's Com-
mission 1979; USNRC, July 1979; USNRC, August 1979; Spectrum
1979). How can we learn systematically and effectively from
these documents? Conventional methods that simply provide an
overview or summary of the various reports should be replaced
by new approaches.
This paper describes a proposal to store in a data base
important paragraphs from reports of investigations into many
types of accidents. The data base is to handle not only reports
on TMI, but also reports on other events at nuclear reactors,
chemical plant explosions, earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, and
so forth.
Every paragraph of the reports that contains ideas of
importance becomes a record in the data base. Each such paragraph,
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consisting of about 5 to 10 sentences, describes either causal
relations between events or recommendations for accident manage-
ment. Several key words (for example, "emergency core cooling
system," "operator," "control room," or "evacuation") are
attached to each record, cor~esponding to words and phrases
appearing in the sentences.* These key words are stored in the
data base together with the paragraphs. Any records relevant
to a user's key words can be printed out on an on-line typewriter,
in response to the user's requests. We have named this retrieval
system the "Cause-Consequence Data Base," since it deals mainly
with causal relations and recommendations rather than quantita-
tive data describing the reliability of systems.
The data base currently uses software called IRIS, an
Interactive Retrieval Information System (Toliver 1979). IRIS
permits us to (1) create sets of records relevant to users' key
words; (2) review an alphabetic index of all such key words;
(3) apply logical operators (AND, OR, NOT) in order to create
sets of records that are subsets of the file with the specified
characteristics; and (~) print out these subsets in a variety
of formats.
The Cause-Consequence Data Base spurs the creativity of
people in charge of accident prevention and preparedness. Dis-
cussions of safety problems that draw on the data base can yield
fruitful results, for it is possible to consult specific records
on accidents that actually occurred. The data base could also
become a basic tool for risk analysis, aiding in the construction
of event trees and fault trees.
The accumulation of records for the data base was started
in November 1979. In January 1980 we had 125 records; the first
100 records came from the Kemeny report (The President's Commis-
sion, October 1979), and 25 records were extracted from a special
issue of Spectrum (Spectrum 1979). This amount of data is suffi-
cient for demonstrating the potential features of the data base, as
is shown in the sample search of the data base provided in the
Appendix at the conclusion of this paper. We are constantly accu-
mUlating new records; as of February 1981 records extracted from
reports on 40 nuclear reactor accidents were stored in the data
base. These ~O accidents are described in Bertini (1980).
THE DATA BASE-AN AID FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
The data base as a source of knowledge. The Cause-
Consequence Data Base can help people think creatively. For
example, records @ 0067 and @ 0110, reproduced in the Appendix at
the end of this paper, might spur plant designers to improve the
simulators used for operator training.
*The key words can be controlled by a thesaurus. For instance,
the key words GAUGE, INDICATOR, AND RECORDER are listed in an
entry entitled SENSOR. The thesaurus not only reduces the amount
of labor required for the attachment of key words, but also
increases the users' chances of finding relevant records.
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The data base prevents safety and reliability theories from
remaining academic exercises. Researchers in universities and
industries can use output from the retrieval system to identify
many important unsolved problems.
Scenario writing and the data base. Modern risk analysis
starts with writing scenarios that describe the development of
events. An example of this is the set of event trees that
played a fundamental role in the Rasmussen Report (USAEC 1975).
Scenarios similar to event trees are important for operator
training, evacuation planning, and design of safety systems and
emergency procedures.
The TMI accident has revealed that risk analysis based on
a single failure is insufficient. Scenarios useful for operator
training should usually contain multiple failures. The problem
is to write realistic scenarios without overlooking crucial
events. Here the Cause--Consequence Data Base can be of help.
For example, records relevant to the key word "MAINTENANCE"
would show which events may follow a maintenance error. If the
consequences of this error involve valve failures, the key word
"VALVE" can be applied to further develop the scenarios.
Fault tree construction and the data base. An event tree
is based on a prospective analysis that involves searching for
possible consequences of events. In contrast, a fault tree
involves a retrospective analysis of an event of importance.
The event is analyzed top-down, with a search for possible
causes. Events isolated at the bottom of the tree are ultimate
causes and are called basic events. Fault trees are fundamental
tools for qualitative and quantitative risk analysis.
One of the drawbacks of fault tree analysis is that too
much time must be spent for the heuristic construction of the
fault tree. The Cause--Consequence Data Base can alleviate
this difficulty. possible causes of a given event can be obtained
from the data base, making it easier to construct the trees
without missing important causes. For instance, a dangerous
ECCS failure may be analyzed retrospectively by examining
records @ 0011, @ 0015, and @ 0087, as reproduced in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX: A SAMPLE SEARCH OF THE DATA BASE
The sample search of the Cause--Consequence Data Base
presented in this Appendix had two objectives:
To print out records that describe relationships between
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and operators.
To print out records relevant to the training of operators
on simulators.
In the computer printout below a question mark "?" follows
each user command. The commands are also underlined to distin-
guish them from data-base output. A step-by-step explanation of
the search procedure follows the printout.
A Sample Printout:
? BEGIN
SET
***
COUNT
*****
DESCRIPTION
***********
? SELECT ECCS
1 2 ECCS
? EXPAND ECCS
REF DESCRIPTION
*** ****************************
82
83
84
85
86
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
DOWNTIME
DRAIN-PIPE
DRAIN-TANK
DRIVING-SAFETY
EARLY-STAGE
CNT REF
*** ***
1 0
2 0
2 0
1 0
1 0
ECCS
87
88
89
90
91
92
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
KEY:
ECCS
ECONOMIC-CONSIDERATION
ECS
ELECTOMATIC-SAFETY-VALVE
ELECTRIC-GENERATOR
ELECTRICAL-FAILURE
2
1
3
1
1
1
o
o
o
o
o
o
223
? S ECS
2 3 ECS
? DESPLAY
ERR17: INVALID ARGUMENT
? OS
SET
***
1
2
COUNT
*****
2
3
DESCRIPTION
***********
ECCS
ECS
? COMBINE 1 OR 2
3 5 1 OR 2
? S OPERATOR
4 45 OPERATOR
? COMBINE 3 AND 4
5 3 3 AND 4
? PRINT 5/4/1-3
ACCN= 54
@ 0011
OTHER INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT> WHILE EQUIPMENT FAILURES
INITIATED THE EVENT> THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS
OPERATOR ERROR. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT IF THE OPERATORS (OR
THOSE WHO SUPERVISED THEM) HAD KEPT THE EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEMS
ON THROUGH THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ACCIDENT> THREE MILE ISLAND
WOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO A RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT INCIDENT.
WHILE WE AGREE THAT THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE> WE ALSO FEEL THAT
IT DOES NOT SPEAK TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT.
ACCN= 69
@ 0015
A SENIOR ENGINEER OF THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY (SUPPLIERS
OF THE NUCLEAR STEAM SYSTEM) NOTED IN AN EARLIER ACCIDENT>
BEARING STRONG SIMILARITIES TO THE ONE AT THREE MILE ISLAND>
THAT OPERATORS HAD MISTAKENLY TURNED OFF THE EMERGENCY COOLING
SYSTEM. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE LUCKY THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
UNDER WHICH THIS ERROR WAS COMMITTED DID NOT LEAD TO A SERIOUS
ACCIDENT AND WARNED THAT UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES (LIKE THOSE
THAT WOULD LATER EXIST AT THREE MILE ISLAND» A VERY SERIOUS
ACCIDENT COULD RESULT. HE URGED> IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT
CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS BE PASSED ON TO THE OPERATORS. THIS MEMO-
RANDUM WAS WRITTEN 13 MONTHS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
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ISLAND> BUT NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS RESULTED FROM IT. THE COMMISSION#S
INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT> AND OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS
WITHIN B&W AND THE NRC> INDICATE THAT THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
THAT LED THE OPERATORS TO INCORRECT ACTION EXISTED BOTH WITHIN
THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND WITHIN THE UTILITY AND
ITS SUPPLIERS.
ACCN= 457
@ 0087
TWO MINUTES INTO THE INCIDENT> WITH THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL STILL
RISING> PRESSURE IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DROPPED SHARPLY.
AUTOMATICALLY> TWO LARGE PUMPS BEGAN POURING ABOUT 1000 GALLONS
A MINUTE INTO THE SYSTEM. THE PUMPS> CALLED HIGH PRESSURE
INJECTION (HPI) PUMPS> ARE PART OF THE REACTOR#S EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM. THE LEVEL OF WATER IN THE PRESSURIZER CONTINUED
TO RISE> AND THE OPERATORS> CONDITIONED TO MAINTAIN A CERTAIN
LEVEL IN THE PRESSURIZER> TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT THE SYSTEM
HAD PLENTY OF WATER IN IT. HOWEVER> THE PRESSURE OF REACTOR
COOLANT SYSTEM WATER WAS FALLING> AND ITS TEMPERATURE BECAME
CONSTANT.
? STRAINING
6 19 TRAINING
? S SIMULATOR
7 3 SIMULATOR
? COMBINE 6 AND 7
8 2 6 AND 7
? PRINT 8/4/1-2
ACCN= 345
@ 0067
A KEY TOOL IN THE B&W TRAINING IS A /SIMULATOR>/ WHICH IS A
MOCK CONTROL CONSOLE THAT CAN REPRODUCE REALISTICALLY EVENTS
THAT HAPPEN WITHIN A POWER PLANT. THE SIMULATOR DIFFERS IN
CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT WAY FROM THE ACTUAL CONTROL CONSOLE. ALSO>
THE SIMULATOR WAS NOT PROGRAMMED> PRIOR TO MARCH 28> TO REPRO-
DUCE THE CONDITIONS THAT CONFRONTED THE OPERATORS DURING THE
ACCIDENT.
ACCN= 620
@ 0110
HAD THE OPERATORS LOOKED AT THE TEMPERATURE GAUGE AND THEN AT
THE REACTOR-COOLANT-SYSTEM PRESSURE RECORDERS> THEN CONSULTED
A STEAM TABLE POSTED BY BABCOCK & WILCOX ON THE SIMULATOR
PANEL> THEY WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT STEAM WAS FORMING. THIS
PROCEDURE WOULD HAVE TAKEN 15 SEC. BUT THERE WERE NO STEAM
TABLES ON THE TMI-2 CONTROL PANELS; NONE WERE CONSULTED BY THE
PLANT OPERATORS DURING THE ACCIDENT; AND THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE OPERATORS WERE EVER TRAINED TO USE
SUCH TABLES.
? END
SEARCH SETS SAVED
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Explanation of the steps in the search:
(1) BEGIN. This command ensures that set numbering begins with
"1". A set is a collection of records with specified charac-
teristics.
(2) SELECT ECCS. Records relevant to the key word ECCS are
combined into Set 1. The set is composed of two records, as
the printout indicates.
(3) EXPAND ECCS. This command helps the user review other key
words that may be relevant to the initial key word, i.e., key
words are printed that precede or follow the initial key word
alphabetically. The list generated by this command in the
above printout includes ECS (Emergency Cooling System), which
the user should identify as a variant of ECCS. The EXPAND
command is useful for finding similar or misspelled words. (A
version of the EXPAND command, PIVOT, is also useful for identify-
ing key words in the form of a modifier + noun. This command
causes the key words containing a particular noun to be listed
in alphabetical order of the modifier.)
(4) S ECS. Records relevant to the key word "ECS" are combined
into Set 2. (The SELECT verb is abbreviated to simply "S".)
We may observe that 3 records have the key word "ECS".
(5) DESPLAY. Misspelled command. An error message results.
(6) OS. The DISPLAY verb is simplified to "OS". The number of
sets created thus far are summarized.
(7) COMBINE 1 OR 2. A new set, Set 3, is created, consisting
of all records that contain either ECCS or ECS as a key word.
This new set contains five records.
(8) S OPERATOR. Records that have OPERATOR as a key word are
formed into Set 4. This set contains 45 records.
(9) COMBINE 3 AND 4. Three records that satisfy the first
objective of our search, i.e., that describe relationships
between operators and emergency core cooling systems, are com-
bined into Set 5.
(10) PRINT 5/4/1-3. The three records in Set 5 are printed out.
The number 4 means that the full output of the records should
be listed.
(11) S TRAINING. Set 6 contains 19 records pertaining to the
key word TRAINING.
(12) S SIMULATOR. Set 7 contains 3 records relevant to the key
word SIMULATOR.
(13) COMBINE 6 AND 7. Two records that fulfill the second objec-
tive of our search, i.e., that describe operator training on
simulators, are combined into Set 8.
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(14) PRINT 8/4/1-2. Both records in Set 8 are printed out.
(15) END. The sets generated so far are saved for the next
session, and the present session is terminated.
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THE OFF-SITE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM SERVING THE
PAKS NUCLEAR POWER STATION IN HUNGARY
S. Deme
I. Feher
A. Andrasi
Central Research Institute for Physics, Hungary
INTRODUCTION
If a major radiological accident, e.g., a design basis acci-
dent, occurs at a nuclear power station and a large amount of
radioactive material is released into the environment, utilities
and local government authorities must make decisions very rapidly
to protect the endangered population. In such a situation, radia-
tion monitoring and reporting undertaken in the shortest possible
time are of paramount importance as instruments for minimizing
the effects of the accident.
This paper describes the main characteristics of the off-
site radiation monitoring system developed for the first Hungarian
nuclear power station, Paks. The focus of the discussion is on
accident management at the plant in the case of a maximum credible
accident (MCA).
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATION
The Paks nuclear power station is located on the right bank
of the Danube River 110 km from Budapest, as shown in Figure 1.
The town nearest the site is Paks, with a fixed population of
about twenty thousand people. The villages in the vicinity are
less populated, each with only a few thousand inhabitants.
The Paks station is at present still under construction;
its capacity is expected to increase from 440 MWe in 1981 to
880 WMe in 1982, 1,760 MWe in 1985, and finally to 3,500-4,000
MWe by 1990. Its highest possible power capacity will range be-
tween 5,000 and 6,000 MWe, but fresh water cooling can be provided
only up to a capacity of 4,000 MWe.
227
o Telemetric
monitoring station
I Other control station
Cable connection
228
Key:
N
t
I
I <if G ..yank30 km
t Dunafbldvar1126 km
I
~"m I
\
I
/ .
meteorological samplers
tower 0---'----0
I
11
Szekszard
28 km
GOd,,','
A-I Dunaszent-
benedek
Kalocsa
12 km
Figure 1. The location of the Paks nuclear power station and
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THE FEATURES OF A MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT AT THE STATION
The plans for off-site radiation monitoring were developed
for the case of a MCA in a pressurized water reactor of the type
WWER-440. An MCA in this type of reactor, with a wet condenser
system, could take the following form.
Event: both-end rupture in the main coolant pipe with a
nominal diameter of 500 mm (design basis accident).
Vo lume of expansion space: 30,000 m3
Maximum pressure in expansion space: 240 kN/m 2
Maximum time of overpressure in expansion space:
Significant radiuactive materials released during
overpressure: see Table 1
Possible release height: 0 to 40 m
Hypothetical release height: 15 m
Assumed Pasquill diffusion category: F
Assumed wind velocity: 2 mls
Maximum dose vs distance from the release point:
Table 1. Possible releases of radioactive materials in the case
of a maximum credible accident at a pressurized water
nuclear reactor .
._-_ ..---,--
Gro._u-'"p I_s~~t~~__.__~f- ~~!.~._
Release
__---'-(_C_ur i e s )
Iodine
Noble gases
8 d
2 hr
20 hr
7 hr
10 yr
5 d
1 ,200
300
1 ,200
700
150
2,800
The calculations of maximum dose and relative dose distribu-
tion are based on the amount of released radioactive materials
and on weather conditions. As can be seen in Figure 2, in the
case of the Paks station the dose to the thyroid through iodine
inhalation is the most significant short-term dose. Ingestion
doses have not been taken into account because the accident
management team can prevent that type of dose quite easily.
A special zone that has a low population density and prac-
tically no children surrounds the power station. Therefore the
thyroid doses for children (indicated by curve (1) in Figure 1)
are given only for distances greater than 3 km. Whole body doses
from beta and gamma radiation are negligible in comparison with
the thyroid doses.
PRE 14 _ P
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Figure 2. Maximum dose vs distance from the plant in the event
of a maximum credible accident (MCA). Curve (1) shows
the iodine inhalation thyroid dose for children; curve
(2) shows the iodine inhalation thyroid dose for adults;
curve (3) shows the iodine inhalation thyroid dose for
adults, assuming intake of iodine tablets within 2
hours after inhalation; curve (4) shows the iodine in-
halation thyroid dose for adults, assuming intake of
iodine tablets within 6 hours after inhalation. Curve
(5) shows whole body beta and gamma doses.
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The dose effect of inhaled iodine can be reduced by medical
countermeasures, i.e., by intake of iodine tablets. The dose
effect can be reduced by a factor of 5 if the intake of tablets
can be arranged within two hoursi it can be reduced by a factor
of 2 if intake occurs within 6 hours of inhalation.
PRINCIPLES OF DOSIMETRY
Before countermeasures are taken in the case of an accident,
the target population group must be specified and the required
measures must be determined. The time sequence of decision-making
activities in the event of an accident is shown in Figure 3. Be-
fore decisions about countermeasures can be made, it is necessary
ACCIDENT
MONITORING ANALYSIS AND COUNTER-
LL DECISION LL MEASURES~ MAKINGInformation Consideration • Prealert
• Maximum dose • Possibilities • Alert
• Relative dose • Cost-benefit • Restrictionsdistribution analysis
• Tablets
• Evacuation
o TIME
Figure 3. The time sequence of actions that should be taken in
the event of a maximum credible accident (MCA) at a
nuclear power plant. The arrows indicate requirements
for telecommunications.
to estimate the probable maximum doses in the absence of counter-
measures and the territorial distribution of these doses. The
results of cost-benefit analyses of each countermeasure alterna-
tive should be inputs to the decision-making process.
During normal operation, when there is underpressure in the
hermetic expansion space, radioactive releases into the atmos-
phere can be measured by the stack monitoring system. This is
not possible in the case of a MCA, because the release would
involve leakage in the expansion space walls. In such a situa-
tion involving overpressure in the expansion space, the only way
to determine off-site doses is to measure the actual dose dis-
tribution in the environs of the station. The collection of
meteorological data for use in atmospheric diffusion calculations
is very important, for the calculations yield an extrapolated
dose distribution for points that cannot be measured directly.
As shown in Table 2, there are several methods for measuring
probable iodine inhalation doses. The best method is the continu-
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Table 2. Quality of information provided by various methods
for measuring probable iodine inhalation doses.
Quality of information
provided
Method
Maximum
dose
Relative dose
distribution
Time required
(hours)
1- 3
1- 3
O. 1
0.2-0.4
0.2
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Poor
Moderate
None
None
Moderate
Poor
Measurement of
wind direction
and velocity.
Analysis of wind
data and Pasquill
category.
Meteorological
measurements and
surface contami-
nation measure-
ment after the
accident.
Meteorological
measurements and
continuous air
sampling during
the accident.
Meteorological
measurements and
iodine telemetry.
Meteorological
measurements and
use of the iodine
and gamma dose
telemetric _syste_m--,-.__~._oo~ c.:;_oo~ O. 2-0.4
ous measurement of the time integrated radioiodine concentration.
The continuous-operation wide-range telemetric iodine monitor
provides the most rapid and reliable means for calculating prob-
able iodine inhalation doses. If the measuring points are at
appropriate locations, from the point of view of population den-
sity, this instrument provides a considerable portion of the
monitoring data needed for decision making in the event of an
accident at a nuclear reactor.
Using the cross-wind iodine distribution calculated for
actual weather conditions (in terms of wind data and Pasquill
categories), it is possible to estimate the maximum dose and the
dose distribution between the monitoring points, as shown in
Figure 4. But this extrapolation may be inadequate for high
stability categories (Pasquill categories E and F). One possible
way to increase the accuracy of extrapolation is to use more
monitors; however, the cost of a large number of such monitors
would be very high. Also, for a given stability category, the
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DOSE
Maximum
dose
Dose ----t----------,
at B
Dose
at A --+---~,
A B CROSS-WIND
DISTANCE
Figure 4. The cross-wind distribution of calculated iodine
doses under maximum credible accident (MCA) weather
conditions fitted to measured values at points A and
B. The shaded area indicates possible uncertainty
in dose values.
intensity of gamma radiation has a broader distribution than
does iodine (see Figure 5). Therefore parallel measurement of
the integrated iodine concentration and the gamma dose at the
same points can decrease the cost and improve the accuracy of
the accident dosimetry monitoring system.
DOSE
(relative
units)
A B CROSS-WIND
DISTANCE
Figure 5. Iodine (curve 1) and gamma dose (curve 2) distributions
under maximum credible accident (MCA) meteorological
conditions.
234
Table 3. Main components of the off-site monitoring system
serving the Paks nuclear power station.
Component
Used in the case of
normal releases
Used in the case of
accidental releases
+
Gamma radiation only
Release measuring
system (stack monitor)
Meteorological tower
(120 m high)
Telemetry system
Other control stations
(tacky cloth collec-
tors, thermolumines-
cent dosimeters
(TLDs) )
Other samples
Mobile on-site gamma-
spectrometry equip-
ment
Roving car (which
records dose-
intensity and con-
tamination, reads
TLDs, and assesses
tacky cloth collec-
tors)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
The choice of the distance of the monitoring stations from
the plant involves two conflicting requirements: if the distance
is small fewer monitors are required to achieve a given accuracy
of the cross-sectional extrapolation; this implies less accuracy
for larger downwind distances. Conversely, if the distance is
large, more monitors are needed to achieve a given level of ac-
curacy, but greater accuracy is possible at large downwind dis-
tances. Generally the optimum distance seems to be from 1 to
3 km, but this depends very much on the local situation and
requirements.
The collection of dosimetric and meteorological data by
means of a telemetric system, as described above, makes it pos-
sible to estimate the maximum dose and relative dose distribution
in a very short time--about half an hour. This information then
may become a basis for decision making concerning countermeasures
by responsible authorities at the scene of a nuclear accident.
The accident dosimetric monitoring system at the Paks nuclear
power station is based on the telemetric iodine and gamma monitor-
ing system described above. Table 3 provides additional informa-
tion on the most important components of the system, and their
use in the case of normal and accidental releases.
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MAIN RESULTS OF THE GERMAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RISK STUDY
Hans-Jurgen Danzmann
Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit, FRG
INTRODUCTION
When a utility files an appJ.ication for the construction and
operation of a nuclear power plant, the responsible authorities
have to examine whether the necessary precautions have been taken,
in accordance with the state of the art, to prevent any damage
that may result from the construction and operation of the plant.
This includes the demonstration that operational discharges of
radioactive effluents will be kept as low as possible, even if
they are already below the acceptable limits, and that accidental
releases will be limited in such a way that neither personal in-
juries nor property damage are likely.
These precautions against damage require comprehensive acci-
dent analyses. In such analyses, it must be demonstrated that
a plant's safety features are capable of coping with possible
accidents. For this purpose, plant design is based on the great-
est loads. A simultaneous failure of the redundant safety fea-
tures is considered to be so unlikely that it is not taken into
account in the design.
Nevertheless, and irrespective of the individual nuclear
licensing procedures, attempts have been made to estimate the
consequences of extremely unlikely accidents such as might result
from the failure of safety features. However, these analyses
covered only one aspect of the risk of reactor accidents. Another
aspect is the probabiZity of such accidents, since risk includes
both the extent of damage and its probability.
The US Reactor Safety Study (USAEC 1975), the so-called
Rasmussen Report, was the first comprehensive risk study to con-
sider both the scale of damage associated with nuclear accidents,
and the probability of such accidents. The study consisted of
a systematic investigation of the accident risk posed by two
235
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typical US nuclear power plants (a boiling water and a pressurized
water reactor) and an extrapolation of the results to the total
number of plants in the country.
PURPOSE AND TASK OF THE GERMAN RISK STUDY
Immediately upon publication of the Rasmussen Report, its
results were studied with great interest by other countries en-
gaged in the peaceful use of atomic energy. The question was
raised as to how far the results may be applicable to the condi-
tions prevailing in other countries. Although, in principle, the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the US use the same type
of reactor, i.e., the light-water reactor, there are important
differences:
As far as engineered features are concerned, the US reference
plants differ from German plants in several ways. Differences
in design and function of the safety features are of major sig-
nificance for a risk assessment.
The population density in the Federal Republic of
far greater than in the US. The density is about
greater in the vicinity of nuclear power plants.
density is about 11 times greater.
Both factors are of great importance in the determination
of risk and require separate investigations for quantification
purposes. About six months after the publication of the Rasmussen
Report, the Federal Minister of Research and Technology awarded
a contract for a German study, as part of the Reactor Safety Re-
search Program. The Cologne-based Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicher-
heit (GRS) was the main contractor, and Prof. Adolf Birkhofer,
one of its Executive Directors, was entrusted with the scientific
management of the project. GRS prepared the event tree and failure
tree analyses for the accidents, as well as the descriptions of
core meltdown accidents and the determinations of radioactive
releases.
Other institutions entrusted with important tasks included
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (which prepared the accident con-
sequence model and carried out the accident consequence calcula-
tions); Institut fur Unfallforschung des Technischer Uberwachungs-
Verein Rheinland in Cologne (which contributed to the emergency
response model), and the Gesellschaft fur Strahlen- und Umwelt-
forschung at Neuherberg near Munich (which established the dose-
response and dose-risk relationships) .
The objectives of the German Risk Study may be summarized
as follows:
To determine the risk posed by accidents at nuclear power
plants for the German population.
To help identify important areas for future research and de-
velopment projects in the field of reactor safety.
In addition, the Study offered an opportunity for testing the
applicability of probabilistic methods for safety evaluation.
237
Biblis B, a representative, operational 1300 MW pressurized
water reactor (PWR) plant served as a reference plant for investi-
gations of engineered plant features. For risk evaluation pur-
poses, all nuclear power plant sites in the FRG with light-water
reactors of 600 MW or more in operation, under construction, or
in the licensing process on July 1, 1977 were considered.
To meet these far-reaching objectives, the German Risk Study
was subdivided into two major phases. Phase A used a great num-
ber of the basic assumptions and methods contained in the Rasmussen
Report. Phase B, which is intended primarily for vigorous special
investigations, takes into account 'to a greater extent new method-
ological developments and recent results of reactor safety re-
search. The Federal Government desires the coooeration of addi-
tional institutions and groups in Phase B. -
APPROACH
The different steps of the investigations carried out within
the framework of the German Risk Study are depicted in Figure 1.
The first step was to identify initiating events that may lead
to radioactive releases to the environment. Different event trees
emerge from this exercise, depending on whether the required safety
systems are available or not. Event tree diagrams were drawn to
provide greater clarification. The separate trees involve dif-
ferent probabilities, which depend on the frequency of occurrence
of the initiating events and the availability of safety features.
Initiating events
Accident consequences
• Atmospheric dispersion
• Health effects
Risk assessment
Figure 1. Topics of analysis in the German Risk Study.
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The necessary reliability analyses were carried out with the aid
of failure trees.
Subsequent investigations focused on the processes involved
in the meltdown of the reactor core, the behavior of the molten
core, the behavior of the containment and its possible failure
modes, the transport of radioactivity inside the containment,
and finally releases of radioactivity to the environment. The
study group considered the dynamic processes inside the contain-
ment and determined the probabilities of the various failure
modes.
The space-dependent and time-dependent radioactive concen-
trations in the environment of the plant were calculated, taking
into account the weather-dependent dispersion of the radioactive
plume, and were used to determine individual doses. Based on
emergency operational responses that would occur as a function
of these exposures, reduced doses and the associated health ef-
fects to be expected as consequences of the accident were deter-
mined. Risk statements could then be presented based on the
numbers of fatalities and associated frequencies.
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS
Analyses of Engineered Plant Features
The investigation covered some 100 accident sequences that
can lead to radioactive releases. Table 1 shows the initiating
events that may lead to a core meltdown, their probabilities,
and the data for the associated probability of a failure of the
required system function. The frequency of core meltdown acci-
dents was determined to be about 1 in 10,000 per year.
The relative contributions of the various failure modes to
the initiation of a core meltdown are shown in Figure 2. The
greatest contribution to the core meltdown frequency is made by
a small break in a reactor coolant pipe when this is not countered
by the safety systems. There are two main reasons for this. On
the one hand, the frequency of a small break is relatively great,
and on the other hand, coping with such breaks requires substantial
manual interventions, which have a relatively high failure rate.
The second most important initiating event is the loss of off-
site power--but this ranks far behind the small pipe break. Large
pipe breaks playa subordinate role. In all, two-thirds of the
total frequency of core meltdowns are caused by human errors (see
Figure 3). Table 2 provides a survey of the release categories
that have been investigated and the associated release frequencies
(which are not identical with the core meltdown frequencies).
Determination of Accident Consequences
The determination of potentiaZ radiation doses was the first
step in the calculation of accident consequences. Concentrations
of radioactive materials in the air and on the ground were cal-
T
ab
le
1.
Su
m
m
ar
y
r
e
s
u
lt
s
o
f
th
e
e
v
e
n
t
tr
e
e
a
n
a
ly
si
s.
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
o
c
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
fa
il
u
re
o
c
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
in
it
ia
ti
n
g
e
v
e
n
t
o
f
r
e
q
u
ir
ed
s
a
fe
ty
c
o
r
e
m
e
lt
A
cc
id
en
t
p
er
r
e
a
c
to
r
y
ea
r
fu
n
ct
io
n
s
p
er
r
e
a
c
to
r
y
ea
r
in
it
ia
ti
n
g
e
v
e
n
t
P
1
P
2
P
3
=
P
1
.
P
2
L
ar
ge
LO
CA
2
.7
·
10
-4
1
.
7
·
10
-3
5
·
10
-7
M
ed
iu
m
LO
CA
8
·
10
-4
2
.3
•
10
-3
2
·
10
-6
S
m
al
l
LO
CA
2
.7
·
10
-3
2
.
1
·
10
-2
5.
7
·
10
-5
L
os
s
o
f
o
ff
-s
it
e
po
w
er
10
-1
10
-4
10
-5
(e
m
er
ge
nc
y
po
w
er
c
a
s
e
)
1
·
1
.3
·
1
.3
·
L
os
s
o
f
m
a
in
fe
ed
w
at
er
10
-1
10
-6
10
-6
s
u
p
p
ly
8
·
4
·
3
·
E
m
er
ge
nc
y
po
w
er
c
a
s
e
w
it
h
10
-4
10
-2
10
-6
s
m
a
ll
le
ak
a
t
p
re
ss
u
ri
z
e
r
2
.7
·
2
.6
·
7
·
O
th
er
tr
a
n
s
ie
n
ts
w
it
h
10
-3
10
-3
10
-6
s
m
a
ll
le
ak
a
t
p
re
ss
u
ri
z
e
r
1
·
2
·
2
·
AT
W
S
e
v
e
n
ts
G
3
•
10
-5
3
·
10
-2
1
·
10
-6
G
A
n
ti
ci
p
at
ed
T
ra
n
si
en
ts
W
it
ho
ut
Sc
ra
m
N W '"
240
ak
urizer
,-
-
Small Ie
-
at press
-
60
20
<V
C>
~
C
<V
~
<V
0..
40
o
Large
LOCA
Medium
LOCA
Small
LOCA
Transients
Figure 2. The relative contribution of various accident-initiating
events to the probability of a core meltdown.
80
60
~
<V
C>
e
c
OJ
~
<V
0.. 40
63%
23%
14%
II
Independent
component
failures
Common
mode
failures
Human
error
Figure 3. The relative contribution of various failure modes to
the probability of a core meltdown.
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Table 2. Times of release and probabilities of release by release
category.
3
2
4
5
2 3
·
10-6
25 2
·
10-5
25 7
·
10- 5
0 1
·
10-4
0 1
·
10- 3
Time of
release Probability b(hr after per reactor year
accident) (mean)
2
·
10-6
6
·
10- 7
2 6
·
10-7
Core melt, stearn explosion
Core melt, large contain-
ment leak (300 rom diameter)
Core melt, medium contain-
ment leak (80 rom diameter)
Core melt, small contain-
ment leak (25 rom diameter) ,
late containment overpres-
sure failure
Core melt, late containment
overpressure failure, fail-
ure of filter systems
Core melt, late containment
overpressure failure
Design basis accident,
large containment leak
(300 mm diameter)
~8_a D~esign basis accident
6
Release
category Description
~Release categories 7 and 8 are not core meltdown accidents.
The probabilities include 10% contributions from adjacent release categories.
culated, and these doses supplied the criteria for establishing
necessary protective actions and countermeasures. The expected
doses were then calculated, based on the assumed implementation
of dose-reducing measures.
With the aid of a sinusoidal dose-response relationship for
early fatalities (threshold value: 100 rad; LD50: 510 rad; LDgg :
770 rad), and a linear dose-response relationship for late soma-
tic effects (risk factor of approximately 10-ij/rem), the expected
doses were then used to calculate early and late fatalities. In
addition, the genetically significant collective doses were deter-
mined. Figure 4 shows the cumulative frequency distribution of
early fatalities per year for 25 plants, and Figure 5 shows the
distribution of late fatalities. The dashed lines indicate 90%
confidence limits. The maximum number of collective fatalities
as calculated in the course of the study is 14,500 early deaths
and 104,000 late deaths. The two figures belong to different
accident sequences. For both events, the frequency of occurrence
is 1 in 2,000,000,000 per year. The associated accident sequences
242
10-3 I
10-4
10- 5
~ 10- 6 -',
,'\
~
"-
10- 7
10-8
1O-9J
I
f
10- 10
I
I
I
,
~
I
I~
x
'Probability per year that N, number of early fatalities,;;' X
Figure 4. Plot showing the complementary cumulative distribution
function for early fatalities per year for 25 plants.
The dashed lines indicate 90% confidence limits.
represent a combination of the most adverse release conditions,
weather conditions, and population distributions.
The number of late fatalities as calculated in the study is
relatively great. Even for events with a probability of 1 in
100,000 per year, 54,000 late deaths were calculated. On the
one hand, this is due to the fact that late fatalities were cal-
culated on the basis of a linear dose-response relationship
without a threshold value, i.e., in the conservative approach
taken it was assumed that late somatic effects will be caused by
any dose. On the other hand--apart from very serious accidents,
which are characterized by an early containment failure and great
radioactive releases--the overwhelming percentage of late fatal-
ities was determined to be caused by specific weather conditions;
these conditions affect relatively large areas, and, after large
releases, lead to concentrations below the action levels for the
introduction of countermeasures.
10
'
243
10 1 I
I
I
-,
I
10-2 - r
10- 3 J i-L
10- 4
. 10 5)(
I~~\
<:
CC 10-6
10- 7
10 9---1
I
I
10--1O~_--r--_----.,-----r---.---,J----+­
1
x
'Probability p~r year that N, number of late fatalities,;;' X
Figure 5. Plot showing the complementary cumulative distribution
function for late fatalities per year for 25 plants.
The dashed lines indicate 90% confidence limits.
THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE MODEL
In the emergency operational response model employed in the
German Risk Study, the spatial distributions of dose rates in
the open air, i.e., the so-called potential doses, were calculated
first. For cases in which doses exceeded the given reference
limits, selected isodose lines were used to delimit areas in which
different measures would be implemented.
The model contains 5 areas (B1, B2, C, D1, and D2) deter-
mined using a dose-dependent approach. Area A, which covers the
immediate vicinity of the plant, was defined to be independent
of any dose and thus to be of constant size. The rigid delinea-
tion of this area is due to the occurrence of high doses and the
fact that large releases of radioactivity and unfavorable disper-
sion conditions make it impossible to carry out and evaluate
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radioactivity and dose rate measurements. The area is shaped
like a keyhole and consists of a 30° sector with a depth of 8 km
in the direction of the dispersion of the radioactive plume, and
a full circle with a radius of 2.4 km, i.e., a total area of
33 km 2 . The inclusion of a full circle is necessary, for turbu-
lence and diffusion may spread radioactivity in all directions
over limited distances and direct radiation from the plume is
also emitted in all directions over limited distances. The study
group postulated that emergency preparedness and evacuation plans
exist for Area A.
Following the establishment of the areas, doses were again
calculated, taking into account the protective actions and coun-
termeasures, and fatalities were determined on this basis. The
number of early fatalities depends on bone marrow doses, while
late fatalities depend on whole-body doses. The isodose lines
delimiting the areas refer either to the potential whole-body
dose or to the potential bone marrow dose. The boundaries of
the areas were set so that early fatalities would only occur in
Areas A, B1 , and B2. Figure 6 shows the subdivision of emergency
response areas used in the study.
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Dose (whole body 30 yr) > 25 rad
Dose (whole body 30 yr) < 25 rad
Figure 6. The risk areas used in the German Risk Study.
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES
The following protective actions and countermeasures were
considered in the study:
Taking shelter in houses;
Evacuation;
Rapid relocation;
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Relocation;
Decontamination; and
Temporary prohibition of the consumption of local agricultural
products.
Table 3 shows the apportionment of protective actions and coun-
termeasures by area and their time schedule in the German Risk
Study.
Table 3. Emergency measures by risk area and time
following the accident.
Risk Time after Emergency
area accident measure
A 2 hr Shelter
2-12 hr Evacuation
B1 2 hr Shelter14 hr Fast relocation
B2 No shelter14 hr Fast relocation
C No shelter
> 30 days Relocation
(5 km2/day)
0 1 30 days Decontamination[Dose (30 years)
< 25 rad after
decontamina-
tion]
The Initial Protective Action Phase
An initial phase of 2 hours was postulated for initiating
actions (informing official decision makers, meeting staffs,
sounding of alerts, informing the population, etc.). The stan-
dard emergency signal would be used to warn the population; in
the FRG this is the one-minute howling sound of a siren. Loud-
speaker vans are used in Area A and, if appropriate, in Area B1to ask the population to take shelter in buildings and switch
on radio or television sets. It was assumed that 3% of the
population would ignore the warning and remain in the open. In
cases where radioactivity reaches certain parts of the areas
within 2 hours after the beginning of the accident, a mixed dis-
tribution of the population in large and small buildings and in
the open was assumed and an averaged shielding factor was used.
PRE 14_0
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Emergency Operational Response Measures in Area A
The aim of emergency operational response measures for Area
A was to prevent or limit acute injury to persons. As a con-
sequence of German licensing practices, Area A will generally
be rural. It was assumed that after 2 hours 65% of the oopula-
tion would have retreated into larger buildings or the c~liars
of small buildings, and 32% would be in smaller buildings but
not in cellars. The 3% who would stay out in the open during
the initial phase were assumed not to retreat into houses later.
The protective effect of buildings consists of lowered ex-
posure (as compared with the open air) to ionizing radiation
from the air or from the ground, since distances to the radio-
active materials are greater; the brickwork, and--in the case of
cellars--the ground, also act as shields. The following protec-
tive factor was defined for the dose-reducing effect of buildings:
Protective Factor Dose outside the buildinaDose inside the bUilding~
The protective factor associated with protected places in larger
buildings or in cellars of smaller buildings was assumed to be
10 for ground radiation, and 6.7 for plume radiation. The pro-
tective factor associated with protected places other than cel-
lars in smaller buildings was assumed to be 5 for ground radiation
and 3.3 for plume radiation.
In Area A the highest dose rates are reached in almost any
kind of weather, and there is no time to carry out and evaluate
measurements. This is why it was postulated that the emergency
control staff would order an evacuation in any case.
The study group considered two parameters with respect to
the time needed for evacuation: the time until people begin to
drive away in their own cars or in other transport vehicles, and
the time until they leave the danger zone. It was assumed (con-
servatively) that the maximum value of the first parameter will
be 12 hours, i.e., that the inhabitants will begin their trips
between 2 and 14 hours after the beginning of the accident. In
all cases it was assumed that the travel time to the boundaries
of the danger zone is 1.5 hours. The travel period was considered
to be an unshielded stay in the open, involving the same local
dose rate as at the place of residence. Because of the direction
of evacuation (which will be a combination of the directions
'away from the plant' and 'out of the danger zone'), this will
generally correspond to the highest dose rate.
The return of the population is scheduled for the time when
radioactive decay, weather conditions, and decontamination mea-
sures have reduced the existing ground contamination to a level
such that the resulting potential whole-body dose over a period
of 30 years will not exceed 25 rad. This accumulated dose is
approximately 7.6 times the dose originating from natural back-
ground radiation. Residual contamination may cause late fatalities
among both persons now living and those born after the accident.
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The measures taken in Area A will affect an average of
6,800 persons (206 inhabitants/km2 ). In the most unfavorable
case, they will affect 42,000 persons (1,270 inhabitants/km2).
Emergency Operational Response Measures
in Areas B1 and B2
According to the calculations carried out in the course of
the German Risk Study, the necessary emergency response measures
will remain restricted to Area A in the majority of all accidents
involving radioactive releases. Larger areas will be affected
only in 3 (out of a total of 8) release categories and in only
about 1% of all core meltdown accidents. To handle these cases,
the study group defined Area B; it envelops the 30 0 sector of
Area A in the direction of dispersion, and is limited by a poten-
tial 100 rad isodose line for a bone marrow dose resulting from
ground radiation accumulated over 7 days. Area B1 extends 24 km
in the direction of dispersion. Just as for Area A, it was pos-
tulated that the population of Area B1 will be asked to take
shelter inside houses.
The study group chose the term 'rapid relocation' to describe
the subsequent movement of the population out of Area B1. Taking
a conservative approach, it was assumed that no preparation exists
for such an action. For this reason the rapid relocation phase
was assumed to begin 14 hours after the occurrence of the acci-
dent at the earliest, i.e., only when evacuation of Area A was
complete.
To calculate overall doses it is necessary to know the dura-
tion of travel during rapid relocation. The study group defined
three different types of areas for this purpose: urban, average
population density, and rural. A computer code for the simulation
of population movements was used to determine a traveling time
spectrum for each type of area. The spectra were approximated
in such a way that a given traveling time was allocated to one-
third of the population of each type of area. As in the case of
Area A, travel periods in Area B1 were considered to be unpro-
tected stays in the open. Added to the traveling times was a
uniform preparatory time of 0.25 hr with unshielded ground radia-
tion. To determine the time of the return of the population, the
same limit for accumulated potential whole-body dose from ground
radiation (25 rad over 30 years) was used as in Area A. The
subsequent late fatalities to be expected were also taken into
consideration.
For 2 release categories it was calculated that the 100
rad isodose line will extend more than 24 km from the plant in
the direction of dispersion, under 4% or 10% of weather condi-
tions (depending on the release category). This area, beyond
the 24 km mark, was termed B2 in the study. No emergency pre-
paredness measures exist for this area in any case. To be on
the safe side, the study group assumed that the inhabitants in
Area B2 would pursue their normal activities until the beginning
of the rapid relocation phase. Both rapid relocation and return
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to Area B2 were treated as for Area B1 . The mean size and maxi-
mum size of Areas Bl and B2 were calculated to be 14 km2 and
379 km 2 , respectively. The average number of persons affected
would be 4000 (226 inhabitants/km2 ). In the most unfavorable
case the number would increase to about 1 million (2600 inhabi-
tants/km2 ) .
Emergency Operational Response Measures in Area C
According to the calculations of the Risk Study, no doses
involving early fatalities will be reached beyond Area B2. How-
ever, areas were determined that could not be decontaminated
sufficiently, with respect to almost all release categories.
Thus, a temporary relocation of the population to reduce late
fatalities was also considered in the model. Area C was defined
to envelop Areas Bl and B2. Area C is limited by a 250 rad iso-
dose line for the potential whole-body dose, which would result
from the accumulation of external ground radiation over 30 years.
It was also postulated that a long-term stay of persons in
this area would only be acceptable if the potential whole-body
dose has been reduced to 25 rad. For cases that necessitate the
demarcation of Area C, the study group postulated a relocation
beginning after 30 days. Relocation begins in the subareas clos-
est to the plant and then extends to greater distances. The
doses received until termination of the relocation measure were
estimated assuming a mixed distribution of the population in
large buildings, small buildings, and in the open air, along with
the associated shielding factors.
The study group assumed that decontamination would be carried
out only if, or not until, the decontamination factor
DF Radioactivity before decontaminationRadioactivity after decontamination
--which is needed to arrive at 25 rad for the potential whole-
body dose resulting from ground radiation and accumulated over
30 years--is smaller than 10. Thus decontamination activities
are carried out as soon as the potential dose caused by ground
radiation falls below 250 rad in subareas of Area C as a result
of radioactive decay and weather-related effects.
After the limit of 25 rad is reached in 30 years, the popu-
lation will return. The collective dose is calculated as before,
on the basis of the dose received during the periods before re-
location and after return. Late fatalities to be expected from
residual contamination, including fatalities of persons born
after the accident, are also calculated for Area C.
According to model calculations, the mean size and maximum
size of Area Care 11 km 2 and 5700 km2 , respectively. Thus, the
mean number of persons concerned is about 2900 (260 inhabitants/
km 2 ); in the most unfavorable case this number will increase to
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about 2.9 million (510 inhabitants/km2). Large areas and great
numbers of persons were involved only where the dispersion of
radioactive material extends into densely populated regions during
rainy weather conditions. The fact that in densely populated
urban areas a great deal of radioactive material will flow into
the sewers with the rainwater was not taken into account.
Emergency Operational Response Measures
in Areas D1 and D2
If the potential whole-body dose accumulated over 30 years
as a result of ground radiation is between 250 and 25 rad, this
value can be reduced to less than 25 rad in all areas by means
of a decontamination factor ~ 10. For this reason the study
group defined Area D1' which envelops Area C and is limited by
the whole-body ground-radiation 3D-year isodose line of 25 rad.
It was assumed that no population movements occur here and that
the inhabitants pursue their normal activities at all times.
Decontamination activities were postulated to go into effect in
all of Area D1 after only 30 days. The late fatalities to be
expected because of this delay and the remaining residual con-
tamination, were taken into account.
The area surrounding Area D1 was termed D2. This area was
defined in accordance with the fact that the potential whole-
body dose resulting from ground radiation and accumulated over
30 years is below 25 rad. The only measure that was considered
involves restrictions in the consumption of local agricUltural
products. For this area, expected late fatalities were also
taken into account.
EVALUATION
In spite of differing engineered plant features and differing
site conditions, the results of the German Risk Study are similar
to those of the Rasmussen Study. Considering the present state
of the art, however, the inherent significance of every risk
analysis is restricted. Due to the existing uncertainties, it
is not possible to provide precise risk calculations, but rather
only risk assessments.
The dependence of the German Risk Study on models becomes
clear in the investigation of event sequences associated with
radioactive releases. Models were used that describe core melt-
down, radioactivity release, dispersion, and biological radiation
effects. The lack of detailed knowledge was compensated by sim-
plifying and pessimistic assumptions, so as to cover the most
unfavorable case.
The accident sequence calculations carried out in the study
permit refined evaluation of the different accident parameters
that can decisively affect the scale of accident-related damage.
The knowledge that was acquired from the calculations can be
used for future emergency planning and preparedness programs.
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The study provides an idea of the period of time during which
operational response is necessary and possible.
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NOISE DIAGNOSIS - A METHOD FOR EARLY DETECTION OF FAILURES
IN A NUCLEAR PLANT
Hans-Fritz Brinckmann
Central Institute of Nuclear Research, GDR
During the past several years a large number of possible
failures in nuclear plants have been analyzed. As a result of
these investigations, new safety concepts have been developed
and implemented in nuclear plants--frequently without considera-
tion of their costs. There is a need for such investigations to
pay more attention to methods for early detection of malfunctions;
such methods include computerized data processing and evaluation.
Until now failure analysis has had the character of a postmortem
procedure: in the framework of a given cause--consequence model,
a computer generally calculates the set of all causes {u} = U of
a perturbation that has occurred in a plant at time t s . This
operation is shown schematically in part (a) of Figure 1. If
the control process for the detection of failures is implemented
earlier in the time scale, at time t a rather than t s , to detect
an incipient failure, then we may speak of early perception of
malfunctions. This method involves the quasi-simultaneous
calculation of the possible set of consequences {f} = F associated
with the perturbation. This is shown in part (b) of Figure 1.
Noise diagnosis constitutes one method for early detection
of plant failures. The method is based on the fact that nearly
all undesired processes in a nuclear power plant make a mea-
surable contribution to the noise portion of signals. Well-
known examples of undesired processes in pressurized water
reactors include core-barrel movement, the vibration of control
elements, the appearance of loose parts in the coolant flow,
and the process of coolant boiling. Each of these processes
has been implicated in past nuclear plant failures.
In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) P. Liewers and his
colleagues have introduced noise analysis systems into the primary
circuit of WWER-440 pressurized water reactors (PWR) (Buttler et
aZ. 1977). The most progressive version (RAS-II) has become
a prototype for research and routine investigations. This
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diagnostic system allows the analysis of signals from about
120 detectors. Half of these are neutron flux detectors in
in-core and ex-core positions within the reactor. In addition,
piezoelectric detectors around the vessel measure accelerations
and pressure fluctuations; for instance, accelerations at the
top of the control rods are measured. The diagnostic system
also includes the use of piezoelectric detectors to observe
the main circulation pumps.
Of course the diagnostic system involves much more than
delivering a set of signals. Conventional measuring techniques
take only momentary averages into account; the noise portion (i.e.,
signal fluctuations in relation to the momentary averages, within
the limits of error) is not considered. The diagnostic system
under discussion here extracts useful information from noise
signals.
Figure 2 shows a scheme for the evaluation of noise signals.
Noise information from the different detectors with their preampli-
fiers is transferred by cable to the central main amplifiers for
final signal conditioning. Programming units make it possible
to observe signals or a combination of signals and to test them
acoustically or visually in a display. The signals can be
evaluated with and without frequency limitations; they can also
be recorded on magnetic tape or transmitted to a process com-
puter for further analysis.
Well-known correlation methods, especially the spectral
power density concept, are used to analyze noise signals. Assump-
tions about the transfer function of the process under considera-
tion have to be introduced to evaluate the signal spectra model.
Parameters of the process can be investigated by fitting estimated
spectra to this mathematical model.
In the course of using the noise diagnosis system, two
shortcomings of its operation within a control system have
become evident. First, a specialist must be present to interpret
the noise information. Second, the advantage of detecting
suspicious situations early is partly lost because noise analysis
is performed off-line. Investigations have now been started for
monitoring selected disturbances to quickly provide initial
information to the operator.
The utility of noise diagnosis may be demonstrated by
the following example. The control elements of our PWRs are
capable of oscillating like a pendulum (Hennig and Grunwald
1978). Therefore neutron noise is composed of space-dependent
contributions from all moving elements. Through the application
of a special correlation technique to signals from the installed
noise instrumentation, it is possible to separate out the neutron
noise that is correlated with the movement of the control ele-
ments under consideration. This is possible even when all the
elements are oscillating in a similar manner (Grabner et al.
1977). As shown in Figure 3, correlated neutron fluctuations
at different detector positions D can be directly determined as
an average function in a time domain. In the form of a Lissajous
253
.. t
F - I f/
~ Uc lu}
I'I--l'--~--­
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
(h) _-.;Ir--__+- .;- .....
Figure 1. Time scales for accident analysis: (a) 'post-
mortem analysis after the occurrence of an accident;
(b) early detection of malfunctions.
figure they give an instructive impression of the trajectory
of the center of gravity of the moving elements (Grunwald et al.
1978). However, this method is too complicated for continuous
monitoring.
Sound signals from the guide tubes of control elements are
better suited for a simple monitoring procedure. These signals
can be used to classify each element by degree of suspicion.
Using continuous monitoring, it has been possible to avoid put-
ting control rods into a critical position, as well as to prolong
the time of operation. All rods are now controlled by a hardware
monitoring device.
Monitors for coolant pumps are currently being developed,
and monitors for loose parts are being tested. All monitors
are hybrid-type devices and contain the same parts, such as
passband filters, amplitude or sign discriminators, pulse
counters, shift registers for one-bit information, and computer
links. This is important for keeping the costs of monitors
low.
Before concluding this discussion, I should mention that
after an accident has occurred noise signals can supply crisis
management teams with valuable information about the conditions
of reactor components; this was shown during the Harrisburg
event. C.W. Mayo (1979) drew attention to this possibility in
a report presented to the 12th Informal Meeting on Reactor Noise
Analysis.
Of course, when a reactor is in a shutdown mode the spectra
of most noise detectors differ from those obtained during opera-
tion. But investigations into these differences, for instance
in the case of in-core detectors, can provide important core
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status information. The usual noise diagnostic methods can
also be successfully applied in a shutdown situation if noise
spectra describing normal behavior are available for comparison.
In the case of the TMI-2 accident, observation of the bubble
volume in the upper part of the reactor vessel was of particular
interest; calculations concerning the behavior of the bubble
and its eventual disappearance could be confirmed by observed
changes in the pressure noise.
These examples show that noise diagnosis can become an
important method for early detection of malfunctions in nuclear
power plant operation. Noise signals can also be important for
obtaining information on the status of the plant after the
occurrence of an accident.
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